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Abstract
This thesis investigates what motivates people to protect the environment
and protect themselves from environmental risks. Specifically, the essays aim
to enhance our understanding of how individual and situational factors drive
decision-making in three areas that lie at the heart of behavioural environ-
mental economics: contributions towards protecting public goods like biodi-
versity, choices under risk from environmental externalities like air pollution,
and cooperation over shared common pool resources. The overarching goal
of the thesis is to unpack the complex processes behind decision making, to
identify policy-relevant mechanisms to promote both planetary and human
health and wellbeing. Given this, the essays adopt an experimental approach
to study themes like pro-social behaviour, affect, risk preferences, beliefs and
social influence, in conjunction with different information and incentive-based
interventions.
Paper 1 explores the direct impact of different types of audiovisual informa-
tion through the charismatic megafauna and outrage effect on contributions
to biodiversity conservation. It also signals that mixed emotions could be
drivers of pro-sociality in the conservation context. Paper 2 charts the indirect
spillover effects of these video interventions on subsequent pro-environmental
behavioural intentions. Taken together, the papers highlight the potential of
the narratives in videos to encourage public engagement and conservation ac-
tion to address the sixth mass extinction event.
Papers 3 and 4 explore the psycho-social determinants of avoidance behaviours
amongst active travellers, namely cyclists in London. In Paper 3, risk percep-
tion rather than risk preferences seem to be a better predictor of avoidance
behaviour in the context and sample studied. Domain-specific risk preferences
via the willingness to take health risks showed more behavioural validity as
regards risk-taking while cycling, and the evidence for cross-context valid-
ity was not strong. Paper 4 showed that underlying beliefs about air quality
determine how individuals respond to social norm messaging. These results
collectively suggest that subjective beliefs about environmental risks influence
individual choice under uncertainty in the context of air pollution avoidance.
Paper 5 explores how the peer monitoring and punishment network structure
affects cooperation in a commons dilemma. The results suggest that although
free-riders are punished in all networks, incomplete and connected networks
elicit lower punishment towards those who deviate less than the socially op-
timal amount. The complete network elicits more punishment, leaving this
network as the least efficient at least in the short-run. Although individu-
als are initially optimistic about others pro-sociality across networks, beliefs
converge to the selfish equilibrium more rapidly in complete networks. The
results show that the underlying socio-spatial structure of peer monitoring
institutions has welfare implications.
6
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Research aim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Summary and contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Notes on intersecting themes and methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4 Notes on the thesis structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2 Seeing red, but acting green? Experimental evidence on charitable giv-
ing and affect towards biodiversity 15
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3 Experimental procedure and design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4 Study 1 results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.5 Study 2 results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.6 Discussion and conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.7 Tables and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3 Do biodiversity conservation videos cause pro-environmental spillover
effects? 59
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.2 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.3 Experimental design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.5 Discussion and conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.6 Tables and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4 Taking ‘measured’ risks while cycling: Field evidence on risk-taking and
air pollution avoidance 92
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.2 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.3 Experimental method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
i
4.5 Discussion and conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.6 Tables and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5 Optimistic about air quality, but avoiding polluted air? Unpacking the
effects of social norm messages 142
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.2 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
5.3 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
5.4 Experimental design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
5.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
5.6 Limitations and thoughts for future research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
5.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
5.8 Tables and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
6 The effect of imperfect monitoring and punishment networks in a com-
mon pool resource dilemma 181
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
6.2 Conceptual framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
6.3 Experimental design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
6.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
6.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
6.6 Tables and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
7 Conclusions 219
A Literature Appendix for Chapter 1 225
A.1 Market failures and Environmental economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
A.2 Behavioural failures and Behavioural economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
A.3 Towards a convergent analysis of market and behavioural failures: Be-
havioural environmental economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
A.4 Locating the papers in existing debates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
B Data Appendix for Chapter 2 254
B.1 Estimation strategy: Cragg-Hurdle model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
B.2 Additional tables and figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
C Data Appendix for Chapter 3 263
ii
D Data Appendix for Chapter 4 269
D.1 Behavioural validity I: Risk-taking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
D.2 Behavioural validity II: Avoidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
D.3 Cross-context validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
E Data Appendix for Chapter 5 285
E.1 Sample characteristics and balance tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
E.2 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
F Data Appendix for Chapter 6 290
G Supplementary materials for Chapters 2 and 3 306
G.1 Video scripts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
G.2 Video links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
G.3 Sequence of photos with links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
G.4 Snapshots of Experimental interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
G.5 Debrief sheet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
H Supplementary materials for Chapters 4 and 5 315
H.1 Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
I Supplementary materials for Chapter 6 325
I.1 Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
I.2 Snapshots of experimental interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
iii
List of Tables
1.1 Summary of methods, themes and interventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1 Impact of Media Content on Donations in Study 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.2 Impact of Public Recognition on Donations in Study 1 . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.3 Impact of videos on affect in Study 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.1 Conceptual framework and experimental design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.2 Direct effect on donations: Media content on anthropogenic cause of en-
dangerment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.3 Spillover effects on WTP a green fee and WTD time: Treatment effect of
media exposure and media content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.4 Heterogeneous spillover effects: Pro-social subjects . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.1 Binswager-Eckel-Grossman (BEG) task: lottery choices, expected payoffs,
and risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.2 Sample characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.3 Descriptive statistics: Risk measures and (aggregate) dependent variables 132
4.4 Risk measures and risk-taking while cycling (aggregate) . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.5 Risk measures and risk-taking behaviours I: Red lights, Music and No lights134
4.6 Risk measures and risk-taking behaviours II: Mobile, No helmet and Alcohol135
4.7 Risk measures and air pollution avoidance (aggregate) . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.8 Risk measures and air pollution avoidance behaviours I: Avoiding Main
roads and Peak travel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
4.9 Risk measures and air pollution avoidance behaviours II: Avoiding stop-
ping behind vehicles and biking short distances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
4.10 Correlations between different risk measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.1 Treatment effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
5.2 Heterogeneous treatment effects: Perceived Air Quality in London (PAQL) 180
6.1 Descriptive statistics by network and node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
6.2 Outcomes across networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
6.3 Outcomes across nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
iv
6.4 Received punishment across networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
6.5 Difference between beliefs and other’s (mean) appropriation across nodes 218
B.1 Description of variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
B.2 Pre-treatment behaviour and socio-demographic characteristics by treat-
ment group: Mean and standard deviation (S.D.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
B.3 Donation with covariates: Study 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
B.4 Affect with covariates: Study 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
B.5 Implicit word associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
C.1 Description of variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
C.2 Summary statistics by treatment groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
C.3 Direct effect: Media content on donations (with individual controls) . . . 266
C.4 Indirect effect: Media content on WTP green fee and WTD time (with
individual controls) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
C.5 Heterogeneous spillover effects: Pro-social subjects as past donors (with
individual controls) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
D.1 Risk measures and risk-taking while cycling: Full specifications . . . . . . 275
D.2 Risk measures and risk-taking behaviours I: Full specifications . . . . . . 276
D.3 Risk measures and risk-taking behaviours II: Full specifications . . . . . . 277
D.4 Risk measures and avoidance (aggregate): Full specifications . . . . . . . 279
D.5 Risk measures and avoidance behaviours I: Full specifications . . . . . . . 280
D.6 Risk measures and avoidance behaviours II: Full specifications . . . . . . 281
D.7 Cross-stability I: BEG, SOEP-G and SOEP-H . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
D.8 Cross-context validity II: Lights, Helmet and Facemasks . . . . . . . . . . 283
D.9 Cross-context validity III: Air pollution risk perception and risk measures 284
E.1 Balance on covariates I (with sample characteristics) . . . . . . . . . . . 286
E.2 Balance on covariates I (other pre-treatment baseline variables) . . . . . 287
E.3 Heterogeneous treatment effects: Perceived Air Quality in London (PAQL),
with individual controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288
E.4 Heterogeneous treatment effects: Perceived Air Quality in London (PAQL),
sub-group analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
F.1 Experimental parameters in relation to CPR literature . . . . . . . . . . 290
F.2 Individual attributes by treatment (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
F.3 Effect of beliefs on appropriation by network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
F.4 Completeness: Complete network versus Undirected circle . . . . . . . . . 293
F.5 Directedness: Undirected circle versus Directed circle . . . . . . . . . . . 294
F.6 Connectedness: Directed circle versus Directed line . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
v
F.7 Nodes in Complete network: N033 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
F.8 Nodes in Undirected circle network: N122 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
F.9 Nodes in Directed circle network: N211 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
F.10 Nodes in Directed line network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
F.11 Received punishment: Pooled sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
F.12 Deviation in beliefs and other’s (mean) appropriation by networks . . . . 305
H.1 Survey variables and balance on covariates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
vi
List of Figures
2.1 Average donations made by individuals (Study 1, N=377) . . . . . . . . 52
2.2 Share of individual donations over £0 (Study 1, N=377) . . . . . . . . . 52
2.3 Angry (Study 2, N = 177) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.4 Sad (Study 2, N = 177) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.5 Guilty (Study 2, N = 177) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.6 Sympathy (Study 2, N = 177) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.7 Happy (Study 2, N = 177) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.8 Calm (Study 2, N = 177) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.9 Interest (Study 2, N = 177) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.1 Charitable donations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.2 Willingness to pay (WTP) a green fee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.3 Willingness to Donate (WTD) time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.1 Distribution of responses for risk-taking while cycling: By behaviours . . 139
4.2 Distribution of responses for risk-taking while cycling: All behaviours (ag-
gregate) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
4.3 Distribution of responses for air pollution avoidance: By behaviours . . . 140
4.4 Distribution of responses for air pollution avoidance: All behaviours (ag-
gregate) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
5.1 Control and treatment group messages on air pollution health risks, avoid-
ance and face-masks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
5.2 Proportion of subjects choosing face-mask (ATE, N = 181) . . . . . . . . 178
5.3 Proportion of subjects choosing face-mask (ATT, N = 164) . . . . . . . . 178
5.4 Choice of face-mask regressed onto control versus normative message for
cyclists with Low and High Perceived Air Quality in London (PAQL) . . 180
6.1 Network treatments and properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
6.2 Appropriation by network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
6.3 Appropriation by node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
6.4 Received punishment by network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
vii
6.5 Received punishment by node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
6.6 Received punishment as share of punishment opportunities . . . . . . . . 212
6.7 Frequency of punishment received by deviation from Pareto equilibrium
and network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
6.8 Received punishment by deviation from Pareto equilibrium and network . 213
6.9 Payoffs by network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
6.10 Payoffs by node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
6.11 Belief’s over other’s appropriation by network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
6.12 Belief’s over other’s appropriation by node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
6.13 Deviation between other’s (mean) appropriation and beliefs by network . 216
6.14 Deviation between other’s (mean) appropriation and beliefs by node . . . 217
B.1 Distribution of donation for all observations (N=377) . . . . . . . . . . . 256
B.2 Reasons for not donating: Share of responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
D.1 Histogram of responses Binswanger-Eckel-Grossman lottery task (BEG) . 269
D.2 Histogram of responses to General risk attitude measure (SOEP-G) . . . 270
D.3 Histogram of responses to Health risk attitude measure (SOEP-H) . . . . 271
D.4 Histogram of responses to Lights (importance in cycling kit) . . . . . . . 272
D.5 Histogram of responses to Helmets (importance in cycling kit) . . . . . . 272
D.6 Histogram of responses to Facemasks (importance in cycling kit) . . . . . 273
D.7 Histogram of responses to Air Pollution Risk Perception (APRP) . . . . 273
F.1 Predicted marginal effect of positive deviations from Pareto over Network
treatment on punishment received . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
F.2 Predicted marginal effect of negative deviations from Pareto over Network
treatment on punishment received . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
F.3 Predicted marginal effect of positive deviations from Pareto over Network
treatment on probability of receiving punishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
F.4 Predicted marginal effect of negative deviations from Pareto over Network
treatment on probability of receiving punishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
G.1 Instructions for watching film . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
G.2 Donation page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
G.3 Donations receipt and further payment instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . 312
G.4 Affect questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312
G.5 Willingness to Pay a green fee (WTP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
G.6 Willingness to Donate time (WTD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
H.1 Opening script . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
H.2 Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
viii
H.3 Binswanger-Eckel-Grossman (BEG) risk measure question . . . . . . . . 320
H.4 Socio-Economic Panel-General (SOEP-G) risk measure question . . . . . 321
H.5 Socio-Economic Panel-Health (SOEP-H) risk measure question . . . . . . 321
H.6 Importance of items in safety kit question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
H.7 Air Pollution Risk Perception (APRP) question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
H.8 Risk-taking behaviours while cycling question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
H.9 Air pollution avoidance behaviours question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323
H.10 Facemask choice question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323
H.11 Barreriers to facemask question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323
H.12 Prize draw instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
I.1 Page 1: Appropriation decision and beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332
I.2 Page 2: Feedback on subject’s earnings from private account, common
account and stage 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
I.3 Page 3: Punishment decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334
I.4 Page 4: Feedback on cost of deduction points and subject’s payoffs after
stage 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335
ix
Chapter 1
Introduction
Two stylized facts characterise the challenges facing humanity and our only home, planet
earth. First, we live in an era of multiple environmental crises. We have breached critical
ecosystem processes and planetary boundaries that represent safe operating limits for the
functioning of the earth. For instance, we are beyond the zone of high uncertainty for
biodiversity. The current rate of biodiversity loss, measured through species extinction is
estimated to range from 100 to 1000 per million species per year, against the planetary
boundary of 10 per million per year. We are also in the zone of uncertainty for climate
change. Atmospheric carbon dioxide is estimated at 400 parts per million (ppm) versus
the planetary boundary of 350 ppm (Steffen et al., 2015).1 Second, human behaviour is
most likely causing these profound and sweeping global environmental changes. In seek-
ing to recognise this, scientists have called for the period from the Industrial Revolution
onwards to be called the ‘Anthropocene’ to mark the shift to a new geological epoch
which is distinct from the Holocene (Zalasiewicz et al., 2011; Steffen et al., 2011).
Understanding and changing human behaviour is critical to addressing these ongoing
crises, given our role in precipitating them. Actions to mitigate the ongoing environmental
degradation and ecological loss and to adapt to its adverse consequences require consider-
ation. To that end, this thesis investigates people’s decisions to protect the environment
and protect themselves from environmental risks. Specifically, the essays aim to enhance
our understanding of environmental behaviour in three core areas: contributions towards
protecting public goods like biodiversity and the environment, choices under risk from
1Rockstro¨m et al. (2009) define planetary boundaries against values of the control variable set at
a ‘safe’ distance from a dangerous level (for processes without known thresholds at the continental to
global scales) or from its global threshold (where thresholds are non-linear transitions in the functioning
of coupled human–environmental systems). We are also in the high uncertainty zone about biochemical
flows and increasing risk for land-use changes. Around 14 and 150 million tons per year of phosphorous
and nitrogen are applied to land as fertiliser each year respectively, as opposed to the planetary boundary
of 6.2 and 62 million tons per year for each. The area of forested land as a proportion of forest-covered
land before human alteration is 62% and falling versus the planetary boundary of at least 75% (Steffen
et al., 2015).
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environmental externalities like air pollution, and cooperation over shared common pool
resources.
The overarching goal of the thesis is to unpack the complex processes driving indi-
vidual decision-making in each setting to identify policy-relevant mechanisms to promote
human and planetary health, and wellbeing. To do so, each paper in this thesis examines
how individual and situational factors influence environmental behaviour, and the role
of information and incentive-based interventions, to bring fresh behavioural insights to
the settings considered. All the papers adopt an experimental approach, which is the
principal method for causal inference in economics. In this way, the thesis hopes to bring
causal insights about environmental behaviour in the settings considered to contribute to
the field of behavioural environmental economics and environmental policy.
The behavioural environmental economics discipline has witnessed rapid growth over
the past decade and has come to fundamentally change the way we conceptualise envi-
ronmental behaviour. It is an umbrella of approaches that bring insights from the social
sciences, especially psychology and sociology, to provide a more realistic - and thereby
a more useful - account of decision-making in environmental contexts. However, the ap-
plication of experimental methods to analyse decision-making in environmental contexts
has been integral to changing the way economists view the world more broadly. Consider
Kahneman’s work documenting bounded rationality through critiques of the stated pref-
erence method applied to value public goods like wildlife and decision-making under risk.
Or alternatively, Ostrom’s investigation of bounded self-interest as evinced in cooperation
in the commons. Indeed many have remarked on the early intellectual connections and
experimental traditions between environmental and resource economics, and behavioural
economics (e.g. in Croson and Treich (2014); List and Price (2016)).
Despite this early ‘two-way traffic’, more considerable convergence in both fields is
needed in areas like contributions to and cooperation over shared natural resources, and
choices under environmental risks (Ostrom, 1998; Shogren et al., 2010; Carlsson and
Johansson-Stenman, 2012). The five papers in this thesis hope to give a sharper view
of the behavioural tendencies that matter by documenting new empirical evidence in
three decision contexts that lie at the core of environmental economics: firstly on peo-
ple’s choices to protect and value public goods, secondly on choices under environmental
risk, and thirdly on cooperation and social dilemmas over shared natural resources, as
described below. For the sake of brevity, Appendix A presents a lengthier literature re-
view that provides historical context to my work, wherein I locate the contributions of
this thesis within the broader disciplinary trends in behavioural environmental economics.
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I first summarise the overarching aim of this thesis. Then I briefly describe each paper
and its contributions, followed by a discussion on the intersecting themes, interventions
and experimental methods employed in each paper.
1.1 Research aim
The overarching aim of the thesis is to isolate the causal role of individual and situational
factors driving human behaviour in different environmental dilemmas and contexts. It
attempts to empirically investigate the causal relationships between these factors by using
experimental methods to feed into the design of policy-relevant mechanisms to ultimately
promote both human and planetary wellbeing. It is composed of the five papers described
below.
1.2 Summary and contributions
Papers 1 and 2 explore contributions towards protecting public goods like biodiversity
and the environment, Papers 3 and 4 examine choices under risk from environmental ex-
ternalities like air pollution, and Paper 5 studies cooperation over shared common pool re-
sources. The main motivations, contributions, and findings of each paper are summarised
below. Table 1.1 presents a snapshot of the thesis structure, including the experimental
method, themes and interventions used in each paper.
1.2.1 People’s choices to protect and value biodiversity and the
environment
1.2.1.1 Paper 1: Seeing red, but acting green? Experimental evidence on
charitable giving and affect towards biodiversity
Biodiversity is an under-provisioned public good as is evident from the rapid and irre-
versible sixth mass extinction event (Ceballos et al., 2015). Accounting for the behavioural
tendencies in the allocation of resources to conservation can go some way towards filling
the unfortunate gap in our understanding of conservation behaviour. These insights are
crucial to design effective interventions to scale-up public engagement and financial sup-
port for conservation.
Paper 1 examines how charitable giving towards conservation and emotion states
varies according to different narratives presented in biodiversity conservation videos, by
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using a series of lab experiments. It is the first joint exploration of the ‘charismatic
megafauna effect’ and ‘outrage effect’ on behaviour and emotions in the context of char-
itable donations.2 It goes beyond the previous economic and conservation literature on
resource allocation towards biodiversity by looking at the causal effects of audio-visual
narrative-based content, by using carefully designed video interventions. It also extends
existing work by considering the impact of a non-pecuniary incentive, the public recog-
nition of donors, in conjunction with these video interventions and adds to the literature
on social image motivations.
Our findings reveal that videos of charismatic Lions increase the likelihood of do-
nating, but not the amount donated conditional on subjects having decided to donate.
Conversely, videos with the anthropogenic cause of endangerment increase the amount
donated, conditional on deciding to donate, but not the likelihood of donating. Thus while
we found that the charismatic megafauna and the outrage effects persist when video in-
terventions were used, they can have distinct impacts on nature of decision-making. We
also found that the anthropogenic cause of endangerment causes ‘outrage’ because it in-
creases a range of mixed emotions including anger and sadness. A practical implication of
these results is that video interventions which combine narratives about non-charismatic
species with the anthropogenic cause of endangerment could be as fruitful as relying on
videos with charismatic species, apart from conveying a more realistic portrait of conser-
vation needs. More broadly, these results suggest that people’s choices could be influenced
through innovative informational interventions like audio-visual media, and careful atten-
tion needs to be paid to the behavioural and emotional reactions their narratives elicit.
1.2.1.2 Paper 2: Do biodiversity conservation videos cause pro-environmental
spillover effects?
The potential for audio-visual media as an instrument for behaviour change is clear from
Paper 1, and numerous other studies which have studied the causal effect of movie expo-
sure on other behaviours including voting turnout and preferences, fertility choices, and
even migration decisions (DellaVigna and La Ferrara, 2015). There is, however, a dearth
of evidence on the behavioural impact of both media content and exposure in the conser-
vation domain, especially on subsequent pro-environmental actions that are not targeted
2Existing analysis based largely on economic valuation to elicit the willingness to pay (WTP) for
conservation, and revealed public expenditure under command and control mechanisms shows a ‘charis-
matic megafauna effect’, i.e., resource allocation is higher for charismatic flagships, like lions or pandas,
which need not align with their ecological value within that ecosystem (Kontoleon and Swanson, 2003;
Richardson and Loomis, 2009; Metrick and Weitzman, 1998). Public WTP is also sensitive to informa-
tion about intentionally caused ecological harm by humans in CV scenarios, which elicited higher values
compared to the damage caused by nature. As people reported feeling more upset and interested, this
empirical result was termed the ‘outrage effect’ (Kahneman et al., 1993).
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by conservation videos but may nonetheless be affected.
Paper 2 builds on Paper 1, to map out the potential unintentional spillover effects
from video exposure and content (and facing a donation task), on the Willingness to
Pay (WTP) a green fee and Willingness to Donate (WTD) time towards environmental
causes, by using a companion lab experiment. Unlike previous work, it uses an innovative
framework of behavioural spillovers to disentangle the direct and indirect effects of media
content and exposure on pro-environmental behaviours. In doing so, it explores how video
interventions and undertaking a personally costly pro-environmental behaviour impacts
two subsequent pro-environmental behavioural intentions. It adds to the literature on how
media impacts environmental and economic behaviour, and behavioural spillovers. It also
aims to the further the debate on the mechanisms underpinning behavioural spillovers,
by paying attention to the interaction effects between pro-social identity and behavioural
similarity.
We found that both media exposure and content had indirect effects on behaviour,
apart from the direct effects outlined in Paper 1. Video exposure has a positive spillover
effect because it increases the likelihood of a positive WTP green fee for the whole sam-
ple. Video content on the anthropogenic cause of endangerment also has a spillover effect
as it increases the WTD the amount of time donated for pro-social subjects but not the
likelihood of donating. These findings convey that people’s pro-environmental preferences
and choices are endogenous to past choices and that they can interact with features of
the behaviours themselves. It also suggests that organizations can follow up with requests
that are similar to past behaviours in future appeals.
1.2.2 People’s choices under environmental risks like air pollu-
tion
Over 80% of city dwellers live in places where air quality levels were deemed harmful by
the World Health Organization (WHO, 2016). In the UK, 59% of the population lives in
areas where the level of air pollution is above the legal limits by some estimates (Laville,
2017). Vehicular traffic is a crucial contributor. Keeping in mind that emissions need to be
curbed on the supply side, a fundamental question on the demand side is what motivates
people to protect themselves by reducing exposure or avoiding air pollution?
Economic research has placed a considerable focus on understanding avoidance be-
haviour due to its welfare implications. It is conceptualised as a type of preventive health
behaviour undertaken by individuals to reduce their exposure to environmental pollutants
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(Zivin and Neidell, 2013). Encouraging avoidance through informational approaches is an
important policy lever to empower citizens to take better decisions to enhance their
health and wellbeing. That said, the bulk of literature on avoidance focuses on the effects
of information alerts on extreme pollution or smog days and their behavioural effects on
reducing outdoor activity (Zivin and Neidell, 2009; Janke, 2014; Saberian et al., 2017).
There is limited research on the ‘everyday’ avoidance choices taken by individuals to
self-protect against daily exposure or the psychological mechanisms underpinning these
avoidance decisions, both of which are crucial to painting a more comprehensive picture
of individual avoidance behaviour.
1.2.2.1 Paper 3: Taking ‘measured’ risks while cycling: Field evidence on
risk-taking and air pollution avoidance
Paper 3 in Chapter 4 is the first attempt to study risk preferences, and its association
with choice in the following two domains: air pollution avoidance and risk-taking while
cycling. It uses a lab-in-the-field experiment with a pool of cyclists in London. Hence,
it extends the literature on the behavioural validity of risk preferences, which examines,
whether different risk preference measures associate with field-based environmental and
health behaviours. It is one of the few field-based studies that jointly elicit risk preferences
across behavioural domains using different methods, including an incentive-compatible
protocol using an ordered lottery selection task, and self-reported willingness to take risks
in life and health, and air pollution risk perception, a subjective risk belief. Harnessing
insights from the behavioural spillovers literature and Paper 2, a broader range of choices
under each behavioural domain is measured to provide a more comprehensive and robust
analysis of choice.
The data revealed that only domain-specific risk preferences, i.e., the willingness to
take risks in health showed robust correlations with risk-taking behaviour. Furthermore,
only air pollution risk perception showed a strong correlation with air pollution avoid-
ance. The results suggest risk preference measures are context-dependent. This implies
that researchers could employ protocols more closely aligned with the behavioural do-
main they are studying in future investigations to draw out empirical associations in the
field. Also, risk perception - rather than risk aversion - can induce people to change their
avoidance behaviour, marking it out as a valuable policy variable.
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1.2.2.2 Paper 4: Optimistic about air quality, but avoiding polluted air?
Unpacking the effects of social norm messages
Paper 4 in Chapter 5 is an exploratory paper which builds on the same field study as
Paper 3. It supplements the previous paper by considering two new types of subjective
beliefs and their relationship with avoidance behaviour: social norms about air pollution
avoidance and perceived air quality. Informational interventions that make social norms
salient are considered robust behavioural change strategies, yet numerous studies fail to
replicate results in new behavioural settings and populations. This raises questions as
to how and why responses vary across contexts. Paper 4 adds to this debate because
it explores the additional benefits of incorporating social norms in messages over and
above basic information on air pollution health risks and avoidance options. The paper
also considers a fast growing avoidance option used by active travellers in the outdoors,
namely anti-pollution facemasks.
The results show that treatment effects were heterogeneous: individuals who held
more optimistic beliefs about air quality in London because they perceived air quality
was better, were more likely to choose face-masks when exposed to the social norms
message. These results bring to light the under-examined role of prior beliefs about envi-
ronmental risks - in this case about air quality - as a possible explanation for why social
norms messaging may induce behaviour change amongst some individuals but not others.
1.2.3 People’s choices to cooperate over common pool resources
The management of shared common pool resources is a continuing struggle: around 90%
of the world’s fish stocks are now fully or overfished and a 17% increase in production
is forecast by 2025, with adverse environmental, food and livelihood security implica-
tions (FAO, 2016). A policy question in the face of these challenges whether governments
should focus on strengthening local institutions, like peer monitoring, which can sup-
port cooperation. Somewhat surprisingly, there is less research on peer punishment in
non-linear CPR appropriation dilemmas, and existing work primarily investigates perfect
peer sanctioning institutions, i.e., everyone can monitor and punish each other.
1.2.3.1 Paper 5: The effects of imperfect monitoring and punishment net-
works in a common pool resource dilemma
Like Paper 4, Paper 5 in Chapter 6 also looks at social influence but through a different
analytical lens. It explores how the socio-spatial structure of monitoring and punishment
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networks impact appropriation, punishment, and beliefs about other’s appropriation in a
common pool resource (CPR) game, by using a lab experiment. It adds to the literature
on decentralised management of the commons analysed through the framework of social
dilemmas, especially on peer sanctioning, by the novel application of different network
architectures. Also, it extends the literature on the impact of network interactions on
cooperation by paying attention to how beliefs over others’ appropriation evolve in sys-
tematically different ways because of variations in the network structure.
We found that despite the fact that individuals start off more pro-social (and expect
others to be more pro-social as well), peer punishment was unable to prevent free-riding
in any of the networks considered, although free-riders (i.e., those who appropriate above
the Pareto optimal level) were sanctioned in all networks. Welfare was lower in perfect
networks because of the higher incidence of punishment used and because connected but
incomplete networks elicited lower punishment for those who appropriated less than the
Pareto optimal level. Lastly, the difference between beliefs and others’ appropriation de-
clined faster in the complete network, relative to incomplete but connected networks. The
results show that underlying variations in the network architecture of peer monitoring in-
stitutions affect welfare, punishment behaviour and the evolution of beliefs about other’s
pro-sociality.
Table 1.1: Summary of methods, themes and interventions
Papers Paper 1 Paper 2 Paper 3 Paper 4 Paper 5
Method Lab Lab Field Field Lab
Themes
Affect x
Pro-sociality x x x
Behavioural spillovers x x
Risk preferences x x
Beliefs x x x
Social influence x
Interventions
Information x x - x x
Incentives x - - - x
a The types of pro-sociality considered are as follows; Paper 1: charitable donations; Paper 2: charitable
donations, willingness to pay a green fee, and willingness to donate time; Paper 5: appropriation in the
common pool and costly punishment to reduce appropriation.
b The types of information interventions considered are as follows; Paper 1 and Paper 2: audio-visual
media/videos; Paper 4: text + graphic; Paper 5: Monitoring feedback (of other’s appropriation decisions in
the network).
c The types of incentive interventions considered are as follows; Paper 1: public recognition; Paper 5:
(personally) costly peer punishment.
d Papers 1 and 2 are companion papers from a series of lab-experiments. Papers 3 and 4 are companion
papers from a lab-in-the-field experiment.
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1.3 Notes on intersecting themes and methods
Table 1.1 outlines the intersecting conceptual themes running through this thesis, which
includes pro-sociality towards the environment and humans, experienced affect, behavioural
spillovers, beliefs about the environment and human behaviour, and finally social influ-
ence through social norms and network interactions. Informational and incentive-based
interventions are intertwined with the themes. Audio-visual information (conservation
videos) are studied in relation to pro-sociality, affect and behavioural spillovers, messages
incorporating text and graphics are designed keeping social influence in mind, and the
network structure determines information feedback. Public recognition seeks to harness
individuals’ social image motivations, and peer punishment opportunities are derived
from network interactions. The intersecting themes and interventions are located within
each paper briefly below.
1.3.1 Intersecting themes
Different types of pro-social behaviour, i.e., when individuals act to promote the inter-
ests of others rather than their material interests in contradiction to the predictions of
the rational model of self-interest, are considered primarily as outcome variables. For
example, charitable donations, WTP green fee, WTD time in Papers 1 and 2, and re-
duced appropriations and pro-social punishment in Paper 5 are all types of pro-social
behaviour. Attention is also paid to different types of subjective beliefs held by individ-
uals both as explanatory variables in Paper 3 (air pollution health risks), and Paper 4
(social norms around avoidance taken by others), and as an outcome variable in Paper
5 (other’s expected appropriation from the CPR). Other individual-level factors investi-
gated experienced affect as a reaction to different types of audio-visual content in Paper
1, and risk preferences as an explanatory variable in Paper 5. Finally, pro-environmental
behavioural spillovers are estimated in Paper 2 and used to motivate the research design
and analysis in Paper 3. The impact of social influence on behaviour is studied in Paper
4 through social norms messaging, and in Paper 5 through analysing the effects of peer
monitoring and punishment network interactions.
1.3.2 Notes on interventions
The behaviourally informed informational interventions are as follows. In Paper 1 and 2,
exposure to carefully designed biodiversity conservation videos are exogenously varied as
regards their content about charismatic and non-charismatic species, a compound habitat
composed of the two, and the anthropogenic cause of endangerment. While video content
is varied in Paper 1, both video content and exposure are varied in Paper 2. In Paper
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4, subjects are exposed to textual and graphic information about air pollution risks and
face-masks or an identical (treatment) message augmented with social norms. In Paper
5, the type of monitoring and punishment network exogenously determines the feedback
that other group members receive about others’ appropriation behaviour. Regarding in-
centives, Paper 1 offers the non-pecuniary incentive of publicly recognising donors. Paper
5 changes the socio-spatial incentive environment through distinctions in the network ar-
chitecture which defines the punishment opportunities available to group members. Each
paper discusses the behavioural interventions in more detail.
1.3.3 Notes on experimental methods
Papers 1, 2 and 5 used lab experiments, and Paper 3 and 4 used a lab-in-the-field exper-
iment. The choice of experimental method for each is discussed below, and each paper
presents a more detailed discussion of the same.
1.3.4 Lab experiments
Papers 1 and 2 tested the affective and behavioural impact of video exposure and content
using a series of lab experiments. Lab experiments were deemed as a suitable start-
ing point to explore these impacts for many reasons. Firstly, an alternative was to use
self-reported before and after data through longitudinal surveys to measure changes in
behaviour and affect in natural locations like movie theatres. However, results from this
method are possibly confounded by sample selection bias, concerns over self-reported
data, and interviewer demand as reviewed by Howell (2014) in greater detail. Another
option was to exploit naturally occurring exogenous variations, e.g. in the roll-out of TV
programs, to estimate causal effects, as done in other studies on the economic impacts
of media (assuming that the necessary assumptions hold) (DellaVigna and La Ferrara,
2015). But obtaining exogenous variation on specific types of media content as opposed
to media exposure is very challenging using this approach. More broadly, existing con-
servation videos did not systematically vary narrative content to test the behavioural
tendencies that we had in mind. Moreover, while such quasi-experimental effects can re-
veal causal effects on behaviour, impacts of emotions are much harder to measure because
they tend to rely on self-reports or bio-physical data, which are easier to collect in the lab.
Similarly, Paper 5 tests the causal effects of different socio-spatial institutions on be-
haviour (appropriation, punishment) and beliefs (expected extraction) also using a lab
experiment. An alternative would have been to use observational and survey data from
the field to look at real resource outcomes as in Rustagi et al. (2010) and real-world social
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networks as in Bodin and Crona (2008). But individuals navigate multiple types of re-
lationships (e.g. family, ethnic, religious, friendship, monitoring and punishment) which
complicates causal inference. The mosaic of inter-personal connections reflects Ostrom
(2006)’s concern that the simultaneous occurrence of many variables in a given field set-
ting increases the uncertainty about the causal effect of a specific variable (or a limited
set of variables) on an outcome.
1.3.5 Lab-in-the-field experiment
Paper 3 and 4 move from the lab into the field. They used a lab-in-the-field experiment,
which is defined by Gneezy and Imas (2017) as a method that ‘combines elements of
both lab and field experiments in using standardised, validated paradigms from the lab
in targeting relevant populations in naturalistic settings’.3 Moving from the lab to the
field confers two main advantages. It allows us to move beyond non-student populations,
and access less artificial environments than the lab, both of which are of policy-interest
in the context of the papers considered. In addition, the lab-in-the-field protocol is espe-
cially useful to elicit individual preferences using experimental methods because it retains
a degree of control due to the use of the lab-validated paradigm.
More broadly, lab and lab-in-the-field experiments are essential methodological tools
in an experimental researcher’s arsenal because they allow the researcher to generate
and take responsibility for data to test a specific hypothesis in a relatively controlled
environment to enhance internal validity. Importantly, they can be replicated across mul-
tiple contexts and field sites at a relatively low cost. Replication can take the form of
re-analysing the data, reproducing the experimental design in a new setting with differ-
ent subjects, as well as varying the experimental parameters to check for the effects of
design-level factors. Given the novel nature of the interventions examined, it was useful to
take the first step to test-bed their impact in the lab first before going into the field. Each
paper discusses the experimental method and design employed in more detail, alongside
its potential limitations.
3This corresponds broadly to Harrison and List (2004)’s description of artefactual field experiment
as ‘the same as a conventional lab experiment but with a non-standard subject pool’. I follow Gneezy
and Imas (2017) in the argument that the physical location of the lab is not what defines a method, and
laboratory experiments that are run outside of the university are not best described as field experiments.
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1.4 Notes on the thesis structure
Each of the five papers is written as an independent piece so that the thesis can be read in
any order. However, Paper 2 extends the findings of Paper 1. Similarly, Paper 4 extends
the research in Paper 3. Both sets of papers also share a common experimental design and
data collection procedure. Given this, there is some overlap in the experimental methods
section between Papers 1 and 2, and between Papers 3 and 4. I have attempted to min-
imise this overlap as much as possible without compromising the integrity of each paper.
Each paper has it’s own data appendix which can include methodological and concep-
tual notes, the full specifications of the empirical models in the main text, and robustness
checks. To avoid replication, Appendix G jointly provides supplementary materials for
Papers 1 and 2, and Appendix H combines the supplementary materials for Papers 3 and
4. The supplementary materials for Paper 5 are provided in Appendix I.
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Chapter 2
Seeing red, but acting green?
Experimental evidence on charitable
giving and affect towards
biodiversity
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2.1 Introduction
Drawing public attention to the rapid human-induced loss of biodiversity to boost sup-
port and funding for conservation is the need of the hour. The average rate of vertebrate
species loss over the past 100 years is 100 times higher than the historical background
rate of 2 mammal extinctions per 10,000 species (Ceballos et al., 2015). Funding shortfalls
are a barrier to increasing the scope and scale of current conservation efforts (Ceballos
et al., 2017; Dirzo et al., 2014; Butchart et al., 2010): illustratively, one estimate is that
only 12% of the estimated cost of reducing the extinction risk of threatened bird species
is currently funded (McCarthy et al., 2012). Unfortunately, we know less about people’s
resource allocation choices towards biodiversity conservation. Our existing knowledge is
derived primarily from the economic valuation literature and analysis of public expendi-
tures under command and control mechanisms.1
A striking empirical pattern emerges: both the public willingness to pay (WTP) for
biodiversity conservation and state and federal spending on conservation is higher for
habitats with charismatic megafauna (Richardson and Loomis, 2009; Metrick and Weitz-
man, 1998).2 However, this pattern, which has been called the ‘charismatic megafauna
effect’ (Metrick and Weitzman, 1998), need not align with ecological criteria for biodi-
versity preservation which often includes other priorities like the number and type of
species or the genetic variability in a given area. In seeking to understand why these
patterns persist, researchers across disciplines like economics, psychology and geography
have remarked that the feelings that people harbour towards species are essential psycho-
logical drivers of decisions to protect them (Metrick and Weitzman, 1998; Lorimer, 2007).
This empirical trend has also led conservation organisations to rely extensively on
charismatic megafauna, especially big cats, in public outreach and funding appeals. The
principal argument for this strategy is that they generate more public funding and support
which can be deployed for the conservation of less charismatic species and the broader
biodiversity habitat in which they live (Macdonald et al., 2015; Caro and Riggio, 2013;
Sergio et al., 2008). Others are concerned about the unintended adverse effects of this
approach, such as the decreased attractiveness and public acceptance of non-flagship
species, increased risk of ex situ conservation for charismatic species, and ‘flagship fatigue’
which may reduce giving in the long-run (Douglas and Winkel, 2014; Lindenmayer et al.,
2002; Sitas et al., 2009; Clucas et al., 2008; Kontoleon and Swanson, 2003; Bowen-Jones
1Please refer to Helm and Hepburn (2012) for a comprehensive overview of the economic analysis of
biodiversity.
2Charismatic megafauna or ‘flagships’ are commonly large, popular vertebrates associated with a
particular habitat, like Lions from the African savanna (Clucas et al., 2008), Leader-Williams and Dublin
(2000), and Verissimo et al. (2011).
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and Entwistle, 2002). Underlying this debate is the worrying dynamic of the continuing
marginalisation of non-charismatic but ecologically relevant species from the conserva-
tion and research agenda, as observed from the allocation of public expenditures towards
species conservation (Metrick and Weitzman, 1998; Dawson and Shogren, 2001).
How robust are these empirical patterns? Do these behavioural patterns reveal them-
selves in other contexts like charitable giving? These issues beg the broader question:
what motivates people to act pro-socially through choices to protect threatened species
and their habitats? How can we design interventions to increase pro-social behaviours,
like charitable giving?
This paper aims to address these questions. It explores the causal effect of different
types of audiovisual information or the narrative content in brief biodiversity conserva-
tion videos on charitable giving and affect, by using a series of lab experiments. Study
1 focuses on charitable donations behaviour. Subjects are exposed to videos featuring
either a non-charismatic species (Bats) or a charismatic species (Lions) or a biodiver-
sity habitat composed of both charismatic and non-charismatic species living in it (Bats
and Lions in the Savanna habitat), after which they can choose to allocate money to a
conservation charity. Thus, our first contribution is to extend empirical evidence on the
charismatic megafauna effect, by examining its robustness in the donations context using
video interventions.
Our second contribution is to verify the ‘outrage effect’ in this setting. The outrage
effect refers to the classic albeit under-explored finding that people’s WTP to undo the
environmental harm caused by humans is higher than if the same harm was caused by
nature (Kahneman et al., 1993; Bulte et al., 2005). Kahneman et al. (1993) coined the
term to capture the underlying affective processes that potentially motivated this eco-
nomic behaviour, on the basis that people reported feeling more upset upon hearing
about the human action was the root cause of adverse environmental outcomes. To test
the robustness of this finding, we augment each video with audiovisual information on
the anthropogenic cause of endangerment and map changes in donations behaviour from
exposure to this additional media content.
In addition to this, we also tested the behavioural impact of a non-pecuniary incentive
through the offer to publicly recognise donors. This is a real-world strategy frequently
used by conservation organisations to increase citizen engagement through combining
informational strategies with non-pecuniary incentives (e.g. publishing their names in
newsletters). Thus the third contribution of this study is to check if such incentives yield
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additional benefits through increased donations when used in conjunction with videos.
Study 2 builds on Study 1, and explores the role of affect as a possible motivational
force in driving donations behaviour. Subjects reported affective responses to being ex-
posed to the same videos used earlier. Hence, our fourth contribution is to disentangle the
affective basis of the charismatic megafauna and outrage effects by looking at changes in
a wider set of discrete positive and negative states of affect that are experienced by indi-
viduals. In doing so, we present new evidence about how audiovisual information about
biodiversity conservation could elicit mixed emotional reactions in public audiences and
flag some possible channels through which donations behaviour may be influenced.
Exploring the effects of videos is particularly expedient at this current moment. Con-
servation and news organisations increasingly rely on audio-visual mass media such as
online videos, documentaries, and photographs to raise financial resources and garner pol-
icy support. This strategy harnesses the growing public proclivity to obtain information
about environmental issues from digital platforms and social media (Stamm et al., 2000;
Gavin and Marshall, 2011; Sakellari, 2015; Painter et al., 2018). To illustrate, YouTube
has over a billion users amounting to almost one-third of all people on the Internet and
over half the views come from mobile devices (YouTube, 2018). Many existing videos
tend to give prominence to charismatic megafauna and sometimes include conservation
relevant information, such as the ecological role of the species and its endangerment sta-
tus. They often omit to mention the anthropogenic cause of endangerment and the role
of humans in hastening the sixth mass extinction. While some feel such videos encour-
age conservation behaviour, others have expressed unease about these narratives because
they may breed complacency about our destruction of the planet (Hughes-Games, 2017).
Well-documented evidence on the behavioural responses to these videos can help further
these debates.
Audiovisual media can change behaviour through different pathways like providing
new information, changing preferences, and altering emotion states, and different types
of narrative content can exert separate impacts on economic behaviour and experienced
affect (Moyer-Guse´, 2008; La Ferrara, 2016; Nicholson-Cole, 2005). For example, La Fer-
rara (2016) notes media can provide new information or provide specific narratives about
an issue, which in turn can induce individuals to update their beliefs, or revise their
preferences over a given course of action. Nicholson-Cole (2005) observes that the use of
emotive imagery and narratives are especially fruitful in attracting people’s attention.
Merchant et al. (2010) notes that charitable organisations use storytelling to provide a
case for public support by taking individuals through different (mixed) emotional stages,
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to induce them to donate to reduce negative affect or to act on feelings of empathy. Go-
ing further, Kemp et al. (2012) observe that charitable fund-raising efforts aim to elicit
mixed emotion states because they elicit more extensive behavioural intentions than ap-
peals based only on the generation of negative emotions. Ruth et al. (2002) observe that
advertisements generating high levels of positive and negative emotions, are processed
more carefully by viewers and hence are regarded as more interesting, and ‘prepares in-
dividuals for action’. These potential pathways of influence suggest that the effect of
narrative content can work towards promoting biodiversity conservation. However, the
impact of different types of media content used in biodiversity conservation videos on
charitable donations and experienced affect is empirically unclear at present, and jointly
eliciting its effects on behaviour and affect is the overarching focus and contribution of
this paper.
Our findings show that the charismatic megafauna and the outrage effects persist
when video interventions are used on charitable donations behaviour, but that they have
distinct effects on decision-making. More precisely, videos of charismatic Lions increase
the likelihood of donating, but not the amount donated conditional on subjects having
decided to donate. Conversely, videos with the anthropogenic cause of endangerment in-
crease the amount donated conditional on deciding to donate, but not the likelihood of
donating. We also found that the anthropogenic cause of endangerment causes ‘outrage’
and an increase in a range of mixed emotions including anger and sadness. The broader
implication of this result is that innovative informational interventions like brief videos
can positively impact conservation behaviour, so careful attention needs to be paid to
the narratives and stories presented in them and the emotional and behavioural reactions
they elicit in audiences.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: the next section locates the current
research in related literature, and section 3 outlines the experimental design and the
procedures used. Section 4 presents the results and section 5 concludes with a discussion.
2.2 Related literature
Below, is a review of four strands of literature: on patterns of resource allocations to charis-
matic megafauna and biodiversity habitats primarily from economic valuation studies and
public expenditure data, studies on the willing to pay to correct anthropogenic environ-
mental problems problems, studies on social image motivations and public recognition
in relation to charitable giving, and finally on affect towards charismatic megafauna and
nature, as well as the outrage effect.
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2.2.1 Charismatic megafauna, habitats and resource allocation
We make several contributions to the existing research on biodiversity conservation. First,
we add to the literature on how species charisma impacts the allocation of financial re-
sources towards protection (Metrick and Weitzman, 1996, 1998; Loomis and White, 1996;
Bulte and Van Kooten, 1999; Dawson and Shogren, 2001; Kontoleon and Swanson, 2003;
Christie et al., 2006; Mart´ın-Lo´pez et al., 2007; Maresˇova´ and Frynta, 2008; Richard-
son and Loomis, 2009; Morse-Jones et al., 2012; Tisdell et al., 2007, 2006). Metrick and
Weitzman (1996) and Metrick and Weitzman (1998) are influential papers, which studied
revealed behaviour towards charismatic and non-charismatic species through the alloca-
tion of federal expenditures under the Endangered Species Act in the United States of
America. They found charismatic species (proxied by size and taxonomy) attracted more
funding and policy support (also see Dawson and Shogren (2001) and Brown and Shogren
(1998)). Stated preferences studies using contingent valuation (e.g. Kontoleon and Swan-
son (2003)) and choice experiments (e.g. Jacobsen et al. (2008), Morse-Jones et al. (2012)
and Richardson and Loomis (2009)), also found charismatic flagships elicited a higher
stated Willingness To Pay (WTP) or donate to conservation programs. We extend this
literature by measuring individual’s revealed pro-social behaviour using an charitable giv-
ing game with monetary stakes.
Currently, limited empirical evidence quantifies the relative benefits of using charis-
matic flagships in donation appeals, relative to non-charismatic species or habitats (Sitas
et al., 2009; Clucas et al., 2008). To the best of our knowledge, only Thomas-Walters
and J Raihani (2017) used a charitable giving game to quantify individual differences
in giving from exposure to combined photo-cum-text appeals featuring charismatic (po-
lar bear, tiger, Asian elephant) and non-charismatic species (dusky gopher frog, North
Atlantic cod, Western glacier stonefly), across different habitats. They found average do-
nations to charismatic species were marginally higher than to non-charismatic species
amongst Amazon Mechanical Turk workers (USD 0.16 versus USD 0.13). Taking this
insight further, we examine if differences in pro-sociality from exposure to various species
persists when individuals are exposed to brief conservation videos in Study 1. Further-
more, we attempt to control for underlying differences in the habitat of charismatic and
non-charismatic species by considering charismatic and non-charismatic species within
the same habitat.3
3Differences in underlying habitats may affect donations if subjects are more likely to donate a higher
amount to more favourable biomes or habitats. For example, forest and tundra biomes have been found to
elicit more favourable rankings of preferences, scenic beauty, and restorative effects, compared to desert
or grassland biomes (Han, 2007; Falk and Balling, 2010). Similarly, individuals report feeling happier
outdoors in all green or natural habitat types, especially coastal areas, than in urban environments
(MacKerron and Mourato, 2013).
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Second, we investigate whether using a charismatic species alongside a non-charismatic
species within the same biodiversity habitat influences pro-sociality. In related literature,
Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004) and Thomas-Walters and J Raihani (2017), found dona-
tions are not significantly different between one and many recipients of the same species.
But Markowitz et al. (2013) reported that non-environmentalists stated lower hypotheti-
cal donation amounts when presented with many recipients of the same species although
environmentalists do not. Keeping in mind these mixed results, we examine donations
towards a habitat composed of different species (biological diversity) instead of many
individuals of the same species (biological resource).4 From the stated preference litera-
ture, Jacobsen et al. (2008) investigate some of these issues using a choice experiment to
assess preferences over the preservation of the Danish heath and its endangered species.
They found that the WTP to conserve this habitat was significantly higher when two
(lesser known) species were ‘iconised’ by explicitly naming them, compared to a quanti-
tative description of the habitat. We build on this work, by comparing whether naming
one charismatic and non-charismatic species changes donations behaviour, compared to
appeals featuring a single species.5 By doing so, we hope to shed light on how the scale of
biocomplexity may impact pro-social behaviour to ultimately feed into the behavioural
design of conservation policies (Mainwaring, 2001).
2.2.2 Anthropogenic cause of endangerment and resource allo-
cation
Third, we examine how media content on the anthropogenic cause of endangerment im-
pacts pro-social behaviour towards conservation. Economic models of behaviour assume
that individuals care only about outcomes and not their causes (Ashraf et al., 2005; Bulte
et al., 2005). But in contingent valuation studies, individuals stated a higher WTP when
information about the human-made causes of environmental problems is made available
4Curiously, the mixed results on the difference in giving to a single versus many non-human victims,
contrasts with the well-established ‘identifiable victim effect’, i.e., an individual human recipient (e.g.
one refugee child) elicits higher donations than many human recipients (Jenni and Loewenstein, 1997;
Va¨stfja¨ll et al., 2014). An implication of this, is that findings from experimental studies of pro-sociality
towards human recipients need not carry over to non-human species and the natural world.
5Our work also potentially connects to discussions on embedding and scope effects in the contingent
valuation (CV) literature. Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) and Desvousges et al. (1993) argue that re-
spondents to CV surveys are willing to spend a particular amount of money on a good, regardless of it’s
scale, which is an important characteristic of the good being valued. While methodological innovations
like split sample tests are one way to address this, scope insensitivity may persist in situations where an
environmental program can provide multiple outputs - like protecting different endangered species in a
biodiversity habitat. As noted by Carson (2012), it is difficult to obtain distinct WTP estimates for the
individual species or outputs as opposed to the entire program in such cases. We do not address issues
of scope sensitivity in the current study, as we consider charitable donations (often used as a payment
vehicle in CV studies) rather than WTP for a particular conservation program. See Carson (2012) for a
review of these issues.
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(Bulte et al., 2005; Brown et al., 2002; Kahneman and Ritov, 1994; Kahneman et al.,
1993). For instance, Bulte et al. (2005) found WTP to protect seals is significantly higher
when they appear to be threatened by an act of humankind (oil and gas drillers, green-
house effect) rather than nature. Kahneman et al. (1993) call this empirical finding the
‘outrage effect’ because individuals reported they would feel more ‘upset’ if they were
to read a story or watch an item on television about man-made environmental problems
rather those arising from natural causes (they also rated man-made problems as more
‘important’; Kahneman et al. (1993).6 We contribute to this literature by considering if
additional audio-visual media content on the anthropogenic cause of biodiversity deple-
tion (through hunting and illegal wildlife trade) impacts revealed pro-sociality, controlling
for background conservation-relevant information. This acts as a robustness check to ex-
amine whether increased pro-sociality persists in this new experimental set-up; i.e., a
different human-cause of endangerment (hunting), informational medium (videos), and
an incentive-compatible rather than stated behaviour (revealed charitable donations).
2.2.3 Social image motivations, public recognition and pro-sociality
We also build on the empirical finding that people behave more pro-socially in public
rather than in private. This observation is supported by theoretical models of moral be-
haviour that propose that an individual’s revealed pro-sociality is motivated by the need
to maintain a moral image and identity, to signal to themselves and others that they ad-
here to the ‘right’ and ‘good’ norms prevalent in society (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006, 2011;
Harbaugh, 1998). Lab and field experiments find that public visibility and recognition of
donors is a non-pecuniary incentive to increase giving (Ariely et al., 2009; Karlan and
McConnell, 2014; Cotterill et al., 2013; Lacetera and Macis, 2010). For example, Kar-
lan and McConnell (2014) found that charitable giving is higher when donor names are
published in funding circle newsletters.7 Conversely, other studies show that incentives
aiming to provide additional benefits to the individual from acting generously can ‘crowd-
out’ pro-sociality and lead to either no effect or a reduction in giving instead (Bowles
and Polania-Reyes, 2012; Irlenbusch and Ruchala, 2008; Cardenas et al., 2000; Gneezy
and Rustichini, 2000). For example, in Irlenbusch and Ruchala (2008), low bonuses did
6Bulte et al. (2005) critically differentiate between the outrage effect which is attributable to the
human-made cause of environmental degradation, and responsibility effects which relates people’s WTP
to the degree of responsibility that they personally feel for the outcome. In the latter case, as noted
by Brown et al. (2002) attributing the case to another entity (e.g. a corporation) will lower the general
public’s WTP, possibly even below WTP if the loss were caused by a natural process. In our experiment,
we only test the outrage effect, not the responsibility effect.
7This is more broadly in keeping with studies which observe that giving in experimental games can
be fragile, and contingent on the contextual and institutional features of the experimental task, such as
public visibility. For example, Dana et al. (2007) and Dana et al. (2006) show that individuals act less
generously when dictators are given the option to keep their decisions shielded from the receiver, even
at a personal cost to themselves.
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not affect contributions in a public goods game. Although high bonuses increased con-
tributions, the amounts contributed by subjects were not significantly different from the
prediction for self-interested individuals. This result showed that in a social dilemma,
both the offer and magnitude of an incentive that conferred personal benefit could exert
an unexpected effect on behaviour (also see Bowles (2008)). We complement this work by
examining whether the offer of public recognition as a non-pecuniary incentive increases
pro-sociality towards biodiversity when used in conjunction with audio-visual informa-
tional strategies.
2.2.4 Affect towards charismatic megafauna and outrage
Lastly, we contribute to the literature on the relationship between affect, charisma, and
conservation. Although numerous studies from ecological economics, psychology and con-
servation have noted that emotional responses to biodiversity (and wildlife more gener-
ally) matter for conservation choices, empirical and experimental evidence on the topic
is scarce. For instance, Metrick and Weitzman (1998) noted that ‘the utility of each
species/library will be measured as a combination of commercial, recreational and, yes,
emotional reactions to a given species.’ Lorimer (2007) observed that ‘affect’ provided
the vital motivating force that compels people to get involved in conservation, and that
animals ‘dramatically other to us humans’ (less charismatic species) are far less likely to
engender sympathetic affections, based on qualitative evidence. Other studies found that
charismatic species are rated as more ‘likeable’ (Tisdell et al., 2005), more ‘appealing’
(Brambilla et al., 2013) and that they can inspire more fondness, emotional affinity and
‘caring’ attitudes (Brown and Shogren, 1998; Ballantyne et al., 2007; Skibins et al., 2013).8
Theoretically, the ‘Biophilia’ hypothesis proposes that emotional responses towards
natural stimuli play a central role in explaining humankind’s innate connection with the
natural world (Kellert and Wilson, 1995). Kellert and Wilson (1995) proposed that in-
dividuals can have inherent emotionally laden negativistic attitudes, such as fear and
aversion, towards species like snakes, spiders and bats, which in turn can determine
broader wildlife attitudes and value orientations (also see Knight (2008). Subsequent re-
search recognizes the evolutionary basis for such emotional reactions, but goes further by
proposing that negative emotional responses towards specific species are a result of socio-
cultural conditioning, knowledge, contextual features (e.g. if animals are in zoos versus the
8Another strand of literature notes that differences in legal rights exist between non-charismatic
species (e.g. rats are not considered ‘animals’ by animal welfare law) and familiar charismatic species
(e.g. dogs are often treated like friends or family members) and proposes that ‘moral heuristics’ are
crucial explanatory factors (e.g. ‘Rats are pests: pests are bad’ versus ‘Don’t betray friends and family’)
(Herzog and Burghardt, 2005; Sunstein and Nussbaum, 2004).
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wild) and/or a combination of all these factors (O¨hman and Mineka, 2003; Jacobs, 2009;
Lorimer, 2007).9 More broadly, there is growing experimental evidence that emotions
or ‘visceral factors’ influence economic and moral decision-making (Loewenstein, 2000;
Slovic et al., 2007; Keltner and Lerner, 2010). For instance, the ‘affect heuristic’ proposed
by Slovic et al. (2007) propounds that emotional responses towards objects, which occur
rapidly and automatically, can guide decision-making by substituting for systematic cog-
nitive assessments. This corresponds to dual systems theories of decision-making, which
differentiate between emotional and heuristics drive System 1 and deliberative processing
in System 2 as mechanisms that motivate behaviour (Kahneman, 2003; Camerer et al.,
2005).10
We contribute to this literature by attempting to quantify the causal impact of con-
tent in biodiversity conservation videos on different types of affect. As a core aspect of
experienced affect is valence (i.e., ‘positive’ or ‘negative’, and ‘good’ or ‘bad’; Cornelius
(1996); Slovic et al. (2007)), we attempt to isolate a range of positive and negative affec-
tive states from videos with charismatic and non-charismatic species, and a biodiversity
habitat consisting of both in Study 2. We also aim to disentangle the affective basis of ‘the
outrage effect’ discussed in Kahneman et al. (1993) who restrict their efforts to measuring
ratings of ‘upset’ and ‘importance’. Related work on the ‘outrage heuristic’ proposes that
responses to perceived wrongdoing inculcate a sharp sense of outrage, which in turn in-
fluences people’s judgements of punishment for the wrongdoing (Kahneman et al., 1998;
Kahneman and Frederick, 2002; Sunstein et al., 2008). We extend this work by investigat-
ing the role of biodiversity conservation videos in increasing moral outrage, by providing
information about the human causes of biodiversity loss in a salient and memorable man-
ner. Specifically, we attempt to map potential changes to a series of positive and negative
affective states to disentangle the emotional basis of the outrage effect, given that previ-
ous research has demonstrated it holds behavioural consequences.11.
9These contextual factors may also include the nativity of species: for example, Lundhede et al. (2014)
found Danish citizens had a higher WTP for the conservation of birds currently native to Denmark, than
for bird species moving into the country.
10Related work explores the role of emotion-based moral satisfaction driving the willingness to pay
to correct environmental problems (Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992). Similarly, the ‘warm glow’ from
charitable giving or the utility that one obtains from the act of giving without any concern about the
interests of others (Andreoni, 1989, 1990) has also been investigated. We do not attempt to measure this
construct in the present study, but see (Konow, 2010) for an novel effort to do so.
11In this paper, we focus on the role of ‘integral emotions’, i.e., the experience of emotions like anger
or sadness, which occur at the moment of decision and are directly related to the decision at hand -
in our case, these emotions are stimulated through the video appeal to donate. These are distinct from
‘anticipated emotions’ from the outcome of the decision itself (e.g. the expectation of happiness of seeing
the Savanna preserved compared to the expected happiness of buying a book, both of which materialize
at some future point), or ‘incidental’ emotions, which may occur at the moment of a choice decision,
but are unrelated to the payoffs from the decision at hand (Rick and Loewenstein, 2008). These different
categories of emotion (apart from the type of emotion experienced) can arguably impact revealed and
stated choices in distinct ways: for example, Hanley et al. (2017) found incidental emotions did not affect
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2.3 Experimental procedure and design
The overarching objective of Study 1 is to examine how audiovisual narrative content on
charismatic and / or non-charismatic species and habitats, and the anthropogenic cause
of endangerment drive charitable giving, to check for the ‘charismatic megafauna’ and
‘outrage’ effects. Study 2, builds on Study 1 to assess whether the same audiovisual con-
tent on charismatic and / or non-charismatic species and habitats, and the anthropogenic
cause of endangerment, elicits particular emotion states. While we cannot conclude that
the potential change in affective states in Study 2 drives empirical patterns of charitable
giving in Study 1, a joint and systematic exploration of donations and emotions from the
same audiovisual information allows us to flag changes in affective states as a possible
driver of behaviour to explored in the future. The experimental procedure, interventions
and study design are explained below.
2.3.1 Procedure
Experimental sessions for Study 1 on Donations and Study 2 on Affect were held from
16 November to 08 December 2016, at the London School of Economics Behavioural Re-
search Lab (LSE BRL). Participation was open to all individuals registered at the LSE
BRL, to ensure an adequate sample size for all treatments. A total of 564 subjects par-
ticipated, where 377 subjects participated in Study 1 and 177 subjects in Study 2. Both
Study 1 and 2 were conducted simultaneously on the same days. Each session lasted for
20 minutes on average, and could hold a maximum of 20 subjects (the number of subjects
per session ranged from 5 to 20). Each subjects were randomly assigned to a computer
terminal upon entering the lab, after which the computer program randomly assigned
them to one of the treatments in either Study 1 or Study 2. Thus, the randomization was
at the individual-level for each session. The experimental survey was hosted on Qualtrics.
The experimental procedure in Study 1 was as follows: after consenting to participate,
subjects watched a video and made their donation decision. Next, they answered questions
measuring affect followed by questions on pro-environmental and pro-social behaviour,
socio-economic and demographic characteristics. After this, subjects could collect their
payments. All subjects were paid £5 for participation and could earn a maximum of £25
from the charitable giving task. But only one subject from each session was selected at
willingness to pay for changes in coastal water quality and fish populations in New Zealand (discussed
in greater detail in Chapter 3)
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random to receive the pay-out from the charitable giving game. The experimental proce-
dure was identical in Study 2, barring the absence of the donations task, and the payment
was restricted to the £5 participation fee. The supplementary materials are available in
Appendix G.
2.3.2 Biodiversity conservation videos
As existing videos were not designed to provide information in a controlled manner, we
constructed conservation videos using a sequence of photos and a scripted voice-over. We
used the International Union for the Conservation of Nature red list database and began
our search by habitat, threat classification, and conservation status.12 We chose the lion
and the bat, both of which live in the Savanna habitat, as charismatic and non-charismatic
species respectively., both of which live in the Savanna habitat. This case-based compara-
tive approach, i.e., measuring individual’s behavioural and attitudinal differences between
charismatic and non-charismatic species, follows standard methods used previously in the
ecological economics and psychology literature (e.g. in Christie et al. (2006) and Tisdell
and Nantha (2006)).
Bats are associated with unfavourable symbolic values and generate negative affective
states such as disgust, fear, and phobias across cultures (Kingston, 2016; Knight, 2008;
Kahn Jr et al., 2008). Although bat populations have also suffered a severe decline, this
phenomenon has received less attention even in scientific circles (Fleming and Bateman,
2016). Furthermore, previous studies demonstrated that subjects have lower WTP to pay
for bats (Mart´ın-Lo´pez et al., 2007). Lions are a popular, charismatic flagship commonly
used on donation appeals, with populations in West, Central, and East Africa likely to
suffer a projected 50% decline over the next two decades (Bauer et al., 2015; Macdonald
et al., 2015). Both bats and lions are found in the Savanna, which is a policy-relevant bio-
diversity habitat projected to experience a severe reduction in species richness (Newbold
et al., 2015). Both bats and lions in the Savanna face endangerment from common anthro-
pogenic factors such as hunting, and illegal wildlife trade, which are unambiguous human
threats (IUCN, 2016; Nielsen et al., 2018). More broadly, hunting and illegal wildlife
trade can invoke strong moral assessments of right and wrong citepfischer2013 and are
under-represented issues in the economics and psychology literature (St John et al., 2011).
Three ‘Control videos’ were constructed, one for Bats, one for Lions, and one for Bats
and Lions in the Savanna (henceforth ‘Savanna’). Each of these videos had conservation-
12We were constrained in our choices, as many non-charismatic species had no or very dated informa-
tion, and fewer still had comparable high-quality photos.
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relevant information, such as the ecological role and conservation status of Bats and Lions.
To construct treatment videos with additional audio-visual content on the anthropogenic
cause of endangerment, each of the three control videos was augmented by one photo
and an additional line of voice-over script stating threats from hunting and illegal wildlife
trade (referred to as ‘Cause videos’). Thus, there were six videos in total, namely Bats,
Lions and Savanna Control videos and Bats, Lions and Savanna Cause videos. Following
Gross and Levenson (1995), the average length of each video is 150 seconds, and each
photo is displayed for around 6-10 seconds. Details of each video, alongside the hypothesis
and experimental design, are discussed in the experimental design subsection.
But before proceeding, we make a note of some caveats. First, the conservation sta-
tus of Lions and Bats is not identical, given the IUCN classifies lions as ‘vulnerable’
and bats as ‘threatened’. Previous work finds the degree of endangerment status impacts
willingness to pay for conservation. For instance, Tisdell et al. (2007) found that WTP
for conservation and the level of species endangerment are positively correlated (also see
Macdonald et al. (2015). Thus, any difference in donations between Lions and Bats across
movies will also capture this difference in endangerment status, if subjects know and act
on the difference.13 Second, we treat species charisma as a black box composed of multiple
constituent factors (such as size, taxonomy, popularity), in line with extant economics
literature.14 As phylogenetic differences may exert independent effects on behaviour, we
attempt to control for some attributes, by picking mammals with forward facing eyes.
Another feature typifying species charisma is fame and popularity. However, we try to
control for prior informational differences by providing conservation-relevant information
and hold constant the Savanna habitat in a standardised format across all videos. As
we are primarily interested in the impact of media content via videos, disentangling the
relative effects of each factor constituting charisma, is left for future work.15
13While 8 out of 12 subjects in the pilot study did not know the difference between threatened and
vulnerable endangerment status, it is unclear whether the final sample knows the difference, as we did
not collect this information.
14Metrick and Weitzman (1996) choose ‘physical length of an average representative of the species’
to identify charismatic species, with the only explanation that, ‘we have not obtained a satisfactory
measure of ‘charisma’, although we have received many creative suggestions’ (pp. 4). Morse-Jones et al.
(2012) do not define charisma, but their choice of charismatic species is ‘relatively large and well-known
mega-fauna such as the lion or gorilla, and non-charismatic as birds, reptiles, and amphibians.’
15Five common elements are physical and phylogenetic features (large mammals, with forward facing
eyes), ecological features, cultural and symbolic value, affect and fame (Macdonald et al. (2015); Bowen-
Jones and Entwistle (2002); Lorimer (2007) examine non-human charisma in more detail). Other work
investgates how particular physical attributes like eyes, are particularly important; Manesi et al. (2015)
observed that participants wished to donate to save spotted butterflies (with eye-like dots) and expressed
more concern over them, compared to spotless butterflies.
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2.3.3 Experimental design
Each subject was randomly assigned to watch one of the six videos. This design follows
experimental methods previously employed in the literature to examine the impact of
the audio-visual message content on behaviour and attitudes (e.g. in Greitemeyer (2013);
van der Linden (2015). More precisely, Study 1 uses a between-subjects ‘build on’ or 3
x 3 fractional factorial experimental design to examine if donations are affected by the
type of media content from differences across (i) Bats, Lions, Savanna Control videos,
(ii) Bats, Lions, Savanna Cause videos and (iii) three Cause videos with the incentive of
public recognition. Study 2 on affect uses a between-subjects 3 x 2 factorial design and
crosses (i) Bats, Lions, Savanna Control videos and (ii) Bats, Lions, Savanna Cause videos
to map changes in affective states from Bats, Lions and Savanna and to disentangle the
outrage effect.16
Control videos: In the Bats and Lion Control videos, each species is introduced and
located within the African Savanna, followed by conservation-relevant information about
its ecological role and conservation status. In the Savanna video that locates both Bats
and Lions within a natural habitat, the voice-over first introduces the habitat and states
‘The diverse community of organisms that live here depend on each other to form a com-
plex food web’. The first line emphasises that the habitat is a larger and more complex
public good than a single species, and the second line emphasises that the habitat is
one coherent unit, composed of interdependent parts. This introduction is followed by a
sequence on the Bat and Lion, with their ecological role and conservation status, with the
photos and script standardised so that it is similar to the previous single-species Control
videos.
Cause videos: The Bats, Lions and Savanna Cause videos are identical to the Bats,
Lions and Savanna Control videos respectively, barring a one-line voice-over in each video
that states that the population of each species faces a threat from illegal hunting and
poaching by humans, and contains one additional photo demonstrating illegal hunting.
All other images and the script are indistinguishable from the Control videos.
Cause Videos + Public recognition: All subjects receiving this treatment are as-
signed to one of the three Cause videos. The only difference from the previous treatment
group is an additional paragraph in the donation appeal page which states, “To publicly
acknowledge your donation, ‘The Beaver’, which is the newspaper of the LSE Student
Union will run a short piece listing the names of the donors and the charity later this
16We feel more comfortable with a between-subjects rather than within-subjects design because we are
concerned that exposure to multiple videos will not yield clean treatment effects on donations or affect.
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year. There will also be posters listing the names of the donors and the charity in the
Saw Swee Hock Student Centre and the LSE Library. Please write your name in capital
letters (e.g. FIRST-NAME LAST-NAME), on the form to be mentioned.”
2.3.4 Hypotheses
We formulate three hypotheses to study the impact of media content of biodiversity
conservation videos on pro-sociality and affect, based on the literature reviewed in the
previous section. Drawing from studies such as Metrick and Weitzman (1998); Christie
et al. (2006); Tisdell et al. (2007) and Lorimer (2007), we propose that media content
about different species have a ‘charismatic megafauna effect’ because they can change
both pro-social behaviours towards biodiversity conservation and experienced affective
states in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis I: Videos with charismatic species elicit higher charitable donations rel-
ative to videos with non-charismatic species in Study 1 (i.e., Donations after exposure
to Bats control videos < Donations after exposure to Lions control videos). Videos with
charismatic species elicit higher positive affect, relative to videos with non-charismatic
species in Study 2.
Next, following findings of the ‘outrage effect’ reported in Bulte et al. (2005) and
Kahneman et al. (1993), we propose that media content anthropogenic cause of endan-
germent will also impact revealed pro-sociality and affect in the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis II: Videos with the anthropogenic cause of endangerment will elicit
higher charitable donations in Study 1, i.e., Donations after exposure to Cause videos
¿ Donations after exposure to Control videos. Videos with the anthropogenic cause of
endangerment will elicit higher negative affect (namely anger), relative to videos without
audiovisual information on the anthropogenic cause of endangerment in Study 2.
Given that public visibility and social recognition can increase charitable giving in
studies such as Ariely et al. (2009) and Karlan and McConnell (2014), we test the third
and final hypothesis:
Hypothesis III: The offer of public recognition will increase charitable donations,
i.e., Donations after exposure to Cause videos < Donations after exposure to Cause videos
+ Public recognition.
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Finally, we also consider if there are heterogeneous treatment effects, by examining
the behavioural responses of ‘pro-social’ subjects, i.e., those who donated to charities
outside the lab. On the one hand, it is likely that past donors may be more sensitive to
the treatments, as they report having engaged in pro-social behaviour in the real world.
Along these lines, there is evidence that pro-sociality in the lab predicts behaviour in
the field (e.g. in Benz and Meier (2008)). Conversely, they may also be likely to donate
less in a lab setting, because they already donate outside the lab. Other studies find no
association or weak evidence on the congruence between giving in experimental games
and in real life settings (Galizzi and Navarro-Mart´ınez, 2018). Given this mixed evidence
from previous work, we pay special attention to those who identify as ‘Past donors’ and
their behaviour in the current setting.
2.3.5 Charitable donations
After subjects watched the video, they faced the charitable donations task. We adopted a
modified dictator game used in other charitable giving experiments (Eckel and Grossman,
1996; Konow, 2010). Each subject could allocate any part of an endowment of £25 (in
increments of £1), to the African Wildlife Foundation. The framing is standard in the
literature, and all donations go to ‘conserve vulnerable African species and their habi-
tats’ - not the species or habitat in the video clip. The donation page featured a photo
of a single, forward facing Bat or Lion for the individual species videos. In the Savanna
treatment, the same Bat and Lion photos were used, with one additional picture of the
Savanna grassland. We adopted several design features to make the decision setting more
realistic. We choose £25 as the endowment because it is a commonly suggested middle-
level amount used by conservation charities. Subjects could receive a mailed receipt of
their donation amount if they were selected for the pay-out and were asked to write
down their lab identification code and postal address if they so desired. The offer of the
receipt served the additional purpose of increasing trust in the experiment and the charity.
Some of our experimental design choices can affect the observed results. Engel (2011)’s
meta-analysis of giving, in dictator games, finds that high stakes can dampen offers, and
we may observe the same pattern in this experiment as the endowment in this experiment
is five times the participation fee. On the other hand, it is possible that subjects are gener-
ous, because they have a windfall endowment (Carlsson et al., 2013).17 Finally, as we use
17Moreover, all subjects were video-recorded throughout the experiment, which is likely to have in-
creased donations if they ‘felt’ observed (Haley and Fessler, 2005). Every subject has to make the donation
decision, i.e., we do not give subjects the chance to opt out of the donation task, which has been found
to reduce sharing in lab and field settings (Andreoni et al., 2017; Lazear et al., 2012; DellaVigna et al.,
2012).
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a slider task, the default is set to £0 across all experimental interventions. All these de-
sign factors are constant across treatments groups, and we do not expect them to interact
with the treatments themselves, but should be kept in mind while interpreting our results.
2.3.6 Affect
The affective states were selected from the PANAS-X affect schedule (Watson and Clark,
1999) and followed the elicitation procedure recommended in (Gross and Levenson, 1995)
to measure experienced affect after watching videos. Subjects were asked to rate from a
scale of 1 to 5 how much of each of the positive and negative affect they feel while watch-
ing the videos, namely, angry, sad, guilty, happy, calm and interest, that they felt while
watching the videos. Previous research which links emotions to action tendencies sup-
ports our choices about affective states. For example, ‘anger’ has been associated with a
tendency to restore justice or hold individuals responsible, and sadness with loss and the
tendency to acquire new goods (Keltner and Lerner, 2010). ‘Sympathy’ has been associ-
ated with pro-sociality (e.g. Small et al. (2007). As clips of wildlife and natural landscapes
are often used in experiments to elicit neutral affective states, we also included ‘calm’.
Subjects answered the PANAS-X affect questions directly after watching the video
clip, and we randomised the order of the list of affect types to mitigate order effects.18
Most studies rely on self-reports using multi-item scales, which are confirmed and vali-
dated by equivalent results from fMRI studies (Harbaugh et al., 2007; Genevsky et al.,
2013). However, we also included an implicit word association exercise, as an additional
robustness check-in Study 2. After reporting affect, subjects were asked to list the first
three words that come to mind, while thinking about the video. The words are then
grouped into positive and negative affect types based on the PANAS-X schedule, other
conservation-related themes as applicable.
2.3.7 Individual-level control variables
Given the large pool of student and non-student subjects, we expected some heterogene-
ity in behaviour and motivation. We asked if subjects had previously donated to any
environmental and non-environmental charities, and about their membership status to
the same. Three questions were posed to measure pro-environmental behaviour, namely
how often individuals bought (a) eco-friendly products (b) organic, local and seasonally
18In study 1, subjects were also asked questions on affect about the video clip, after making their
donation decision. However, we prefer to disregard these responses in the analysis, as that donation
decision can independently impact self-reports of affect.
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grown food, and (c) if they recycled. Each item is rated on a 5-point Likert scale from
‘Never’ to ‘Always’, and scores of these three questions are averaged to form an aver-
age pro-environmental behaviour score. Lab experiments using dictator games find that
women, non-students, and older participants make higher offers (Engel, 2011). Therefore,
the experiment concludes with questions on socio-demographic attributes on age, gender
and job status. We included filler questions to mitigate experimenter demand effects and
randomised the order of all questions to reduce any order effects.19
2.3.8 Summary statistics for the pooled sample
The average age was 24.4 years (median age of 22 years), and 66.35% of the sample
was female. Around 81% of the subjects were full-time students, and 76% of the sample
reported that they had donated to a charity in the past.20. The average sample size for
each treatment group was 42 in Study 1 and 36 in Study 2. Tables B.1 and B.2 present
the individual-level characteristics for the pooled sample from both Study 1 and 2, and
by intervention group respectively.
2.4 Study 1 results
2.4.1 Media content on donations
The average donation is £8.51 or 34.04% of the endowment. This figure is close to offers
in charitable giving experiments, such as 30% in Eckel and Grossman (1996), but higher
than offers in anonymous dictator games (around 20% in Camerer (2003). The median
donation at £5 was made by 28.91% of subjects, and 20.42% of the sample donated £10.
While 6.63% of the sample donated their entire endowment of £25, 14.59% gave nothing.21
Figure 2.1 illustrates the average donations by treatment group (with error bars of
95% confidence interval). Three empirical tendencies emerge: first, average contributions
elicited after exposure to the Lions ‘Control’ video (£9.46) was higher than the Bats
(£7.25), and Savanna control videos (£6.32). Secondly, for each type of video (i.e. across
19We also ask subjects willingness to pay for a green tax immediately after the affect questions, which
we do not report in the current paper but discuss in greater detail in Chapter 3.
20This proportion is close to but marginally higher than, nationally representative U.K. survey esti-
mates, where 67% reported making donations to a charity in 2015 (CAF, 2016)
21Figure B.1 shows the distribution of donations for the pooled sample. Skewness and kurtosis tests
and Shapiro-Wilk tests for normality rejects that donations are normally distributed (both for the pooled
sample and by treatment group).
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Bats, Lions, and Savanna), additional media content on the anthropogenic cause of en-
dangerment elicited higher average donations, compared to the control group videos.
Thirdly, the Cause videos + Public recognition intervention evokes marginally lower av-
erage contributions than Bats and Savanna Cause videos (£7.10 and £7.89 for Bats and
Savanna respectively). Probing further into the data, we see that fewer subjects choose
not to donate when exposed to Lions videos, and this is illustrated in Figure 2.2 which
displays the share of subjects choosing to donate an amount over £0 in the donation task
by intervention group. On average, around 80% of subjects exposed to any of the Lion
videos decided to donate, compared to 63.64% and 56.31% of the subjects shown any
Bats or Savanna videos. Thus, the descriptive data provides tentative evidence for the
charisma and outrage effect, but the impact of public recognition on donations is unclear.
[Figures 2.1 and 2.2]
Table 2.1 presents results from the regression models on donations. The outcome
variable is the donation, and the two primary explanatory variables of interest are the
treatment dummies on the type of media content. The first treatment dummy called the
‘Species’ variable has three categories of Bats, Lions or Savanna. The second treatment
dummy called ‘Cause’ also has three categories for the Control video, Cause video or
Cause video + Public recognition. We present results from both Tobit (Tobin, 1958) and
Cragg-Hurdle regression models (Cragg, 1971), following econometric approaches used in
previous dictator game experiments (Engel, 2011). As the upper boundary is the dona-
tion limit £25, models (1) and (2) present the Tobit regression models right-censored at
£25. However, the donation choice can be conceptualised as a two-stage decision process
instead: first, the probability of donating any non-zero amount, versus donating noth-
ing; and second, the decision of how much to donate conditional of having decided to
donate. In this case, we treat the lower boundary as ‘observed’ rather than censored, i.e.,
the probability of donating is treated as another observed behaviour (Wooldridge, 2010;
Cragg, 1971). The specific advantage of this approach was that it allowed us to estimate
if the treatments had separate impacts on both the probability of donating (Probability)
and the amount donated conditional of having to donate (Amount).22
Thus, Models (3) to (10) in Table 2.1 present results from the Cragg-Hurdle models,
such that ‘Probability’ reports coefficients from a Probit regression model and ‘Amount’
reports coefficients from a Truncated-linear regression model. The higher proportion of
subjects choosing to donate when exposed to Lions videos suggests the Cragg-Hurdle
model is appropriate. We use robust standard errors clustered at the subject-level for all
22Appendix B has a note on the Cragg-Hurdle model and estimation strategy used in the paper.
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regression models, and the omitted category is the Bats control video. To control for po-
tential session-level factors, we added session dummies, and an additional control variable
for the number of subjects who attended each session, to control for the variation in the
probability of the payoff from the charitable giving game. Individual controls included
a dummy for whether the subject donated in the past (Past donor) and covariates on
Pro-environmental behaviour, Age, Gender, Job status (Table B.3 presents the results of
the full model).
[Table 2.1]
First, consider results from the Tobit regression models. From model (1) in Table 2.1,
the coefficient on Lions is positive and significant at 5%, suggesting that the predicted
value of donations is £1.7 higher for subjects in the Lions group compared to those in the
Bats group, holding all other covariates constant. The coefficient remains stable when
we add individual controls in model (2). The coefficient on Cause is also positive and
significant at 5%, suggesting that for those exposed to information on the anthropogenic
cause of treat, their predicted donation was higher by around £2 compared to those who
were exposed to the control group videos. Note that the coefficient on Cause + Public
recognition is positive, but not statistically significant.
Now we turn to the results of the Cragg-Hurdle regression models (models (3) to (10),
Table 2.1). The positive coefficient on Lions in models (3) and (5) suggest that subjects
are more likely to donate when exposed to Lions videos, compared to Bats (the difference
is significant at 5%). While there is a positive coefficient on the amount donated by sub-
jects, conditional on having decided to contribute, i.e., once they had cleared the hurdle
(model (4) and (6)), it is not significant. Conversely, the treatment variable on Cause is
positive and significant at 5% on the amount donated, conditional on having decided to
donate. The predicted conditional mean estimates of donations or the predicted average
marginal effect on contributions from the Cragg-Hurdle models are nearly identical to
results from the Tobit models. For instance, in model (4), the average effect of watching
Lion videos relative to Bats, holding other covariates constant is an increase in average
donations by £1.53 (significant at 5%). Similarly, the average marginal effect of exposure
to the Cause videos compared to the Control videos amounts to an increase in average
donations by £2.01 (significant at 5%). This amount is comparable to the suggested on-
line donation amounts for animal charities, which start from £2 per month. Note that the
coefficient on Cause + Public recognition is negative in models (3) and (5), suggesting
that the offer of public recognition reduces the likelihood of donating, but this difference
is not statistically significant. The coefficient is however positive when considering the
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amount donated in models (4) and (6), but is again not statistically significant.
To summarise, our first set of results find there is a positive charisma effect on chari-
table donations. This result is consistent with previous findings that charismatic species
elicit higher contributions, as in Thomas-Walters and J Raihani (2017) and other stated
preference studies. However, our results extend the literature to show that the probabil-
ity of donating is affected, rather than the amount, i.e., videos with charismatic species
(Lions), increases the probability of making a charitable donation, relative to those with
non-charismatic species (Bats), holding other variables constant. Secondly, audio-visual
content on the anthropogenic source of conservation threat increases the charitable dona-
tion amount, conditional on having decided to donate, providing empirical support for the
positive outrage effect on charitable donations, but we find no impact on the probability
of donating. The positive relationship between information on the human-made cause of
endangerment and donations is also consistent with previous work, such as (Bulte et al.,
2005).
2.4.2 Pro-social subjects (Past donors)
We now restrict the sample to pro-social subjects, i.e., those who reported making dona-
tions to charities outside the lab (past donors) and use Cragg-Hurdle model to examine
potential treatment effects. Models (7) to (10) in Table 2.1 show the results. Three impor-
tant differences emerge. First, the coefficient on Lions is positive, but weakly significant,
in models (7) and (9) (Probability, with and without individual controls). Second, the
coefficient on Cause in the truncated linear regressions remains positive but increases in
both economic and statistical significance (to the 1% significance level). For past donors,
the average marginal effect of exposure to Control videos is £3.18, compared to the con-
trol group videos (significant at 1%).
Third, for donors, the treatment effect of the Cause + Public Recognition increases
the amount donated in a statistically significant way (at the 5% level, models (4) and (6),
relative to the Control videos). The average marginal effect is also economically mean-
ingful: subjects exposed to videos with the anthropogenic cause of endangerment and the
offer of public recognition, have higher donations amounts of £2.16, conditional of having
decided to donate, compared to subjects who were exposed to videos with the cause of
endangerment. This gives us the following result: Pro-social subjects (past donors) show a
positive effect of Cause + Public recognition, i.e., the offer of public recognition increases
the charitable donation amount, conditional on having decided to donate, relative to the
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control, videos.
2.4.3 Public recognition incentive on donations
Models (7) to (10) in Table 2.1 show an increase in donations for pro-social subjects ex-
posed to Cause videos + Public recognition (relative to control videos), but the increase
is of lower magnitude than being exposed to Cause videos without Public recognition. To
obtain the separate treatment effect of the Public recognition incentive, we restrict the
sample to those subjects exposed to either the Cause video (omitted category) or Cause
+ Public recognition (treatment dummy).
Table 2.2 reports the results of the Tobit and Cragg-Hurdle models. The coefficient
on Public recognition is negative in all models, and weakly significant (at 10%) in (Tobit)
model (2) when individual controls are added. The Probability of donating in model (3) is
also faintly significant at 10% (translating into an average negative effect of £1.5). When
we consider pro-social subjects (models (7) to (10)), the coefficient stays negative, but
the difference is not statistically significant. This negative relationship is suggestive of
the crowding-out effect of weak incentives on pro-social behaviour. While it is difficult to
conclude why this is the case from the data available it is likely that the incentive is too
weak to have a substantial positive effect on behaviour. Instead, it could have reminded
subjects about what personal benefit they could derive from the donation or may have
signalled to players that those who donate do so for self-interested motivations, i.e., to
‘look good’ rather than actually ‘be good’ (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; Bowles, 2008;
Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012).23
[Table 2.2]
2.4.4 Limitations and robustness
Our results are robust to the addition of session and individual controls, which yield
coefficients of comparable economic magnitude. For instance, a one-unit increase in the
average pro-environmental behaviour score was associated with an increase in predicted
donations by around £1.70 (Table B.3 in Appendix B). We also checked for heterogeneous
treatment effects by crossing the dummy on past donor with the treatment dummies on
video content about Cause to find qualitatively similar results in the restricted sub-sample
models. We also interacted the dummies on the types of video, i.e. Bats/Lions/Savanna,
23There is some support for the possibility that the incentive is weak, as only 17.6% subjects exposed
to the Cause videos + Public recognition treatment opted to have their name mentioned on the receipts.
36
with control videos/Cause/Cause + Public recognition dummies. Lions positively predict
the likelihood of donating at 10% in the full sample, and the Cause variable positively
predicts the amount donated in the restricted sample of past donors. We also replicated
our analysis using other specifications, to find qualitatively similar results (such as Or-
dinary Least Squares, Logistic regression models). These results are omitted for brevity,
but available on request.24
We then considered the possibility that subjects may choose not to donate £0 be-
cause they mistrust the experiment or charity. If subjects decided to give £0, they were
asked to state their top two reasons for choosing not to donate after they completed
affect questions. ‘Rather keep the money’ was the top reason chosen (25.5% and 27.3%
of non-donors chose this as reason one and reason two respectively). ‘Do not trust the
charity’ was chosen by 18.2% of the non-donors (10 subjects) and came in as the third
most popular reason (and was also chosen by four subjects as reason 2). Overall only
four subjects chose ‘Do not trust the experiment’ suggesting that the research design was
successful in convincing subjects that the donations would indeed go to the charity.25
We restricted the sample by dropping the 17 observations of the non-donors that stated
that they did not trust either the charity or the experiment as one of the reasons for not
donating. The estimated treatment effects are qualitatively similar and are available on
request. Finally, we cannot fully control for the context subjects bring with them into
the lab or the numerous differences that exist between the lab and field setting, which
threaten external validity. Instead, we attempt to estimate the impact of these factors
on our results, through the collection of observable subject attributes and past donations
behaviour.
2.5 Study 2 results
2.5.1 Media content on Experienced Affect
We now turn to the impact of the biodiversity conservation videos on self-reported affect.
Figures 2.3 to 2.9 illustrate the average scores of experienced affective states (angry, sad,
guilty, sympathy, happy, calm and interest), for subjects exposed to the control group
videos and videos with additional content on the anthropogenic cause of endangerment.
Results from ordinal logistic regression models are presented in Table 2.3 (with standard
24We follow Humphreys (2010) and Wooldridge (2010) to treat the boundary value of £0 donations
as observed, rather than a sample selection problem with no missing data, so we do not use a Heckman
selection model.
25For more detail, please refer to Figure B.2 Appendix B.
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errors clustered at the subject level, with session dummies and individual controls).
Several findings emerge. First, we consider the effects of species habitat videos. Ex-
posure to Lions videos elicited higher scores of experienced happiness (significant at 5%,
model (5) in Table 2.3). This result implies an increase in the odds of reporting the
highest happiness scores by 2.42 times, holding other variables constant, relative to the
Bats Control videos. The increase in self-reported affect is in line with previous studies
that link species charisma to positive affect and likeability (Lorimer, 2007; Tisdell et al.,
2007; Brambilla et al., 2013; Mart´ın-Lo´pez et al., 2007). Exposure to Savanna videos,
on the other hand, elicited higher reported interest, where the odds of reporting highest
Interest scores were also around 2.16 times higher, relative to Bats videos. There was also
a positive effect on experienced calm (significant at 10%).
Secondly, there was an increase in the intensity of most types of affect between sub-
jects exposed to Control and Cause videos. Cause videos increase the intensity of anger,
and interest (significant at 1%), and sadness and sympathy (at 5%). From model (1) in
Table 2.3, the odds of highest angry affect score versus the low categories were 2.85 times
higher, for ‘Cause videos, when holding other variables constant. The odds of reported
sadness at the highest score are were 1.84 times higher for Cause videos compared to
control group videos. Model (4) considers sympathy, where the odds of subjects report-
ing the highest sympathy and interest scores are 1.70 and 2.10 times higher for Cause
videos, respectively. This finding is consistent with the outrage effect, as well as other
studies linking sadness and sympathy to giving (Kahneman et al., 1993; Kahneman and
Knetsch, 1992; Small et al., 2007). But cause videos also elicited weakly higher reported
happiness (at 10%). While it is unclear why this may be the case, one explanation could
be that individuals experience greater emotional arousal across all types of affective when
the human-made cause of harm is made salient or when they experience greater ‘outrage’.
However, further investigation is needed to examine this idea.
[Table 2.3]
[Figures 2.3 to 2.9]
In summary, audio-visual media content about different species and habitats, elicit dif-
ferent affective responses: videos with charismatic species (Lions), increases self-reported
happiness, and those with composite habitats (Savanna) evoke greater interest, relative to
videos with non-charismatic species (Bats). Finally, media content on the anthropogenic
cause of threat in conservation videos causes an increase a range of self-reported affect
types, including anger, sadness, sympathy, happiness and interest. This extends previous
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experimental evidence in Kahneman et al. (1993), who measure an increase in one type
of negative affect, as subjects report feeling more ‘upset’. More broadly, these results are
in line with studies that find individuals experience mixed emotional states, which are
separable by experience, and linked to the narratives told by charitable organizations
(Ruth et al., 2002; Kemp et al., 2012; Merchant et al., 2010; Bennett, 2015). From an
alternate theoretical perspective, citetkonow2009 also found that dictators experienced
more of a ‘good mood’ when the recipients are charities, and ‘bad mood’ when they are
fellow students, highlighting that the target recipient (and perceived need) can also in-
fluence the donor’s experienced affect.
2.5.2 Limitations and Robustness
Our results are robust to the addition of session fixed effects and individual controls.
Notably, when we look at the individual’s attributes, pro-environmental behaviour scores
are significantly and positively related to anger, sadness, and interest (at 1% significance
level), and sympathy (at 5%). We also replicate the analysis with the interaction be-
tween treatment dummies on the types of video (i.e. Bats/Lions/Savanna) with Control
videos/Cause dummies, with qualitatively similar results. Finally, we consider results of
the implicit word association test, to examine the frequency of positive and negative af-
fect words across different treatments. We find that Lions elicit a higher count of positive
affect words (mainly related to happiness/joviality), and this is congruent with our exper-
imental results on self-reported affect (Table B.5 in Appendix B). That said, it is beyond
the scope of the both studies to unpack the causal effect of different types of affect or the
intensity of experienced affect on donations behaviour.
2.6 Discussion and conclusion
The ongoing sixth mass extinction event mandates urgent public attention and support
for conservation work. There is a dearth of empirical evidence about what motivates peo-
ple to give to conservation and how to design effective interventions to this end. This
paper aims to fill the gap by exploring how different types of audiovisual media content
impacts charitable donations and experienced affect, by using a series of lab experiments.
The novelty of this effort is to disentangle the behavioural and emotional basis of the
charismatic megafauna effect and outrage effect. We attempt this task by exposing indi-
viduals to brief biodiversity conservation videos with narrative content about charismatic
Lions, non-charismatic Bats and a complex Savanna habitat composed of both species,
both with and without the anthropogenic cause of endangerment. We also examine if a
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non-pecuniary incentive of public recognition impacts charitable donations. In this way,
we attempt to push the frontier of existing evidence of how resources are allocated to-
wards biodiversity by considering a new context and potential psychological processes
that can underpin decision-making therein.
The results from both Study 1 and 2 yield evidence for the charismatic megafauna
and outrage effect, but extend the previous literature by isolating distinct channels of
behavioural impact. Specifically, videos with charismatic Lions increased the likelihood
of donating, but not the amount donated. Conversely, videos with the human cause of en-
dangerment, increased the amount donated conditional on having decided to donate, but
not the likelihood of donating. We also noted that treatment effects are heterogeneous:
the offer of public recognition increased donations for past donors or those who have
selected into altruistic giving environments outside the lab, albeit to a lower extent than
exposure to Cause videos, with no incentive. Effects were sizeable and ranged from £1.5
to £3. To put this into perspective, £2 is the suggested lower limit on donations on many
conservation charity websites. Study 2 reveals videos elicit complex and mixed emotional
reactions in subjects: for instance, videos with the anthropogenic cause of threat caused
an increase in self-reported anger, sadness and interest, and charismatic Lions increased
self-reported happiness.
Our results hold some potential implications for those in academia, conservation, and
policy. One implication is that conservation organisations could diversify the type of
species used in video appeals by featuring more non-charismatic species and complex
habitats, and by making explicit the anthropogenic cause of species endangerment. They
could continue to use charismatic species to widen their donor base as a complementary
strategy. This approach simultaneously addresses previously voiced concerns about the
marginalisation of non-charismatic species and ignorance of the anthropogenic drivers of
the mass extinction event. It also capitalises on the benefits of using charismatic species.
Replicating these results in different contexts and samples, and by using different narra-
tives, alongside field testing is an exciting prospect for future research to ensure a robust
evidence base for policy.
Finally, we suggest that mixed emotional reactions can have short-term effects on pro-
sociality towards biodiversity if subjects see ‘red’ but act ‘green’. While we cannot shed
light on the causal effects of emotions on donations, this is another promising avenue for
future work. Using alternative bio-physical measures of affect like fMRI scanning or skin
conductance technologies may be particularly fruitful methods to uncover these causal
relationships.
40
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2.7 Tables and Figures
Figure 2.1: Average donations made by individuals (Study 1, N=377)
Figure 2.2: Share of individual donations over £0 (Study 1, N=377)
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Figure 2.3: Angry (Study 2, N = 177)
Figure 2.4: Sad (Study 2, N = 177)
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Figure 2.5: Guilty (Study 2, N = 177)
Figure 2.6: Sympathy (Study 2, N = 177)
Figure 2.7: Happy (Study 2, N = 177)
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Figure 2.8: Calm (Study 2, N = 177)
Figure 2.9: Interest (Study 2, N = 177)
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Table 2.3: Impact of videos on affect in Study 2
Dependent variables: Angry Sad Guilty Sympathy Happy Calm Interest
Ordinal regression models: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Species = 1, Lions 0.347 -0.138 0.265 0.309 0.941** 0.471 0.470
(0.398) (0.377) (0.392) (0.376) (0.439) (0.388) (0.376)
Species = 2, Savanna 0.498 0.464 0.709* 0.483 0.549 0.625* 0.791**
(0.364) (0.333) (0.400) (0.348) (0.422) (0.374) (0.376)
Cause = 1, Human 1.050*** 0.610** 0.433 0.656** 0.756* -0.005 0.833***
(0.330) (0.293) (0.311) (0.310) (0.398) (0.295) (0.313)
Observations 177 177 177 177 177 177 177
Session dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: self-reported affect (None at all (0) to Extremely (4)); all models use robust standard errors
clustered at the subject-level, with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The omitted group is Bats control video.
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Chapter 3
Do biodiversity conservation videos
cause pro-environmental spillover
effects?
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3.1 Introduction
Conservation organisations increasingly use persuasive audiovisual media like brief online
videos to reach mass audiences. This strategy harnesses the growing tendency for the
public to depend on audiovisual and digital modes of mass communication as a source
of knowledge about environmental issues (Stamm et al., 2000; Doulton and Brown, 2009;
Feldman et al., 2012; Gavin and Marshall, 2011; Schmidt et al., 2013; Sakellari, 2015;
Vasi et al., 2015; Painter et al., 2018). Another reason that this strategy is vital is that
most individuals are physically removed from conservation sites. There is also a shift to-
wards sedentary activities involving electronic media comes at the expense of recreational
choices located in nature (Pergams and Zaradic, 2008, 2006). But as noted by Waters and
Jones (2011), there is much-untapped potential to leverage YouTube videos to float direct
appeals for public involvement. But to take advantage these types of audiovisual tools
and platforms, we need to understand both the direct and indirect effects that videos can
have on individual decision-making.
As demonstrated in Paper 1, the narrative content of biodiversity conservation videos
can have a direct effect on charitable donations. But they can also have unintentional,
spillover effects on subsequent pro-environmental behaviours (PEBs) that are not the pri-
mary target of the video intervention. The conceptual framework of behavioural spillovers
is useful to explore this possibility. It captures the notion that ‘no behaviour sits in a
vacuum’ (Dolan and Galizzi, 2015). It recognises that an intervention may have unin-
tentional effects on subsequent behaviours that are not directly targeted by it (Truelove
et al., 2014). This framework allows us to consider whether the promotion of one pro-
environmental behaviour (like watching videos and donating) raises the likelihood that
individuals will adopt other PEBs in the following decision period (i.e., positive spillover),
or reduces other PEBs (i.e., negative spillover) or even has no effect (i.e., no spillover). In
the first case the intervention could be warranted, in the second case it needs reconsid-
eration, and in the third case, we could have over-estimated its effects. The application
of this tractable framework may be particularly useful in a conservation setting because
organisations often try to amp up citizen engagement by following up donation appeals
with smaller requests for future commitments.
Indeed, recent work documents that both positive and negative behavioural spillovers
exist. Some studies show that audiovisual environmental media have a positive short-
run impact on multiple PEBs, concern, attitudes, and beliefs (e.g., in Howell (2011)).
But other studies show that engaging a pro-environmental behaviour may reduce later
pro-environmental actions due to moral licensing, unintentional compensatory or offset-
ting effects. For example, Mazar and Zhong (2010) found people were more likely to act
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less altruistically and cheat, after buying green products compared to conventional prod-
ucts.1 The underlying mechanisms driving the direction of these spillover effects is often
unclear, and depend on the intervention context and individual characteristics. Moreover,
whether biodiversity conservation videos (and the media content within them) cause pro-
environmental spillovers, is an open empirical question, warranting further investigation.
This paper builds on and extends Paper 1, by examining if audiovisual media ex-
posure from the biodiversity conservation videos and facing a donation task cause pro-
environmental spillovers on two subsequent non-target behaviours: the Willingness to
Pay (WTP) a green fee, and the Willingness to Donate (WTD) time to an environmental
campaign. The first novelty of this paper is to extend the previous literature on media
effects on behaviour by exploring the direct and indirect effects of both media exposure
and content. In particular, we focus on media content about the anthropogenic cause of
species endangerment. The second contribution is that we investigate if the similarity
between PEBs (e.g., charitable donations of money and time versus willingness to pay
a tax) impacts the likelihood of a positive spillover. We consider subjects’ pro-sociality
as a potential source of inter-subject heterogeneity, which can change the probability of
a positive spillover effect between similar PEBs, such as revealed monetary donations
and WTD time. As before, pro-social subjects are those who selected into altruistic en-
vironments in the real world, a more in-depth investigation into spillover effects of this
sub-group is of academic and policy interest.
We found that both media exposure and content have direct and indirect effects on be-
haviour. Video content on the anthropogenic cause of endangerment increases the amount
donated, but not the likelihood of donating. Video exposure increases the likelihood of a
positive WTP green fee. We also found that past donors behave differently. They donated
more when exposed to the anthropogenic cause of endangerment and were WTD more
time when exposed to media content on the anthropogenic cause of endangerment. These
findings convey that people’s pro-environmental preferences and choices are endogenous
to past choices interact with features of the behaviours themselves. Conservation orga-
nizations could also benefit by choosing to follow up requests with more similar types of
behaviours.
In the next section, we locate our work in two strands of research: firstly, in studies
seeking to quantify the behavioural impact of environmental films, and secondly, in stud-
ies about pro-environmental (and pro-social) behavioural spillovers. Section three outlines
1For example, moral licensing is one type of behavioural spillover and refers to the effect that when
people initially behave in a moral or pro-social way, they are later more likely to display behaviours
that are immoral, unethical, or otherwise problematic. See Blanken et al. (2015) et al for a review of the
literature on moral licensing.
61
our experimental design, hypotheses, and procedures. Section four presents our results.
Section five concludes with a summary of our key findings and discusses potential policy
implications and directions for future research.
3.2 Related literature
3.2.1 Impacts of audiovisual environmental media
Audiovisual media can increase moral concern and pro-environmental behaviour (PEB),
by communicating complex information quickly and memorably, using emotive images
and narratives (Moyer-Guse´, 2008; Nicholson-Cole, 2005). Theoretical insights from eco-
nomics and psychology suggest that audiovisual media can change behaviour through
various conduits, such as increasing knowledge about the problem, and changing prefer-
ences, attitudes, beliefs and experienced affect about specific places, objects and issues
covered in the video; and promoting the desirability of the pro-social action (La Ferrara,
2016; Howell, 2014; Nicholson-Cole, 2005; Pooley and o’Connor, 2000).
Previous studies reveal that environmental films can increase multiple PEBs, concern,
attitudes, and beliefs, in the short-run (Balmford et al., 2004; Reusswig, 2004; Leiserowitz,
2004; Hart and Leiserowitz, 2009; Nolan, 2010; Jacobsen, 2011; Howell, 2011; Bahk, 2010;
Greitemeyer, 2013; Howell, 2014; van der Linden, 2015; Janpol and Dilts, 2016; Arendt
and Matthes, 2016). Most studies measure a range of PEBs and behavioural intentions
using surveys, either before and after the film (within-subjects design), or after watching
the film (between-subjects design). Sakellari (2015) and Howell (2014) provide recent re-
views of the impact of climate-change cinema on PEBs, and DellaVigna and La Ferrara
(2015) reviews quasi-experimental studies on how media impacts other social and eco-
nomic behaviours.
Studies that focus on the impact of media exposure, i.e., watching an environmental
documentary film, find positive short-term effects. For instance, Leiserowitz (2004) found
that subjects who saw the ‘Day after Tomorrow,’ were more likely to state that they
would donate money to or volunteer with a global warming group, apart from expressing
greater risk perception, concern and worry about global warming. Nolan (2010), studied
the impact of ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ and reported positive short-run effects on stated
behavioural intentions to reduce personal emissions. Howell (2011) found ‘The Age of
Stupid’ increased stated concern about climate change, motivation to act, and viewers’
sense of agency (although these effects did not persist 10–14 weeks afterwards; also see
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Howell (2014).
Janpol and Dilts (2016) and Arendt and Matthes (2016) are the closest to our study
because they use a between-subjects experimental design to look at media impacts on con-
tributions towards the environment. Both studies assign individuals to watch either nature
or non-nature documentary films, after which each person could choose to donate to an
environmental or non-environmental cause. Janpol and Dilts (2016) found that a higher
proportion of subjects exposed to the nature documentary made a pro-environmental
contribution, and Arendt and Matthes (2016) found a positive effect on donations, only
for a sub-group who expressed greater connectedness to nature. In associated work, Ja-
cobsen (2011) used a quasi-experimental approach and found ‘An Inconvenient Truth’
caused an increase in the purchase of voluntary carbon offsets.
Few related studies look at the impact of message content of climate change films
and find mixed short-run effects. For instance, Greitemeyer (2013) found that watching a
climate change sceptic film decreased environmental concern, whereas watching a climate
change affirming film did not affect subject’s concern. Similarly, van der Linden (2015)
found that subjects were less likely to sign a global warming reduction petition, and were
willing to volunteer less time and money after watching a climate conspiracy video.
We contribute to this body of literature in several ways. First, we extend the empir-
ical evidence on how media affects PEBs to persuasive and brief online charity videos,
within the realm of biodiversity conservation. Second, we quantify the separate impacts
of media exposure to audiovisual information and additional audiovisual message con-
tent on donations, and two different stated behavioural intentions: namely to pay a fee
and donate time. Also, we examine if behaviour varies across three different conservation
videos, namely a charismatic species, a non-charismatic species and habitat, each with
and without the anthropogenic cause of threat (therefore six videos in total), as a robust-
ness check. Third, we consider how videos cause short-run behavioural changes using a
spillovers framework, where we conceptualise that audiovisual media interventions target-
ing donations (direct effect), may unintentionally impact subsequent stated behavioural
intentions (spillover effects). Thus, while previous work finds that audiovisual media af-
fect multiple PEBs, we explicitly incorporate the sequential nature of pro-environmental
decision making, into our analysis, as discussed below.
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3.2.2 Pro-environmental behavioural spillovers
Previous experimental studies have quantified pro-environmental and pro-social behavioural
spillovers, by exogenously varying price incentives, nudges, and information provision
(e.g., in Alp´ızar et al. (2017b,a); d’Adda et al. (2017); Thomas et al. (2016); Lanzini
and Thøgersen (2014); Poortinga et al. (2013); Baca-Motes et al. (2012); Thøgersen and
O¨lander (2003). Studies using experiments (and longitudinal surveys), with sequential de-
cision tasks show mixed results, demonstrating negative, positive or no spillover effects.
We refer the reader to Nash et al. (2017); Truelove et al. (2014) and Dolan and Galizzi
(2015), for recent reviews from environmental psychology and economics.
Studies examining spillover effects of audiovisual information are closer to this ar-
ticle. These studies primarily focus on how specific ‘incidental’ emotions caused by the
emotion-arousing video clips, which are unrelated to the subsequent decision task, im-
pact behaviour (Hanley et al., 2017; Andrade and Ariely, 2009; Harle´ and Sanfey, 2007;
Lerner et al., 2004). For instance, Harle´ and Sanfey (2007) found lower acceptance rates
of unfair offers, when subjects were exposed to movie clips eliciting sadness. Andrade and
Ariely (2009) exposed subjects to films that cause either happy or angry affective states,
followed by a series of sequentially designed Ultimatum and Dictator games. They found
that subjects exposed to film clips eliciting anger were more likely to reject unfair offers
and make fairer offers in both games, highlighting the potential importance of behavioural
consistency. On the other hand, Hanley et al. (2017) found no impact on willingness to
pay to improve coastal water quality and fish populations, when subjects were exposed
to film clips arousing, happy, sad or neutral emotion states. We extend this body of work,
by considering if environmental film clips intentionally designed to increase donations,
cause PEB spillovers.
We also attempt to shed light on whether behavioural similarity affects both the
direction and existence of PEB spillovers. Previous research suggests that a higher per-
ceived degree of similarity between different behaviours can influence spillover effects
(Thøgersen, 2004), but few studies systematically examine this (Truelove et al., 2014;
Dolan and Galizzi, 2015). For instance, a positive spillover is more likely if individuals
are prone to co-perform similar behaviours (Gatersleben et al., 2002), or if they act to
prevent cognitive dissonance, or have preferences for behavioural consistency (Bem, 1972;
Thøgersen, 2004). More specifically, Thøgersen (2004) noted that if individuals perceive
that two behaviours are linked to a common goal, individuals might experience cogni-
tive dissonance when performing one, and not the other. In addition, an individual’s
self-identity can be strengthened when she undertakes consistent choices in a specific
domain, which may lead to behavioural consistency within that domain (Van der Werff
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et al., 2013; Whitmarsh and O’Neill, 2010). In one of the few studies on the topic, Mar-
getts and Kashima (2017) found that positive spillover effects were more pronounced
for behaviours that required similar money resources (between green shopping and will-
ingness to pay a green fee) than for the behaviour that demanded dissimilar resources
(between green shopping that required money and willingness to donate time to a charity).
On the other hand, there may be a negative spillover between similar behaviours, if
subjects have a weak pro-environmental or pro-social identity (Whitmarsh and O’Neill,
2010; Truelove et al., 2014). Fishbach et al. (2006) propose that behaviours within a
domain may be perceived as substitutes, so that the successful performance of the first
behaviour might be regarded as having done enough to move towards the goal, reducing
the need to perform the second goal-related behaviour. Another mechanism facilitating
negative spillovers is the ‘self-licensing’ or ‘moral licensing’ effect, where an individual’s
inclination to engage in moral behaviours decreases after undertaking the previous sus-
tainable behaviour (Clot et al., 2016; Mazar and Zhong, 2010; Sachdeva et al., 2009).
There is experimental evidence of negative spillover effects within the same behavioural
domain and across behaviours with great similarity. Within electricity conservation, No-
blet and McCoy (2017) found individuals who engaged in past sustainable energy be-
haviours are less likely to support proposed energy efficiency/renewable energy policy
investments. Bran˜as-Garza et al. (2013) found donations in the previous period nega-
tively affected present decisions in a sequence of dictator games that tested pro-social
behavioural spillovers. These findings lend empirical support for the simultaneous exis-
tence positive and negative spillovers (Thøgersen and O¨lander, 2003; Effron and Monin,
2010).
We contribute to this work, by mapping the spillover effects from videos across dif-
ferent classes of pro-environmental behaviours of varying degrees of similarity. We focus
on whether positive spillovers occur within the same behavioural domain of charitable
donations, compared to the willingness to pay a green fee. The latter can be perceived
as stating policy support for mandatory tax payment and is arguably dissimilar to giv-
ing money and time, which are two types of voluntary contributions (albeit measured
in different resource units). In support of this, Duncan (1999) theoretically predicts that
volunteering time and money can be perfect substitutes for contributors to the public
good. Carpenter and Myers (2010) also provide experimental evidence that donations of
money and time are correlated in a sample of fire-fighters (also see Bauer et al. (2013) for
similar evidence from cross-country surveys). Other studies point out that volunteering
time and money is perceived differently from the willingness to pay a green tax due to
the compulsory ‘push’ element of regulatory coercion associated with taxes, which in turn
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can have behavioural implications (Drews and Van den Bergh, 2016; Steg et al., 2006).
In related work, Clot et al. (2016) found that inducing environmentally-orientated
students to imagine a compulsory commitment to a virtuous act (called the ‘regulatory
condition’) resulted in a licensing effect. More precisely, individuals donated less money
to an environmental cause, compared to those subjects who imagined a voluntary com-
mitment to an environmental program (non-regulatory condition) and a control condition
(no commitment to any virtuous act was imagined). They also find that environmental-
orientated students donated significantly more than business-orientated students in the
non-regulatory condition. We extend this work, by considering if there are spillover effects
from money donations (voluntary contribution) to the willingness to pay a fee (coercive
tax regulation) to the willingness to donate time (voluntary contribution). By doing so, we
attempt to recreate a sequence of three separate environmentally- relevant decisions, to
trace whether individuals reverse or enforce previous environmental and moral behaviour,
across different behavioural domains. We also pay careful attention to whether pro-social
subjects show positive spillover effects from watching videos and donating money, to
giving time. We describe our experimental design and procedures in more detail in the
following section.
3.3 Experimental design
3.3.1 Experimental design and hypotheses
We follow Truelove et al. (2014) to define a behavioural spillover as the effect of an inter-
vention on subsequent behaviours not targeted by that intervention. Panel A in Table 3.1,
describes the three behaviours, which are the outcome variables in our study. Behaviour
one is charitable donations of money (Donations) and is the target of the intervention.
Behaviour two is the stated Willingness to Pay a green tax (WTP), and behaviour three
is the stated Willingness to Donate time to an environmental campaign (WTD time).
In line with Dolan and Galizzi (2015), we conceptualise that the behaviours take place
sequentially, i.e., behaviour one is followed by behaviour two, and then behaviour three.
Table 3.1, Panel B summarises the between-subjects ‘add-on’ experimental design.
[Table 3.1]
Subjects are randomly assigned to a No Video condition, or to watch one of the dif-
ferent videos, without or with the anthropogenic cause of endangerment (called Control
Videos and Cause Videos conditions respectively). In the No Video group, we directly
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elicit the WTP a green fee and then the WTD time from subjects. In the Control Video
group, the baseline videos contain conservation-relevant information (for example the
ecological role and conservation status of each species, described in detail in the next
subsection). In the Cause Video group, we add audiovisual information on the anthro-
pogenic cause of threat to each baseline video. After subjects watch the video, we elicit
charitable donations, using an incentive-compatible modified dictator game, followed by
the stated WTP a green fee and then the WTD time, as described in the following sub-
sections. This design allows us to compare potential differences in donations, WTP a
green fee and WTD time between subjects in different treatment groups, to yield direct
and spillover treatment effects of media interventions.
We formulate three hypotheses based on the literature reviewed in the previous sec-
tion. First, we consider the direct treatment effect of media content describing the an-
thropogenic cause of endangerment, on donations. We build on the insight that additional
textual information on the human-made causes of bio-diversity depletion increases the
stated WTP to undo the harm caused (Bulte et al., 2005; Brown et al., 2002; Kahneman
et al., 1993). For instance, Bulte et al. (2005) find that Dutch respondents are willing to
state a higher WTP to protect seals when they appear to be threatened by human-made
factors, such as oil and gas drillers, or by the greenhouse effect. Assuming audiovisual
messages on the human-made causes of species depletion has a similar impact on dona-
tions:
Hypothesis I: Exposure to media content about the anthropogenic cause of endan-
germent, has a positive direct effect on contributions, i.e., ∆ DonCause = DonCause
Video – DonControl Video > 0.
Now we consider two of types of spillover effects on the WTP fee and WTD time.
First, we explore the spillover effect of media exposure to videos aiming to increase do-
nations and donating (between subjects with No Video, Control Video, and Cause Video
groups). Second, we look at the spillover effect of media content on the anthropogenic
cause of threat, conditional on having been assigned to one of the Videos and facing a
donation task (between subjects in Control Video and Cause Video groups). While the
former measures the unintended effect of exposure to a charity video (and facing a costly
donation decision), the latter measures unintended consequences of a specific type of cam-
paign message, controlling for the baseline audiovisual conservation information. Given
the mixed results in the previous literature (e.g., in Janpol and Dilts (2016); Arendt and
Matthes (2016); Howell (2014); Greitemeyer (2013), we formulate and test a null hypoth-
esis of no spillover effect from media exposure and content on WTP:
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Hypothesis II: There is no spillover effect from biodiversity conservation videos on
WTP a green fee or WTD time. More specifically, there is:
Hypothesis II-A: Media exposure has no spillover effect: ∆WTPVideo — D =
WTPVideo — D – WTPControl = 0 and ∆ WTDVideo — D, WTP = WTDVideo —
D, WTP – WTDControl — WTP = 0.
Hypothesis II-B: Media content on the anthropogenic cause of endangerment has
no spillover effect: ∆ WTPCause — D = WTPCauseVideo — D – WTPVideo = 0 and
∆ WTDCause — D, WTP = WTDCauseVideo — D, WTP – WTDVideo — WTP = 0.
However, as discussed previously, positive spillovers may be more likely if there is a
higher similarity between two behaviours if subjects have preferences for consistency or
hold a stronger pro-social identity (Thøgersen, 2004; Truelove et al., 2014; Margetts and
Kashima, 2017). In our experimental set-up, there is arguably more similarity between
money donations and WTD time as they are both pro-social actions. Subjects who do-
nated to charities in the past are demonstrably more pro-social than those who have
not, by already selecting into altruistic environments in the real world. Notably, previous
work has shown that pro-sociality measured in the lab predicts behaviour in the field
(Benz and Meier, 2008) and that pro-social preferences are stable over long periods of
time (Carlsson et al., 2014; Volk et al., 2012). Thus, it is possible that past donors may
perceive the greater similarity between charitable donations and WTD time, leading to
the higher likelihood of positive behavioural spillovers on WTD time, for these pro-social
subjects. We test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis III: Media exposure and content have a positive spillover effect on WTD
time amongst pro-social subjects, i.e., subjects who report donating to charity in the past.
3.3.2 Experimental procedure
All sessions were run at the London School of Economics Behavioural Research Lab
(LSE BRL) during November to December 2016. The experiment was hosted on the
Qualtrics platform. We followed a double-blind experimental procedure, where subjects
were randomly assigned to a computer terminal upon arrival, after which the computer
program randomly assigned each subject to one treatment group. Participation was open
all individuals registered at the LSE BRL to obtain a heterogeneous subject pool and
an adequate sample size for all treatments. In total, 259 subjects participated, and each
treatment group had an average of 37 subjects. Each subject was paid a £5 show-up fee
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that they could collect at the end of the experiment. Apart from this, all subjects had
an equal chance to earn a maximum of £25 from the charitable giving task, but only
one subject was randomly selected in each session to receive this payout. Such lottery
methods to determine payment have been used in other studies such as Clot et al. (2016).
Moreover, in a recent paper, Charness et al. (2016) review a series of experimental games
(including dictator games) and find that paying one or paying all subjects in a session
results in qualitatively similar behaviour.
3.3.3 Video interventions
Existing videos had not been designed to provide conservation-relevant information in a
controlled manner suitable for this experiment’s objectives. Thus, we constructed three
standardised Control Videos, featuring a non-charismatic species (Bats), a charismatic
species (Lions) and a composite habitat composed of the two species (Bats and Lions in
the Savanna). Each video had a sequence of fifteen photographs for each species/habitat,
with a standardised voice-over, first introducing the species/habitat, the ecological role of
each species, it’s conservation status, and a line that habitat loss due to land conversion,
is a cause of endangerment.2
The Cause videos are identical to the Control Videos, barring one additional photo
and a line of voiceover stating that another important cause of species decline is hunting
and poaching. This is useful for numerous reasons. Firstly, understanding how responses
to information about human-made drivers of endangerment are critical to generate greater
awareness about the nature of the Anthropocene and associated environmental problems
(Dirzo et al., 2014; Waters et al., 2016). Secondly, hunting is an unambiguous anthro-
pogenic cause of biodiversity loss and can invoke moral assessments of right and wrong
(Fischer et al., 2013). The issue of hunting is also underrepresented in the environmental
and conservation behaviour literature (St John et al., 2011). Importantly, hunting and
illegal wildlife trade is a consistent cause of species decline for both species considered
(IUCN, 2016). Following the procedure outlined in (Gross and Levenson, 1995), subjects
were exposed to a blank screen for 20 seconds, followed by the conservation appeal, last-
ing for an average length of 150 seconds.3
2See Appendix G for supplementary materials.
3After this, we also elicit stated affect from the video clip, which is analysed in greater detail in
chapter 2.
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3.3.4 Donations
After subjects were exposed to the video, they were directed to a donation page, which
carried one photo of the species/habitat featured in the , and instructions for the donation
task. We adopt a modified dictator game used in other charitable giving experiments (e.g.
in Eckel and Grossman (1996). An endowment of £25 was given to each subject. Subjects
could choose to allocate any part of this endowment) to the African Wildlife Foundation,
a conservation charity (in £1 increments). We chose an endowment of £25 because it is a
frequently suggested donation amount by conservation charities and of sizeable economic
magnitude (five times the show-up fee). This incentive-compatible design increases to
cost of being pro-social to all subjects facing the donation task, but holds the cost itself
fixed across subjects across treatment groups. We adopt several design features to make
the decision setting more realistic: for instance, donations go to conserve the same public
good, i.e., vulnerable African species and their habitats. Also, the instructions informed
the subjects that they would be sent a payment receipt if they so desired, upon writing
down their lab identification code and postal address.
3.3.5 Willingness to Pay (WTP) a green fee
Subjects stated their WTP a green fee after watching one of the videos and making their
donation decision. Conversely, subjects in the No Video condition, were directly exposed
to the question on the WTP a green fee. The proposed tax was an additional fee per dis-
posable cup of hot beverage on the LSE campus and could lie between 0 to 100 pence per
cup. Any revenue raised would be earmarked for environmental sustainability projects on
the LSE campus. We emphasized consequentiality to reduce hypothetical bias, by stating
that their responses would be used to inform LSE’s sustainability policy (Bulte et al.,
2005). We also used an entreaty to promote truth-telling through the following message:
‘Please provide your honest answer’ and ‘While answering, please consider how many
hot drinks you buy at LSE in disposal cups and how much that extra charge will affect
you’ (Loomis, 2014). Subjects could select any amount between 0 to 100 pence in one
penny increments using a slider task (default was set to 0 pence). To control for potential
sources of individual heterogeneity, we asked two control questions, after subjects stated
their WTP. The first question asked how often they bought hot beverages on the LSE
campus, on a Likert scale of 1 (Never) to 7 (Always). The second question asked how
often subjects used reusable beverage cups, on a Likert scale of 1 (Never) to 5 (Always).
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3.3.6 Individual attributes
Next, subjects answered questions about whether they had donated previously to char-
ity, to obtain a measure of how pro-social they were.4 Subjects also answered three self-
assessment questions measuring PEBs, on how often they bought eco-friendly products,
organic/local/seasonally grown food and how often they recycled. The responses were
measured using Likert scales from 0 (Never) to 4 (Always). Each subject’s answer to
these three questions was averaged to form a single PEB score, in order to capture to
what extent subjects engage in previous behaviours. We collected socio-demographic char-
acteristics, such as age, gender, whether they were full-time students, and their affiliation
to the LSE.
3.3.7 Willingness to Donate (WTD) time
Lastly, we measured the WTD time to an environmental campaign, which is the second
non-target behaviour in our experimental set-up. After subjects answered questions on in-
dividual attributes, the experiment ended with a question on whether and how much time
subjects would be willing to volunteer to organize events to raise awareness of environ-
mental issues on campus in the following semester. They had to indicate their willingness
to donate time by choosing a number between 0 to 7 hours using a slider task (where the
default was set to zero).5
3.3.8 Sample
Of the total sample, 63.71% was female and had an average age of 24 years. Eighty point
three one percent (80.31%) were full-time students, and 73% were affiliated to the LSE
(in Appendix C, C.1). There was balance across individual attributes by treatment group,
and shows balance on most attributes, barring age (one group elicited slightly older peo-
ple). As we follow a double-blind random assignment, this is likely due to chance (Table
4Another option would be to as subjects whether they consider themselves pro-social, to get a self-
assessment measure of their identity. We did not want to prime the subjects to be pro-social by asking
them before the video and were concerned measures elicited after watching the video would be biased.
Thus, we prefer to use a survey measure of revealed behaviour, by directly asking subjects if they had
donated to charity previously.
5A possible concern is that the WTD time elicited here captures the stated intention to donate time to
an unspecified environmental campaign on the LSE campus next semester. As the treatment is perfectly
random, any difference in the stated intention across groups should capture the spillover effects. But
the effects should be interpreted with caution if subjects are unclear what they are donating their time
to, or what they are ‘buying’ with their time. For instance, the measure may be possibly affected by
hypothetical bias, which could service to inflate the WTD time measure and the size of the spillover
effect.
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C.2 in Appendix C).
3.4 Results
After describing our estimation strategy, we report our main results in three subsections,
corresponding to each hypothesis, i.e., direct effect on donations, spillover effects on WTP
and WTD, and heterogeneous spillover effects by pro-social subjects, i.e., past donors.
3.4.1 Estimation strategy for direct and spillover effects
We used the linear two-part Cragg-Hurdle model to estimate impacts on bounded out-
comes (Cragg, 1971), due to the nature of our outcome variables and experimental set-up.
For instance, when we estimated the treatment effects on charitable donations, the first
part of the Cragg-Hurdle model deals with the decision of whether to donate (i.e., the
first hurdle is the decision to give a non-zero amount) and was estimated using a probit
regression model. The second part deals with how much to donate (i.e., the unbounded
outcome), which is estimated by using a truncated linear regression model.6 We applied
similar reasoning to determine the treatment effects on WTP a green fee and WTD time.
This estimation strategy yielded several advantages over standard statistical tests.
First, it allowed us to consider the distinct causal effects of each treatment variable on
the probability of donating a non-zero amount (Probability) as separate from the deci-
sion of how much to give (Amount). While previous experimental evidence from dictator
game experiments does find distinct treatment effects on donation probability and amount
(Engel, 2011), how media exposure and content impact the two-part decision is an open
empirical question. Second, it allowed us to control for potential session-fixed effects, by
adding session dummies. In addition, we added another covariate for the number of sub-
jects per session, to control for any variation in the expected payout from the donations
game, which may in turn impact donations and spillover effects. We also used robust stan-
dard errors-clustered at the subject-level. Third, it allowed us to control for individual
heterogeneity as an additional robustness check, by using individual-level covariates (such
as age and gender). In the following subsections, we restrict our attention to discussing
the impact of media exposure and content in the text, and present results for the pooled
Cragg-Hurdle regression models (with dummies to control for each video type, i.e., Bats,
6The Cragg-Hurdle model treats the first hurdle i.e., donations of zero currency units, as an observed
value of behavioural and policy interest rather than censored or selected variable values; it is preferable to
alternatives like the Heckman selection model (Wooldridge, 2010). The estimation strategy is explained
in the Appendix B.
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Lions, Savanna).
3.4.2 Direct effect on donations: Media content on anthropogenic
cause of endangerment
Average contributions for the pooled sample were about £8.72 or 34.88% of the en-
dowment (the median and mode = £5).7. While it is possible that higher offers in our
experiment were due to media exposure, we do not have another subject group which did
not watch any film, so it is difficult to conclude this was the case. In total, 13.45% of the
sample chose to zero-donations. From Figure 3.1, we see average donations are higher for
subjects exposed to Bats and Savanna Cause Videos, and Lions groups (around 39-40%
of endowment), providing suggestive evidence that media content positively impacts do-
nations.
[Figures 3.1]
Table 3.2 presents results of the Cragg-Hurdle model on donations, with session and
video controls. The explanatory variables of interest are a treatment dummy for Cause
Videos, with the omitted category being the Control Video group. From model (1), there
was no impact on the probability of donating a non-zero amount. But in Model (2), media
content on the anthropogenic cause of endangerment increased the amount given, condi-
tional on having decided to donate (significant at 5%). This result implies that additional
media content from Cause videos elicits higher donations by around £2.05, relative to the
control videos. Given the lower threshold for contributions on many charity’s websites
are £5, the effect size is of relatively sizeable magnitude, especially when scaled across a
large population. Thus, we find confirmatory evidence for the hypothesis of the positive
effect of media content on donations, in line with insights from previous studies (e.g., in
Bulte et al. (2005); Kahneman et al. (1993)).8
[Table 3.2]
7This figure is close to but marginally higher, than offers in charitable giving experiments, such as
30% in Eckel and Grossman (1996), but higher than offers made in anonymous dictator games of around
20% in Camerer (2003).
8When we add individual controls in Table C.3, the significance on the Cause variable falls, although
none of the individual covariates are significant (barring full-time student status, which is positive and
significant at 5%). The Lions videos increase the probability of donating in all specifications (weakly
significant at 10%).
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3.4.3 Spillover effects on WTP a green fee and WTD time: Me-
dia exposure and media content
Figure 3.2 presents the average WTP green tax by treatment group, and the average
WTP a green fee for the pooled sample is 22.72 pence (median = 20 pence). Figure 3.3
presents WTD time to a campaign. We found that the average for the pooled sample
is around 2.34 hours (median = 2 hours). In Table 3.3, models (1, Probability) and (2,
Amount), provide the results of the effect of media exposure to either the Control or
Cause Video on WTP, with session and video controls. Model (1) shows that when sub-
jects are exposed to any video, they were more likely to state a positive WTP, relate to
the no video control group (significant at 1%). In addition, model (2) demonstrates that
there is a weak positive effect on WTP amount, conditional on having decided to state a
positive WTP (significant at 10%). This finding is in line with previous literature, such
as Janpol and Dilts (2016) and Howell (2011), who also found that exposure to environ-
mental films can increase stated the intention to engage in future PEBs and elicit more
support for green policies. However, we found that spillover effects are more robust on
the probability of choosing to pay a fee, rather than the amount.
[Figures 3.2 and 3.3] [Table 3.3]
On the other hand, Models (3) of the Probability, and (4) of the Amount, indicate
that on average, there is no spillover effect on WTD time, for the pooled sample. This
result suggests that the extent to which the impact of the charity videos can carry over
to impact subsequent PEBs may be limited.9 Our results are robust to the inclusion of
(i) session controls in the main models (ii) the addition of individual controls (iii) be-
havioural lags, including donation and WTP, and (iv) replicating analysis with separate
discrete choice Probit, models, and Tobit and OLS regression models. The robustness
estimates provide qualitatively similar results, but are omitted for brevity, and are avail-
able on request.
In summary, although we did not observe a negative spillover effect on WTD time,
we did not see positive spillover effects either. More generally, these results reveal only a
modest impact of media on pro-environmental behaviour, unlike studies which document
changes in a far more extensive range of PEBs after exposure to environmental films
(e.g., in Howell (2011) and Leiserowitz (2004)). There are several potential reasons for
9From Table C.4, when we add individual controls to model (7), we find that media content on an-
thropogenic cause of endangerment increases the probability of stating a positive WTD time (significant
at 5%). We also find that a higher PEB score is associated with a positive probability of stating a positive
WTP (significant at 1-5%), and positive with amount and probability of stating WTD (significant at
1%).
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this, although it is difficult to conclude why this is the case. Firstly, unlike many previous
studies that use cross-sectional or before-and-after surveys and a self-selected sample,
our experimental design followed sequential behaviours and allowed us to map how past
decisions impact future choices. Given this, our findings suggest that after subjects un-
dertake the money donations task and state their WTP a green fee, there is no spillover
effect of videos on WTD time. Relatedly, real monetary stakes may have dampened sub-
sequent stated behavioural intentions, by increasing the salience of money to crowd out
moral motives (Bolderdijk et al., 2013) or by reducing hypothetical bias (Lo¨nnqvist et al.,
2011; Harrison, 2006). Secondly, our experimental design incorporated brief conservation
videos rather than full-length documentary films that can arguably have a weaker effect
on behaviour.
3.4.4 Heterogeneous spillover effects
We explored subgroup variation in a regression framework used in previous work such
as Heckman et al. (1997, 2002), Djebbari and Smith (2008) and Ferraro and Miranda
(2013). More specifically, we considered the interactions terms between the treatment
variables (i.e., media exposure effects by dummy variables for No Video, Control and
Cause Videos, or media content by a dummy for Control and Cause Videos) and the
donor dummy, which switches on if subjects donated to charities in the past. We ran in-
dependent regressions for the donor sub-group covariate, following Heckman et al. (2002),
continued using the Cragg-Hurdle model as before, with session and video controls, and
clustered robust standard errors at the subject-level.
In total, 74.51% had donated to charities in the past and were considered ‘pro-social’
subjects for this study. We tested if these pro-social subjects were more likely to show a
positive spillover effect on WTD time, by first considering the direct effects on donations,
presented in Table 3.2, models (3) and (4). We found that the coefficient on the interac-
tion term between Past Donor and Cause Video increased in magnitude, and is significant
at 5%. This result indicates that pro-social subjects are especially sensitive to messages
on the anthropogenic cause of endangerment, relative to non-donors, controlling for other
covariates (this result is robust to the addition of individual controls). Secondly, we found
that - controlling for other covariates - pro-social subjects donated lower amounts relative
to those who did not donate in the lab. One explanation for this is that subjects state
lower donation amounts in the lab because they engage in more pro-social activities in
the real world. Another possibility is that pro-social subjects become ‘reluctant sharers’
in the lab, i.e., they demonstrate lower levels of pro-social behaviour when they cannot
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remove themselves from the sharing opportunity in the donation task (Lazear et al., 2012).
[Table 3.4]
Next, we considered spillover effects on WTP a green fee and WTD time, in Table
3.4. As per our hypothesis, we found that the interaction term between the Cause Video
and Past Donor dummy had a positive and significant effect on the amount donated
(conditional on deciding to donate), in models (4) and (8). This finding lends empiri-
cal support to the idea that positive spillovers from media exposure to Cause Videos
and media content on the anthropogenic cause of endangerment are more likely, between
similar behaviours, when subjects are more pro-social. It is in line with studies which
highlight that heterogeneity across individuals impacts measured spillover effects (e.g., in
Clot et al. (2016), as well as impacts of the media (e.g., in Arendt and Matthes (2016)).
This finding is also in line with literature which highlights that self-identity plays a vital
role in influencing behavioural change (e.g., in Van der Werff et al. (2013); Whitmarsh
and O’Neill (2010). However, we did not find a similarly positive and significant effect on
the interaction term between Control Video and Past Donor. This suggests that videos
with narratives that draw attention to the negative impact of humans on the environment
may have a spillover effect of larger magnitude, amongst this sample. These results are
also robust to the addition of individual controls, and to restricting observations to the
sub-sample of donors.
3.5 Discussion and conclusion
Online and digital audiovisual media have a crucial role in increasing awareness and
support for conservation, and more broadly, in fostering environmental education. Thus,
understanding the direct and spillover effects of media exposure and content represents
a valuable research enterprise. Interestingly, relatively few studies have examined how
media affects PEBs, using a spillovers framework. Most studies on how audiovisual me-
dia impacts behaviour demonstrates that there can be positive (albeit) short-run effects
on multiple PEBs, and behavioural intentions. Others have shown that specific types of
message content also can impact intentions negatively (e.g., climate conspiracy videos),
or have no impact. The bulk of past research moreover focuses on measuring multiple
PEBs in a self-selected sample and primarily focus on climate change films, especially
documentaries.
We contribute to the literature on how media impacts environmental behaviour by
using the conceptual framework of behavioural spillovers. More specifically, we map the
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sequential nature of decision making to examine how media exposure and content can have
distinct spillover effects in the short-run. We drew from the literature on PEB spillovers,
which have not yet, to our knowledge, examined spillover effects of audiovisual media on
biodiversity conservation. Thus, we have attempted to bring together these two lines of
research, to map out the direct and spillover effects of media exposure and content of
brief biodiversity conservation videos.
We provide initial evidence that people can behave consistently, generating positive
spillovers, when exposed to media about biodiversity conservation. Moreover, unintended
positive effects persist from exposure to media content on the anthropogenic cause of en-
dangerment, when behaviours are more similar, and subjects are already pro-social. These
results are broadly consistent with previous research on pro-social and pro-environmental
behavioural spillovers, as well as on the impacts of audio-visual media. However, they
document more modest impacts of brief videos on multiple PEBs than previous studies.
We found that media exposure caused positive spillover effects on the WTP a green
fee, by increasing the probability of subjects donating a positive amount, but there are
limited effects on the WTD time. We also found that media content on the anthropogenic
cause of endangerment engenders positive spillover effects on the amount of time subjects
are willing to donate (conditional on having decided to give) for pro-social subjects. This
result provides initial empirical support, which greater similarity between subsequent be-
haviours, such as monetary donations and WTD time, can engender positive spillovers
for pro-social individuals. In addition, it highlights that audiovisual information effects
are heterogeneous.
These findings hold some potential policy implications. Firstly, exposure to audio-
visual media can have positive or no spillover effects on subsequent PEBs, suggesting
conservation organisations can follow up donation requests, with smaller requests on be-
havioural intentions. Secondly, we iterate that special care must be paid to design of
media content, and the narratives presented in videos as noted in Paper 1 for the ad-
ditional reason that they can have spillover effects. Information on the anthropogenic
cause of endangerment is a promising avenue to consider to raise PEBs and behavioural
intentions. Lastly, follow-up requests that are more similar to previous behaviours (e.g.,
money donations and WTD time) may yield positive spillover effects amongst donors.
That said, our findings must be seen with caution for a couple of reasons. Our method-
ological approach of using a lab experiment yields the advantage of having greater control
over media exposure and content, and in the mapping of different behaviours sequentially.
However, there are concerns regarding external validity, if the findings from within the
77
lab do not translate qualitatively in the field context. We attempt to engage with this
issue, by explicitly examining how pro-social subjects behave in the lab, given the exist-
ing evidence on the stability of social preferences in the lab and the field. We find that
pro-social subjects are likely to donate lower amounts (conditional on deciding to give
and controlling for other covariates), which may be an artefact of the lab environment.
But they are also more responsive to audiovisual messages on the anthropogenic cause
of endangerment and show heterogeneous impacts regarding spillover effects on WTD
time. We also cannot entirely rule out the potential effect of experimenter demand on
behaviour. Future work can address these concerns, by using a field experiment, to test
how robust these findings are in a larger and more representative sample. We also hope
that subsequent research may shed further light into underlying mechanisms and pro-
cesses associated with the enduring spillover effects on a broader range of behaviours, to
leverage the widespread use of digital and online media, for conservation and environ-
mental protection.
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3.6 Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Conceptual framework and experimental design
Panel A: Description of variables
Behaviour 1 Behaviour 2 Behaviour 3
Outcomes: Donations Willingness to Pay Tax Willingness to Donate Time
(Don) (WTP) (WTD)
Intervention focus Target Non-target Non-target
Elicitation order First Second Third
Range £0-25 0-100 pence 0-7 hours
Unit Money Money Time
Measure Revealed behaviour Stated intention Stated intention
Type Voluntary Coercive Voluntary
contribution regulation contribution
Panel B: Experimental design
Outcomes: Donations Willingness to Pay Tax Willingness to Donate Time
(Don) (WTP) (WTD)
Interventions:
Control - WTP No Video WTD No Video
Intervention 1, Video Don Control Video WTP Control Video-D WTD Control Video-D,WTP
Intervention 2, Cause Video Don Cause Video WTP Cause Video-D WTD Cause Video-D,WTP
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Figure 3.1: Charitable donations
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Table 3.2: Direct effect on donations: Media content on anthropogenic cause of
endangerment
Sample: All Sub-group analysis
Hurdle type: Probability Amount Probability Amount
Hurdle models: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Media Content = 1, Cause Video 0.234 3.073** 0.0255 -2.325
-0.221 -1.487 -0.574 -2.974
Past Donor = 1, Yes -0.413 -5.929**
-0.406 -2.572
Cause Video X Past donor 0.247 7.363**
-0.641 -3.366
Constant 7.189*** 2.114 7.806*** 8.391*
-0.29 -4.007 -0.549 -4.867
Observations 223 223 223 223
Session controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Video controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at subject-level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Linear Cragg-Hurdle model with donations is truncated at 0: the hurdle is modelled as a
probit regression model, and the amount donated as a truncated linear regression. Session controls
include subjects per session and session dummies. Video controls includes dummies for video type
(i.e., Bats, Lions and Savanna videos).
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Figure 3.2: Willingness to pay (WTP) a green fee
Figure 3.3: Willingness to Donate (WTD) time
89
T
ab
le
3.
3:
S
p
il
lo
ve
r
eff
ec
ts
on
W
T
P
a
gr
ee
n
fe
e
an
d
W
T
D
ti
m
e:
T
re
at
m
en
t
eff
ec
t
of
m
ed
ia
ex
p
os
u
re
an
d
m
ed
ia
co
n
te
n
t
T
re
at
m
en
t
eff
ec
t:
M
ed
ia
ex
p
o
su
re
M
ed
ia
co
n
te
n
t
o
n
C
a
u
se
O
u
tc
om
e
va
ri
ab
le
:
W
T
P
W
T
D
W
T
P
W
T
D
H
u
rd
le
ty
p
e:
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
A
m
o
u
n
t
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
A
m
o
u
n
t
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
A
m
o
u
n
t
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
A
m
o
u
n
t
H
u
rd
le
m
o
d
el
:
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
M
ed
ia
=
1,
C
on
tr
ol
V
id
eo
4.
74
4*
**
9
6
.4
6
*
0
.6
8
7
1
.0
8
5
-0
.6
01
-5
4
.2
5
-0
.6
8
1
-1
.0
0
5
M
ed
ia
=
2,
C
au
se
V
id
eo
4.
83
6*
**
9
4
.8
6
*
0
.4
5
4
1
.5
1
0
.0
9
2
6
-1
.7
2
-0
.2
3
3
0
.4
3
4
-0
.6
22
-5
4
.2
8
-0
.6
9
-1
.0
3
2
-0
.2
5
8
-1
3
.0
5
-0
.1
9
3
-0
.3
2
5
C
on
st
an
t
-4
.9
44
-5
3
8
.7
*
-1
.8
0
1
-1
4
.2
5
*
*
6
.2
7
4
*
*
*
-6
0
.5
6
0
.3
4
6
1
.4
2
7
*
*
*
-5
.2
94
-3
0
7
.1
-3
.9
7
1
-6
.1
5
7
-0
.4
5
7
-7
9
.6
1
-1
.1
2
-0
.4
9
4
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
25
9
2
5
9
2
5
9
2
5
9
2
2
3
2
2
3
2
2
3
2
2
3
S
es
si
on
co
n
tr
ol
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
V
id
eo
co
n
tr
o
ls
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
te
s:
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
su
b
je
ct
-l
ev
el
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
,
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
p
<
0
.1
.
L
in
ea
r
C
ra
g
g
-H
u
rd
le
m
o
d
el
w
it
h
d
o
n
a
ti
o
n
s
is
tr
u
n
ca
te
d
a
t
0
:
th
e
h
u
rd
le
is
m
o
d
el
ed
a
s
a
p
ro
b
it
re
g
re
ss
io
n
m
o
d
el
,
a
n
d
th
e
a
m
o
u
n
t
d
o
n
a
te
d
a
s
a
tr
u
n
ca
te
d
li
n
ea
r
re
g
re
ss
io
n
.
In
M
o
d
el
s
(1
)-
(4
),
N
o
V
id
eo
is
th
e
o
m
it
te
d
ca
te
g
o
ry
,
a
n
d
in
M
o
d
el
s
(5
)-
(8
),
C
o
n
tr
o
l
V
id
eo
is
th
e
o
m
it
te
d
ca
te
g
o
ry
.
S
es
si
o
n
co
n
tr
o
ls
in
cl
u
d
e
su
b
je
ct
s
p
er
se
ss
io
n
a
n
d
se
ss
io
n
d
u
m
m
ie
s.
V
id
eo
co
n
tr
o
ls
in
cl
u
d
e
d
u
m
m
ie
s
fo
r
v
id
eo
ty
p
e
(i
.e
.,
b
a
ts
,
li
o
n
s
a
n
d
sa
v
a
n
n
a
v
id
eo
s)
.
90
T
ab
le
3.
4:
H
et
er
og
en
eo
u
s
sp
il
lo
ve
r
eff
ec
ts
:
P
ro
-s
o
ci
al
su
b
je
ct
s
T
re
at
m
en
t
eff
ec
t:
M
ed
ia
ex
p
o
su
re
M
ed
ia
co
n
te
n
t
o
n
C
a
u
se
O
u
tc
om
e
va
ri
ab
le
:
W
T
P
W
T
D
W
T
P
W
T
D
H
u
rd
le
ty
p
e:
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
A
m
o
u
n
t
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
A
m
o
u
n
t
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
A
m
o
u
n
t
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
A
m
o
u
n
t
H
u
rd
le
m
o
d
el
s:
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
M
ed
ia
=
1,
C
on
tr
ol
V
id
eo
5.
47
5*
**
9
6
.4
5
*
0
.6
9
1
1
.1
8
4
-0
.7
69
-5
2
.5
-0
.7
9
5
-1
.0
9
4
M
ed
ia
=
2,
C
au
se
V
id
eo
5.
07
1*
**
7
5
.4
3
0
.0
8
0
5
-0
.2
4
2
-0
.4
0
4
-2
2
.7
3
-0
.6
1
-1
.4
6
0
*
*
-0
.6
84
-5
1
.7
1
-0
.7
9
9
-1
.1
8
7
-0
.5
2
3
-2
6
.1
1
-0
.4
3
-0
.7
1
4
P
as
t
D
on
or
=
1,
Y
es
0.
61
1
2
2
.6
3
-0
.1
2
3
-0
.9
3
2
-0
.0
1
9
8
1
4
.5
4
-0
.1
4
7
-0
.9
3
9
*
-0
.5
62
-2
6
.1
5
-0
.4
8
5
-0
.8
2
7
-0
.5
1
4
-1
9
.8
6
-0
.3
5
4
-0
.5
3
4
C
on
tr
ol
V
id
eo
X
P
as
t
D
on
or
-0
.6
31
-9
.0
8
2
-0
.0
2
4
3
0
.0
1
5
1
-0
.7
62
-3
1
.2
2
-0
.6
0
1
-0
.9
8
4
C
au
se
V
id
eo
X
P
as
t
D
on
or
0.
15
6
1
5
.4
6
0
.4
8
2
.4
2
9
*
*
0
.7
8
8
2
6
.5
2
0
.5
0
4
2
.4
7
2
*
*
*
-0
.6
98
-3
3
.2
1
-0
.5
8
5
-1
.0
0
5
-0
.6
4
2
-3
1
.7
6
-0
.4
9
3
-0
.8
3
C
on
st
an
t
-6
.2
-5
2
6
.7
*
-1
.6
6
5
-1
4
.0
5
*
*
5
.9
8
4
*
*
*
-7
5
.2
9
0
.4
6
3
2
.0
7
1
*
*
*
-4
.8
66
-2
8
8
.2
-3
.9
4
6
-5
.7
7
6
-0
.7
8
5
-7
7
.1
8
-1
.1
5
7
-0
.6
5
8
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
25
9
2
5
9
2
5
9
2
5
9
2
2
3
2
2
3
2
2
3
2
2
3
S
es
si
on
co
n
tr
ol
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
V
id
eo
co
n
tr
ol
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
te
s:
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
su
b
je
ct
-l
ev
el
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
,
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
p
<
0
.1
.
L
in
ea
r
C
ra
g
g
-H
u
rd
le
m
o
d
el
w
it
h
d
o
n
a
ti
o
n
s
is
tr
u
n
ca
te
d
a
t
0
:
th
e
h
u
rd
le
is
m
o
d
el
le
d
a
s
a
p
ro
b
it
re
g
re
ss
io
n
m
o
d
el
,
a
n
d
th
e
a
m
o
u
n
t
d
o
n
a
te
d
a
s
a
tr
u
n
ca
te
d
li
n
ea
r
re
g
re
ss
io
n
.
In
M
o
d
el
s
(1
)
to
(4
),
N
o
V
id
eo
is
th
e
o
m
it
te
d
ca
te
g
o
ry
,
a
n
d
in
M
o
d
el
s
(5
)
to
(8
),
C
o
n
tr
o
l
V
id
eo
is
th
e
o
m
it
te
d
ca
te
g
o
ry
.
S
es
si
o
n
co
n
tr
o
ls
in
cl
u
d
e
su
b
je
ct
s
p
er
se
ss
io
n
a
n
d
se
ss
io
n
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
.
V
id
eo
co
n
tr
o
ls
in
cl
u
d
e
d
u
m
m
ie
s
fo
r
v
id
eo
ty
p
e
(i
.e
.,
b
a
ts
,
li
o
n
s
a
n
d
sa
v
a
n
n
a
v
id
eo
s)
.
91
Chapter 4
Taking ‘measured’ risks while
cycling: Field evidence on risk-taking
and air pollution avoidance
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4.1 Introduction
This paper aims to map the empirical relationship between risk preferences and daily
transport behaviour in two domains: risk-taking and self-protection from air pollution
while cycling. It reports the results from a lab-in-the-field experiment in a pool of 181
cyclists who attended a large cycling festival in London. The primary aim is to assess
the behavioural validity of risk preference measures: to what extent do risk preference
measures elicited using different methods associate with behaviour across individuals?
The second aim is to explore cross-context validity: to what extent do these different risk
preference measures associate with each other within an individual?
This research was motivated by the need to test different measures of risk preferences
in environmental and health settings. Risk preference is widely considered a fundamen-
tal driver of behaviour. However, a closer look reveals mixed and inconclusive empirical
results on the associations between risk aversion and behaviour in domains as diverse as
smoking, transport, the adoption of agricultural technologies, and medical screening. Un-
derlying these divergent results is the fact that existing studies employ multiple types of
risk preferences measures, each with a distinct underlying methodological and theoretical
framework.1 For instance, current methods to measure risk preferences for health out-
comes mainly rely on stated measures using self-assessments using Likert-scale questions
or hypothetical scenarios. On the other hand, incentive-compatible experimental methods
to measure revealed risk preferences with real consequences are commonly based on mon-
etary outcomes. To date, there is no consensus about the ‘gold-standard measurement
methodology’ (Galizzi et al., 2017).
A related challenge is that there is growing evidence that risk preferences are domain-
specific and can even vary across different decision contexts within the same behavioural
domain (Blais and Weber, 2006; Barseghyan et al., 2018). The simultaneous existence of
heterogeneous risk preferences across behavioural domains and decision contexts - but
within an individual - has methodological and conceptual implications. Domain-specific
risk preferences are more likely to show stronger associations with behaviour and thus
show stronger behaviourally validity, compared to domain-general risk preferences (Gal-
izzi et al., 2016b; Ioannou and Sadeh, 2016). It also complicates the proposition that
risk preferences are a stable personality trait (Hanoch et al., 2006). A means to address
this concern empirically is to check if risk preference measures are correlated across dif-
ferent domains. Indeed, disagreements on how to measure risk preferences run parallel
to those on the theorisation of risk aversion (Frey et al., 2017). Thus, to enhance our
understanding of human choice under uncertainty, the choice of risk preference measure,
1See Charness et al. (2013) for a recent review.
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its methodology and the behavioural domain all matter.
Few studies examine these questions in the transport domain, especially amongst ac-
tive travellers in urban settings. Yet they are of interest for both research and policy.
Cycling is pro-environmental and health behaviour that has been actively encouraged
by policy-makers at the intersection of environmental, health and urban policy. It con-
fers health and well-being benefits from increased physical activity, and societal benefits
through reduced traffic-related emissions and burden on public transit systems (Wood-
cock et al., 2014). However, UK cyclists have a higher risk of death or serious injury, per
mile, than users of motorised modes of transport except for motorcycles (DFT, 2015).
If proximate to exhaust-emitting cars and lorries, they are exposed to higher levels of
pollutants and tend to inhale more particulates because they breathe more heavily. Both
risk-taking while cycling, and air pollution health risks take-away from the benefits of
cycling and are barriers to increasing cycling take-up. Relatively little is known about
the cyclist’s preferences and behaviours (Handy et al., 2014). This knowledge is critical
to design more effective policy like targeted training programs and communication in-
terventions.2 Furthermore, insights on the behavioural and cross-context validity of risk
preferences add to methodological debates on how best to measure risk preferences in the
field. Advancing this debate is the key to understanding decision-making in the environ-
ment, health and transport domains.3
This study jointly explored risk-taking and self-protection via air pollution avoidance.4
Data on decision making across decision contexts within each domain were collected to ex-
plore how different risk measures associated with both aggregated behavioural outcomes
for each domain, and discrete choices across contexts within domains. Three types of
commonly used risk preference measures were elicited: the ordered lottery selection task
(modified from Binswanger (1980, 1981) and Eckel and Grossman (2002, 2008), hence-
forth called BEG risk) and self-assessments on the willingness to take risk in general and
health domains (from the German Socio-Economic Panel survey, hereafter called SOEP-G
and SOEP-H for the domain-general risk measure and health domain-specific risk mea-
sures respectively). Besides this, precautionary attitudes towards items in a cycling kit
2Aldred et al. (2016) notes that take-up in the UK has not increased sufficiently despite an increase
in resource allocation towards cycling. These policy learnings can be useful in other countries as well, as
the number of cyclists has been rising in major cities worldwide (Pucher et al., 2011; Handy et al., 2014;
Fishman, 2016).
3Another core dimension of the validity of risk preferences is the temporal stability of risk preferences,
i.e., the stability of preferences across time for an individual elicited using different measures. See Galizzi
et al. (2016a) and Chuang and Schechter (2015) for a brief review.
4Ehrlich and Becker (1972) differentiated between self-protection (choices that reduce the probability
of a loss) from self-insurance (choices that reduce the size of a loss). Many daily decisions, such as wearing
a helmet or a facemask, can be seen as self-protection, even if they can also incorporate an element of
self-insurance (Gollier et al., 2013).
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(e.g. Lights, Helmets and Facemasks) were measured to offer an alternate perspective
of risk attitudes across different contexts within each behavioural domain. Air pollution
risk perception was also measured, to investigate if subjective risk beliefs correlate with
behaviour and other risk measures. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first
to elicit risk preferences using both incentive-compatible and questionnaire methods to
look at risk-taking and air pollution avoidance amongst active travellers in a field setting.
Turning the spotlight on air pollution avoidance is particularly novel, and overall this
study is one of the few analyses that account for a variety of risk preference measures
and subjective risk perceptions in a single study.
The overall finding is domain-specific risk preferences show stronger associations with
risk-taking behaviour, but that risk preference measures do not associate with air pol-
lution avoidance. More precisely, the first result of the paper is that SOEP-H, which
captures an individual’s self-reported willingness to take risks in health is strongly cor-
related with risk-taking while cycling, in particular, the aggregated outcome measure.
The second result is that air pollution risk perception was strongly associated with air
pollution avoidance, but none of the risk preferences measures were. Third, the different
risk preference measures correlate and map onto each other, but their associations are
imperfect and weak.
These results support the idea that individuals exhibit variability between different
risk elicitation methods. Taking this idea further, risk preferences elicited using context-
specific tasks need not predict behaviour in other contexts. This implies that future
researchers need to use risk measures that are lie close to the behavioural domain under
study, and measure a more comprehensive set of both risk preference and behavioural
outcome measures to detect underlying behavioural tendencies. These results also suggest
that risk perception – rather than risk preference – is an important explanatory variable
when it comes to self-protection from ambient environmental risks like air pollution. Risk
perception is arguably more amenable to change in the short-run relative to risk prefer-
ences, and therefore this finding presents a potential avenue through which policy-makers
could change behaviour (discussed in section 4.5 in greater detail).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section briefly reviews different
risk elicitation methods and the literature on the behavioural and cross-context validity
of different risk preferences. Section three outlines the experimental method, variables
and empirical model used the analysis. The next section presents the results and briefly
discusses the study limitations. Section four concludes, by summarising the main findings
and implications for policy and future research.
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4.2 Related literature
4.2.1 Brief overview of risk elicitation methods
As an important component of the paper is to test different risk preference measures in
the field setting, I briefly make a note of the main methods employed that are directly
relevant to the current study. I refer the reader to Galizzi et al. (2017), Barseghyan et al.
(2018), Chuang and Schechter (2015), Charness et al. (2013), Harrison and Rutstro¨m
(2008), and Cox and Harrison (2008) for more detailed reviews.
Risk preferences are mostly commonly elicited in the lab and field through either ex-
perimental and questionnaire methods. Experimental methods rely on revealed behaviour
and use incentive-compatible choice tasks with financial trade-offs. These trade-offs can
be across investment options (e.g. in Gneezy and Potters (1997) or the GP investment
game), ordered lotteries (e.g. the Multiple Price List method from Holt and Laury (2002)
(HL-MPL); or the BEG risk task) or the Deal or No Deal game (DOND) (Post et al., 2008;
Deck et al., 2008). Some other experimental risk measures include the Becker-DeGroot-
Marshak mechanism (e.g. in Isaac and James (2000)), the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task
(Crosetto and Filippin, 2013) (BRET) and the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART)
(Lejuez et al., 2002).
Alternately, questionnaires methods rely on self-assessment measures from surveys
on an individual’s willingness to take risks. The German SOEP panel survey asks ques-
tions on the willingness to take risks in more generally in life (previously referred to as
the SOEP-G), as well as in behavioural domains like health (SOEP-H) (e.g. in Dohmen
et al. (2011)). The Domain-Specific Risk-Taking scale (DOSPERT scale) measures risk-
taking in general life domain (DOSPERT-G), as well as financial, ethical, recreational,
health/safety and social life domains (Weber et al., 2002). Unlike the other measures, it
distinguishes between conventional risk attitudes using a risk behaviour scale and per-
ceived risk perception.
Each method has its advantages and disadvantages. For instance, one concern is that
non-incentive compatible methods are subject to hypothetical bias. Another concern is
that survey questions either infer risk attitudes from self-reported engagement in risky
behaviours rather than actual risk attitudes (e.g. DOSPERT) and cannot scale to a the-
oretically rooted risk parameter (e.g. SOEP measures). That said, designing choice tasks
with real consequences across domains (e.g. for health or recreation) can be challeng-
ing, and current incentive-compatible measure predominantly rely on monetary rewards,
which in turn are costly - especially if high stakes are required to dampen hypothetical
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bias.
4.2.2 Behavioural validity
In Expected Utility Theory (EUT), the standard economic model of decision making
under uncertainty, risk aversion is conceptualised as a preference parameter and is equiv-
alent to the concavity of the utility function (Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1965, 1968). It is often
seen as a personality trait or stable risk attitude (e.g. in Borghans et al. (2008); Becker
et al. (2012)). Under this framework, one would expect risk averters are less likely to en-
gage in risk-taking behaviour. Correspondingly, risk averters may also be more likely to
engage in self-protection behaviours, which are fundamental to coping with health risks. 5
Subsequent conceptual models suggest the relationship between risk aversion and self-
protection is ambiguous (Dionne and Eeckhoudt, 1985; Briys et al., 1991; Eeckhoudt and
Gollier, 2005). Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1985) showed that risk aversion need not be mono-
tonically related to self-protection, as self-protection effort can decrease the final wealth
in the state. Briys et al. (1991) shows that the relationship is ambiguous when the effec-
tiveness of self-protection is uncertain. Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2005) show self-protection
is affected by higher-order preferences, such as prudence, apart from risk aversion. They
showed that prudent risk averters might have lower levels of self-protection, as prudent
individuals may prefer to save effort or spending on self-protection to cover the loss if it
occurs. Thus, based on theoretical models, we may expect risk aversion to be negatively
associated with risk-taking, but not necessarily with self-protection.
However, results from empirical investigations are inconclusive. Studies that exam-
ine transport-related outcomes or health behaviour show positive, null, and negative
correlations. For example, Anderson and Mellor (2008) obtained incentive-compatible
risk preferences using the HL-MPL task from Holt and Laury (2002). They found risk-
aversion was positively (albeit weakly at the 10% level) associated with higher reported
seat-belt use amongst a large sample of over 900 American students and adults, but no
association with driving over the speed limit. They also found weak associations with
smoking, heavy drinking, and being overweight/obese. Rustichini et al. (2016) also used
an incentive-compatible lottery task to elicit risk preferences amongst a sample of over
700 trainee truckers. They found no significant relationship with the number of accidents,
5Subsequent models in behavioural economics consider risk-taking behaviour to be an outcome of
broader cognitive processes. For instance, by evaluating potential values of the gains and losses in prospect
theory and by using heuristics (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Mousavi
and Gigerenzer, 2014). Starmer (2000); Gollier et al. (2013); Mishra (2014) provide reviews on theoretical
developments in economics and psychology on decision making under uncertainty.
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Body Mass Index and job attachment outcomes like time of exit, but they found strong
associations with smoking and credit scores in the expected directions. Goldzahl (2017)
measured risk-aversion through the incentive-compatible BEG ordered lottery selection
task amongst 178 French women. She found that more risk-averse women were less likely
to get screened for breast cancer.6 The current study aims to augment the literature
on the behavioural validity of risk preferences by looking daily decision making in two
different and under-studied domains: risk-taking and self-protection choices through air
pollution avoidance, while cycling.
Most studies - including the ones reviewed above- use only a single measure of risk
aversion to examining questions of behavioural validity. This practice is insufficient if risk
preferences are domain-specific, as the evidence increasingly shows (Blais and Weber,
2006; Barseghyan et al., 2011; Einav et al., 2012; Dohmen et al., 2011; Galizzi et al.,
2016a,b; Ioannou and Sadeh, 2016; Hanoch et al., 2006; Riddel, 2012). To illustrate, both
Riddel (2012) and Ioannou and Sadeh (2016) found that subjects exhibit higher risk
aversion in the environmental domain compared to the financial domain using both hy-
pothetical and incentive-compatible tasks respectively. Similarly, Galizzi et al. (2016a)
also find subjects are less risk averse in the financial domain, compared to the health
domain.7 Domain-specific risk preferences suggest that risk preference measures elicited
through using incentive-compatible experimental methods using monetary payoffs may
not capture risk-taking adequately in other domains like health or self-protection. Rather,
domain-specific risk measures - either through experimental or questionnaire methods -
may be more useful to explain variations in risk-taking and self-protection. Thus, the
6Such inconsistent results stretch to studies covering other behavioural domains as well. For example,
risk aversion was found to be associated with lower acceptance of genetically modified food (Lusk and
Coble, 2005), lower drug use (Blondel et al., 2007), lower body mass index (Sutter et al., 2013; Galizzi
et al., 2016a), lower smoking and drinking (Anderson and Mellor, 2008; Reynolds et al., 2006; Khwaja
et al., 2006; Barsky et al., 1997), higher demand for medical screening tests (Picone et al., 2004), reduced
residential energy use (Volland, 2017), increased pesticide and fertilizer use amongst farmers (Liu and
Huang, 2013; Verschoor et al., 2016), the late adoption Bt Cotton (Liu, 2013), the increased likelihood
of relying on traditional seeds (Brick and Visser, 2015), lower probability of adopting energy efficient
technologies and renovating homes (Qiu et al., 2014; Fischbacher et al., 2015). On the other hand, there
are studies which found no association between risk aversion and smoking (Harrison et al., 2010; Szrek
et al., 2012; Harrison et al., 2017; Galizzi et al., 2016a) or other health behaviours, like the consumption
of junk food (Galizzi et al., 2016a). Verschoor et al. (2016) found no association between risk aversion
and the growing of cash crops and market orientation amongst farmers. Barham et al. (2014) saw only
a weak association between risk aversion and the timing of adoption of GM soy, and no association with
GM corn, amongst a sample of US farmers.
7In the same vein, Einav et al. (2012) found that risk preferences that are elicited from subject’s choices
in insurance domains have more predictive power for explaining insurance choices than demographic
variables (like age, income, gender, and race). It can also be noted that individuals may have different
risk preferences according to how the risk reduction comes about, for example towards private reductions
in risk (e.g. through self-protection) versus public reductions in risk (e.g. through public initiatives to
reduce the need for self-protection). In such cases, private reductions in risk may act as substitutes or
complements to public initiatives to reduce risk. While this is an interesting issue that needs further
investigation, this paper focuses primarily on private actions to reduce risk.
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current study builds on and extends the literature, by exploring both experimental and
self-assessment measures of risk-taking in different behavioural domains link to risk-taking
and air pollution avoidance behaviours. Data on sub-domain risk attitudes and beliefs,
namely precautionary attitudes towards items in a cycling kit (e.g. Lights, Helmets and
Facemasks) and Air pollution risk perception, is also collected to provide a more granular
picture of the behavioural validity of risk preferences, as explained in the methods section
in greater detail.
Additionally, many studies focus only a specific behaviour, or a narrow range of two to
three key behaviours, to represent decision-making in a given behavioural domain. How-
ever, a substantial body of work has established that individuals make decisions across
multiple distinct contexts within a given domain and there can be unintended spillover
effects from one choice to the next (Truelove et al., 2014; Dolan and Galizzi, 2015; Nash
et al., 2017). This implies that an individual can compensate risk-taking in one decision
context (e.g. by not wearing a helmet) by acting as a risk averter in another (e.g. cycling
more slowly). Therefore, focusing on one behaviour arguably presents an incomplete pic-
ture of decision making in a given domain, and implicitly assumes that choices in that
context are representative of decision-making in the domain in question. Collecting data
on a broader range of decision contexts could serve to guard against this, by yielding
associations both with individual and aggregated outcome measures. This task is also es-
sential because if risk preferences vary by decision context, it is not clear to what extent
the result for previously studied behaviours can generalise to other settings. Hence, this
paper improves upon previous work by measuring self-reported choices across different
decision texts with each domain of risk-taking and air pollution avoidance, to present a
more comprehensive picture of decision making. Specifically, it considers both discrete
choices across contexts within domains and aggregated measures of behaviour for a given
domain.8
4.2.3 Cross-context stability
Only a limited set of recent studies have explored the question of cross-context validity.
One line of research uses within-subjects design with representative samples: Dohmen
et al. (2011); Josef et al. (2016); Coppola (2014) consider Germany, and Galizzi et al.
(2016a) study the U.K. Another line of research uses a lab-in-the-field method with non-
student samples and a within-subjects design (Dave et al., 2010; Reynaud and Couture,
2012; Galizzi et al., 2016b; Riddel, 2012). Other studies use lab experiments (mostly
8Bradford et al. (2017) adopt a similar approach when testing for the behavioural validity of time
preferences.
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with students or those enrolled in experimental laboratories in universities) with either a
within-subjects design (Lo¨nnqvist et al., 2015; Deck et al., 2013; Loomes and Pogrebna,
2014; Isaac and James, 2000; Vieider et al., 2015; Falk et al., 2015; Dulleck et al., 2015;
Csermely and Rabas, 2016; Attanasi et al., 2016; Berg et al., 2005; Hey et al., 2009) or a
between-subjects design (Crosetto and Filippin, 2016). The evidence so far shows mixed
evidence on cross-context validity. The majority of studies also rely on lab experiments,
with student samples, especially when more than two risk measures are considered. 9
For instance, Dohmen et al. (2011) tested for associations between an experimental
and incentive-compatible risk measure using a multiple price list (not the HL-MPL) and
the SOEP-G risk measure. They elicited risk preferences using a fixed order of questions,
such that subjects went through a detailed questionnaire, which elicited the SOEP-G
risk measure, immediately followed by the paid lottery experiment. They find that the
SOEP-G predicts the experimental measure quite well. Galizzi et al. (2016a) tested two
experimental measures (HL-MPL, BEG) and three survey measures (SOEP-G, SOEP-H
and SOEP-Finance). They first measure HL-MPL (alongside time preferences), followed
by BEG risk measures, after which subjects answered a standard module of the U.K.
Understanding Society survey, that contained the SOEP questions. They found mixed
results on cross-context validity; the HL-MPL measure was correlated with the SOEP-G,
but no other survey measure and the BEG risk measure was correlated with all survey
measures.
Field-based studies also show mixed evidence on cross-context validity. For instance,
Dave et al. (2010) find measured risk aversion is higher when it is elicited using the HL-
MPL lottery, compared to the BEG lottery, in a sample of Canadian residents (subjects
completed the BEG task before attempting the HL-MPL task). Conversely, Reynaud
and Couture (2012) found risk aversion measured using the BEG task is higher than
when measured in the HL-MPL, in a sample of French farmers (with hypothetical lot-
teries). Subjects first undertake the HL-MPL task, followed by the BEG-task. They find
HL-MPL and BEG risk measures are significantly correlated. They find only weak cor-
relations between the experimental and DOSPERT measures (with DOSPERT-General,
Finance and Recreation, but not with Health/Safety, Social or Ethical). Lab experiments
also reveal limited support for cross-context validity. For instance, Lo¨nnqvist et al. (2015)
compare risk aversion elicited using the HL-MPL and an aggregated General Risk Factor
composed of the different SOEP measures (such as social, health, finance etc.) in a within-
subjects lab experiment. They find no correlation between the General Risk factor form
9Many studies in this literature also check for associations between economic preferences (such as
time, risk, trust and altruism), to psychological traits (e.g., like the Big-5 personality traits, the locus of
control, and cognitive ability).
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the questionnaire and the HL-MPL risk measure (also see Crosetto and Filippin (2016)).10
This study extends the currently limited literature on cross-context validity in three
main ways. Firstly, it extends the evidence to an under-examined sample and field setting,
as well as two new behavioural domains as previously discussed. In this way, it takes the
evidence on cross-context validity outside the lab and student sample, and into the field.
Second, it considers a broader range of risk measures, specifically the BEG, SOEP-G and
SOEP-H risk measures, and precautionary attitudes and air pollution risk perception,
alongside more standard risk measures. Thirdly, it offers methodological improvements
in the experimental design, as the order of the risk questions is randomised. Randomiza-
tion serves to mitigate order and anchoring effects, which may affect the risk measures
observed in many previous studies, and thereby the results about cross-context validity.
4.3 Experimental method
This analysis draws on data from a lab-in-the-field experiment as defined in Gneezy and
Imas (2017).11 Data was collected using an experimental survey in the public festival
zones of the Prudential Ride London (PRL) Festival held during 28-31 July 2017. The
experiment targets urban cyclists, who are a theoretically relevant population, especially
in the context of targeted programs on risk-taking, road safety and air pollution avoid-
ance in urban cycling. The PRL cycling events are geared towards both professional and
amateur cyclists, and a random ballot determines participation held the previous year. As
it is open to the public, interested spectators can attend with their families. They can also
take part in numerous other cycling themed festivities in the public festival zones. This
locale offers a distinctive opportunity to access cyclists of different types and abilities,
including commuters, recreational cyclists, and those interested in cycling. The following
subsections summarise the experimental procedure, risk and outcome measures, control
variables, and empirical model used in the analysis.
10(Barseghyan et al., 2011) infer underlying risk preferences from households insurance choices in three
domains: auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home all perils, and extract their risk preferences from
these choices. They test whether household’s deductible choices across domains overlap over different
intervals of the degree of absolute risk aversion. They find evidence to the contrary, as the three intervals
intersect for only 23 percent of households.
11Harrison and List (2004) call this an ‘artefactual field experiment’, given the non-standard nature of
the subject pool (i.e., non-students) and the lab-experimental protocol.
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4.3.1 Procedure
The study was approved by the LSE Ethics review process. Convenience sampling was
used, as surveyors were stationed at fixed locations in public festival zones and directly
approached potential participants. Individuals were informed that the study looked at cy-
cling and air pollution in London, that they could win a prize and possibly some money
for their participation, and that time required varied from around 10-15 minutes. The en-
tire survey was conducted on electronic tablets and hosted on Qualtrics survey program.
Interested individuals participated upon answering three qualifying questions in the af-
firmative: (1) they are residents in the Greater London Area (2) they cycle in London for
either recreation/commuting/both and (3) they are over 18 years of age. After the sur-
veyor entered these responses, tablets were handed to the participant, who completed the
remainder of the survey alone after agreeing to the consent form. Surveyors were avail-
able to assist with any questions from the subjects but took care to not see any responses.
At the start of the survey, subjects were directed to a preamble which requested them
to read the questions carefully, answer truthfully and by themselves. The preamble aims
to promote clarity about the survey protocol. After this, subjects answered the survey
component on risk elicitation, followed by cycling and air pollution. Then, they were ex-
posed to some information about air pollution and could choose a prize for the draw. The
experimental survey concluded after subjects answered questions on socio-demographic
attributes. After this, subjects participated in the lucky draw, which determined whether
they would receive any participation prize, as well as their payout from the risk task,
described below. Appendix H provides more details about the experimental survey, data
collection, and variables.
4.3.2 Risk measures
The risk measures are the primary explanatory variables of interest in this study. Given
the limited resources available for the study, only one incentive-compatible experimental
risk measure could be investigated. Simplicity and clarity of the choice task were the
overarching criteria that guided the choice of the risk elicitation methods, to mitigate
the cognitive and time burden on participants and mitigate attrition. Thus, an incentive-
compatible version of the BEG task was used. Compared to alternatives like the HL-MPL
method, this technique is more straightforward to comprehend if subjects have hetero-
geneous numerical and literacy skills (Charness et al., 2013; Dave et al., 2010). Also,
it is simpler to execute in the field using a standard coin toss and correlates well with
self-assessment risk measures and behaviours across many contexts (Reynaud and Cou-
ture, 2012; Galizzi et al., 2016a; Crosetto and Filippin, 2016). A potential drawback is
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that a given gamble may serve to anchor expectations due to the gain-loss frame, which
may induce individual’s to take decisions based on reference dependence (Harrison and
Rutstro¨m, 2008).
Subjects are presented with five lotteries characterised by a linearly increasing ex-
pected value and higher standard deviation. Each outcome in each gamble has a 50%
chance of success, and subjects can select their most preferred lottery. Table 4.1 presents
details of the BEG task used in this study. The same monetary payoffs used in Crosetto
and Filippin (2016) are also employed here (in Great Britain Pound (£)). Assuming con-
stant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility and that each subject’s utility function takes
the form:
U =
x(1−r)
(1− r) (4.1)
Here, r is obtained as the CRRA parameter. The ranges of r can be estimated from
the gamble and are calculated as a function of the monetary payoff from the gamble.
Risk-averse subjects should choose one of the lotteries numbered one to four. A risk-
neutral or risk-seeking subject should choose lottery five, as it yields the higher expected
value. This version of the BEG task cannot differentiate between risk-neutrality and risk-
seeking. Another version of the BEG task in Dave et al. (2010) features an additional
lottery characterised by the same expected value as the fifth lottery, but by a higher
variance. As noted in Crosetto and Filippin (2016), while the additional choice allows
separating the behaviour of slightly risk-averse agents from that of risk seekers, a risk-
neutral agent would still be indifferent between the two. Subjects obtain the chance to
play the lottery in a coin toss if they win the prize draw.
[Table 4.1]
Two self-assessment questionnaire risk measures were employed from the German
Socio-Economic Panel Study, to measure the willingness to take risks in general and
health domains. The question asks subjects to report from a 1 to 11 scale, ‘Are you gen-
erally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?’.
Here, 1 is ‘Unwilling to take risk’ and 11 is ‘Fully prepared to take risk’. For willingness
to take risks in health, subjects report on a 1 to 11 scale, ‘Are you generally a person who
is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks in health?. These single-
item questions were picked over experimental methods to elicit subjective probabilities
and DOSPERT questionnaire due to resource constraints and to reduce the time and
cognitive burden on participants. Crosetto and Filippin (2016) show that the DOSPERT
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and the SOEP measures are strongly correlated both at the aggregated level and across
DOSPERT subscales, including health. Besides, the behavioural validity of these ques-
tions has been explored in Dohmen et al. (2011), who find relatively strong correlations
with different behavioural outcomes and across behavioural contexts.
To measure precautionary attitudes in the cycling domain specifically, self-assessment
questions about the importance of safety-items in a cycling kit - namely lights and hel-
mets - are asked, as both items are essential from accident prevention standpoint. In
addition, we ask subjects to rate the importance of anti-pollution face-masks as a part of
a cycling safety kit, to assess whether there is any relationship to avoidance behaviour.
Specifically, subjects are asked ‘What do you think are essential to a cycling kit?’ and
they report on a 1 to 5 scale, where 1 is ‘Not at all important’ and 5 is ‘Extremely im-
portant’. This is similar to measures of safety attitudes to cycling used in other studies
(Chataway et al., 2014; Lawson et al., 2013). The item order in the question (i.e., Lights,
Helmet, Facemask) is randomised to mitigate order effects.
Finally, air pollution risk perception, a type of subjective risk belief, is also measured.
Risk perception is consistently associated with a variety of environmental and health
behaviours like the greater willingness to mitigate climate change (Leiserowitz, 2006;
Spence et al., 2011, 2012), greater frequency of breast cancer screenings and the up-
take of mammographies (Goldzahl, 2017; Carman and Kooreman, 2014; Katapodi et al.,
2004), and decisions to purchase flood insurance policy (Petrolia et al., 2013). A single-
item self-assessment question is used because it yields a parsimonious focus to examine
the relationships with other indicators (Kahan et al., 2012; Ganzach et al., 2008). Sub-
jects are asked to report on a 1 to 11 scale, ‘How much risk, if at all, do you think air
pollution poses to your health and safety?’. Variations of this single-item measure have
been used in previous research to measure the perceived severity of other environmental
risks including climate change (Kahan et al., 2012).12
Subjects first face the block of risk elicitation questions, after reading the preamble,
namely the BEG task, SOEP-G and SOEP-H questions. Unlike many studies reviewed
earlier, the order of the risk questions is randomised to mitigate ordering and anchoring
effects on measured responses. The other two risk measures, namely on attitudes towards
items in the cycling kit and air pollution risk perception, were asked in the survey block
on cycling behaviour and air pollution respectively. Notably, the question order in each
of these blocks was also randomised.
12See Appendix H for a short note on risk perception and its measurement methods.
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4.3.3 Dependent variables: Risk-taking and air pollution avoid-
ance
The paper explored two categories of dependent variables. First, risk-taking while cycling
focuses on risky behavioural choices taken while cycling. Second, air pollution avoidance
pertains to a range of preventive health choices against an ambient environmental risk
factor. Within each category, self-reports of individual behavioural practices were mea-
sured, which are aggregated to form a composite behavioural measure for each domain.
In this way, I attempted to quantify micro-behavioural processes that constitute decision
making in both domains and aggregate these behaviours to obtain a composite outcome
measure. As before, the order of behaviours displayed in each question was randomised
to mitigate order effects.
To measure risk-taking while cycling, subjects were asked, ‘How often, if ever, do you
do any of the following?’, and they report on a 1 to 5 scale, where 1 is ‘Never’ and 5 is
‘Always’. The options were identified from previous studies of risk-taking while cycling
and the pilot study, and include six behaviours: cycle through red lights (Red lights),
cycle with music in headphones (Music), cycle after dark without lights (No lights), cycle
using a mobile phone (Mobile), cycling without a helmet (No helmet), and cycle after
drinking alcohol (Alcohol). For the composite risk-taking while cycling variable (referred
to as ‘Risk-taking’), the answers to the individual items are aggregated to form a min-
imum score of 6 (Never is selected for all six risk-taking behaviours) and a maximum
score of 30 (always for all six behaviours). Thus individual risk-taking behaviours and
the aggregate risk-taking variable are ordinal.
To measure air pollution avoidance while cycling, subjects were asked, ‘Do you engage
in the following actions to avoid air pollution?’, and were provided with a list of options.
The options were identified from the pilot study and the advice pages of the National
Institute for Health Research (NIHR, 2017). The six options include avoiding main and
busy roads (Avoiding main roads), avoiding busy and peak hour travel (Avoiding peak
travel), using your bike/walk for short journeys instead of car/public transport (Bik-
ing short distances), avoiding stopping behind large diesel vehicles (Avoiding stopping
behind vehicles), wearing an air-pollution face mask (Facemask), checking air pollution
levels on the news, internet and/or mobile applications (Checking air pollution) and/or
none of the above (None). Note that the list of avoidance behaviours included both in-
cidental strategies, which may be taken to avoid accident risk or other environmental
stressors like noise or congestion (e.g. avoiding main roads and peak travel) and deliber-
ate strategies to unambiguously to avoid air pollution (e.g. wearing facemasks). Subjects
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reported whether they engage in a given avoidance behaviour or not. Thus each avoid-
ance behaviour is a categorical variable, taking either 0 (No) or 1 (Yes). The aggregate
avoidance behaviour is a count variable or the sum of all the individual behaviours and
can take a minimum of 0 (None) or 6 (individual engages in all six avoidance behaviours).
4.3.4 Control variables
Additional data were collected on cycling behaviour, air pollution knowledge, and socio-
economic attributes to address omitted variable bias and to control for any unexplained
variance. Cycling behaviour variables were the type of cyclist (Cyclist type), i.e., recre-
ational or commuter cyclist (Com), or both (Rec+Com)commuter cyclists and frequency
of cycling (Cycle freq.).
To measure air pollution knowledge, which has been flagged as a significant predictor
of risk perception (Kahan et al., 2012; Leiserowitz, 2006), subjects were asked standard
questions to assess how much they know about the sources of air pollution. The responses
were aggregated to form an air pollution knowledge score (AP knowledge).
Finally, the models control for socio-demographic attributes including age, gender,
ethnicity, income and education level. The empirical evidence about how these attributes
correlate with risk preferences is not straightforward. I illustrate this using the exam-
ples of gender and age. The conventional understanding is that that females show higher
risk aversion than males (Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Holt and Laury, 2002; Croson and
Gneezy, 2009; Charness and Gneezy, 2012). Studies also found older persons show greater
risk aversion (Halek and Eisenhauer, 2001; Paulsen et al., 2011). However, subsequent
empirical evidence muddies these trends: Nelson (2015) re-analysed 35 frequently cited
studies on gender differences in risk aversion, and found that differences are not as sub-
stantial are commonly claimed because the standardized differences in means amounted
to less than one standard deviation in most cases, and the degree of overlap between
male and female distributions generally exceeded 80%. Similarly, Filippin and Crosetto
(2016) gather data from 54 replications of the Holt and Laury (2002) risk task, to find
that significant gender differences appear in less than 10% of the studies, and depend on
design features (e.g. presence of a safe option; also see Harrison et al. (2007) and Schubert
et al. (1999)). Other studies show that older adults are not necessarily more risk averse
either (Mather et al., 2012). Nevertheless, I control for these attributes as a robustness
check in the empirical analysis.
106
4.3.5 Payment and survey completion
The two central design decisions regarding payment were whom to pay and when to do
so. Given the limited resources available, the reluctance to collect personal details of
respondents and for ease of implementation in the field, it was decided that only a sub-
set of subjects would be paid immediately after they completed the survey. Thus, after
subjects completed the socio-demographic questions, they were given instructions for the
prize draw. The results of the prize draw determine whether the subject gets the chance
to play the BEG lottery task, and obtain the participation prize. The probability of win-
ning the prize draw is fixed across subjects, and everyone had an equal 1-in-50 chance.
A review of the literature in Charness et al. (2016) suggests that paying on a subset of
players in incentive-compatible risk tasks can have no or limited impact on responses.
That said, this payment feature must be kept in mind while interpreting the results.
The implementation procedure was as follows: subjects had to pick a number between
1 and 50 and tell the surveyor. They handed back the tablet to the surveyor. After this,
they picked one token from a bag of tokens numbered 1-50, and if the number picked
from the bag matches the number vocalised to the surveyor, the subject wins the prize
draw. The outcome of the BEG task is determined by a coin toss, where subjects obtain
Event A if heads are realised and Event B otherwise. If subjects win the draw, they enter
their email addresses on the tablet and are contacted the following week for their chosen
prize.
4.3.6 Empirical models
The primary objective of the empirical model is to test for statistically significant associ-
ations between risk preferences and the dependent variables on risk-taking and avoidance
behaviours, i.e., behavioural validity of risk measures. In order to address this, the fol-
lowing regression model is run for each outcome:
yi = α + βri + γXi + θSi + εi (4.2)
where i denotes individuals, ri is the risk measure in question, X is a set of control
variables, β and γ are parameters to be estimated, and εi is the error term. Individual
control variables include cyclist type, cycling frequency, air pollution knowledge, age,
gender, ethnicity, income and education covariates, where the omitted categories for age
is less than 35 years old, for gender is male; for ethnicity is white, for income is earning
a household income of less than £32,000, and for education is those having less than
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undergraduate degree (UG). To control for potential survey fixed effects, S is a set of
survey controls which include dummies for the surveyor, time and location of the survey.
As previously discussed, the behavioural outcomes are a mix of ordinal (individ-
ual risk-taking behaviours and aggregate risk-taking), binary (individual avoidance be-
haviours), and count variables (aggregate avoidance). The explanatory variables are
treated as continuous variables, and the raw choice data is used. 13
Ordered logistic models are used for the ordinal outcomes, logistic models for the
binary outcomes and Poisson models for the for the count dependent variables. The re-
ported estimates are ordered log-odds (logit) regression coefficients for the ordered and
binary logistic regressions. The coefficients are the difference in the logs of expected event
rate (or count of the number of events) or the log of the rate ratio for the Poisson regres-
sion models.
To test the cross-context validity of different risk measures, pairwise correlations of
the raw choice data between different risk measures is first undertaken. Then, the robust-
ness of these associations is further tested using ordered probit regressions models, with
and without individual controls.
The results of the models testing behavioural and cross-context validity are sum-
marised in the text without details of the coefficients of the individual controls for brevity.
Appendix D presents results of the full specifications of all the models.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Sample characteristics
Table 4.2 summarises the distribution of responses for each control variable used in the
analysis. The final sample consists of 181 survey responses, since nine responses were
omitted due to interruptions or because they were incomplete. The majority of subjects
identify as both recreational and commuter cyclists (75%). The frequency of cycling is
also higher in this sample: 89% reported cycling at least once a week compared to 76% in
representative surveys from cyclists in London (TfL, 2016). The majority of subjects were
below 55 years of age, male, white, with a reported household income of over $64,000, and
at least an undergraduate degree. The over-representation of aﬄuent, white men mirrors
13In future work, I plan to retrieve the CRRA parameters from the BEG task, and test associations
using interval level regressions.
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findings from other representative surveys and qualitative studies on cycling in London
and the UK (Aldred et al., 2016; Steinbach et al., 2011; TfL, 2016).
[Table 4.2]
4.4.2 Description of risk measures
Table 4.3 provides descriptive statistics of the different measures of risk. When we con-
sider the BEG risk measure, the mean lottery choice is 2.16 (S.D. = 1.57, median = 2),
compared to an average lottery choice of 2.79 in Crosetto and Filippin (2016) (S.D. =
1.29, median = 2 or 3, n = 88 students), and 3.45 in Eckel and Grossman (2008) (S.D. =
1.17, n = 256 students). These responses imply that 77.35% of the sample is risk-averse
(they choose one of the Lotteries 1 to 4), and 22.65% is risk neutral/seeking (they choose
Lottery 5). This result is in line with Crosetto and Filippin (2016), who observe 20% of
the sample is risk neutral/seeking. This is also similar to Galizzi et al. (2016a), who ob-
serve that nearly 24% of the subjects choose the risk-neutral/seeking option in the BEG
task (albeit with different money payments), in a representative U.K. sample. When we
consider the distribution of responses across gamble choices, Lottery 1, the most risk-
averse option (£4 versus £4) is most popular, as it is chosen by 36.46% of the sample
(similarly, Galizzi et al. (2016a) find 35.11% chose the safe lottery choice). Given this,
the responses collected in the survey seem to correspond to results in previous studies.
To test whether BEG preferences predict avoidance, an ordinal variable is used, and it
takes value 1 for Lottery 1 and value 5 for Lottery 5.
[Table 4.3]
Next, consider responses to the SOEP-G and SOEP-H questions. The mean willing-
ness to take risk according to the SOEP-G and SOEP-H questions are 7.05 (S.D. = 2.24)
and 6.28 (S.D. = 2.52) respectively. This figure is higher than the willingness to take risk
observed in other studies. For instance, the mean General risk attitude using the SOEP
question is is 5.29 in Crosetto and Filippin (2016), and 4.76 in Dohmen et al. (2011) (S.D.
= 2.54, n = 450 in the experiment, and mean = 4.42, S.D. = 2.38, n = 21,875 subjects
in SOEP survey in Dohmen et al. (2011)). It is also higher than Galizzi et al. (2016a)’s
representative U.K. sample, where mean SOEP=-G and SOEP-H values are 4.52 and
3.15 respectively. To test whether willingness to take risk predicts avoidance, SOEP-G
and SOEP-H are used as decreasing measure of risk aversion, such that the minimum
value of 1 denotes ‘unwillingness to take risks’, and the maximum value of 11 denotes
‘fully prepared to take risk’.
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When the responses to these standard risk measures are considered, BEG risk aligns
with responses obtained in some other experiments and representative samples. However,
the SOEP-G and SOEP-H measures denote lower risk aversion amongst our sample com-
pared to other studies. One possible explanation is the self-selection of less risk-averse
individuals into the cycling in London can be perceived as and is a risky activity. Sug-
gestively, the perception that cycling in London is ‘too dangerous’ is the main reported
reason (around 50% of those surveyed) for cycling less, primarily due to fear of traffic col-
lisions (TfL, 2017). Along these lines, other studies have pointed out that individuals who
engage in risky sports may not act less risk averse than others in economic tasks with in-
centives (Collard and Oboeuf, 2013; Riddel and Kolstoe, 2013). For example, Riddel and
Kolstoe (2013) found that risk aversion amongst risky recreationists (e.g. amateur auto
racers and SCUBA divers) are qualitatively similar to a student control group (elicited
using incentive-compatible HL-MPL). More broadly, these somewhat inconsistent results
seem to suggest that the experimental and survey risk methods are measuring different
risk preferences.
Finally, we consider self-assessments of Air Pollution Risk Perception (APRP) and
precautionary attitudes, captured through the importance of Lights, Helmets and Face-
masks. The average APRP score is 7.956 (S.D. = 2.035, median = 8 or 9), and no subject
reported that air pollution posed no risk (the minimum possible scores of 1 and 2 were
never chosen). The APRP variable is an increasing measure of risk perception, such that
the minimum value of 1 denotes ‘no risk at all’, and the maximum value of 11 denotes
‘extreme risk’. Helmets are reported as extremely important by most subjects (58.56%),
followed by Lights (35.91%). Although the majority of subjects report that face-masks
are slightly or moderately important (48.07%), only 4.4% of subjects reported that face-
masks were extremely important. The mean (S.D.) scores are all reported in Table 4.3.
Lights, Helmet and Facemask variables are all ordinal, and denote increasing precaution,
where 1 is ‘not at all important’ and 5 is ‘extremely important’.
4.4.3 Behavioural validity I: Risk measures and risk-taking
The associations between aggregated and discrete risk-taking behaviours and risk prefer-
ences are explored to investigate behavioural validity. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the
responses to the risk-taking questions. The least common behaviour was using a mobile
while cycling (72.38% reported Never), followed by listening to music and cycling (69.61%
reported Never) and cycling without lights in the dark (66.85% reported Never). The most
common risk behaviour was not wearing a helmet (12.71% reported Always, and 20.99%
reported Sometimes). Another common risk-taking behaviour was cycling through a red
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light (46.96% of the sample reported Sometimes). For the aggregate variable, the mean
risk-taking score was 9.56 (S.D. = 2.832, median = 8).
[Figure 4.1] and [Figure 4.2]
Tables 4.4 to 4.6 present results of the ordered logistic model’s regression models for
aggregate and individual risk-taking behaviours following empirical model (1) specified in
section 4.3.6. Table 4.4 considers aggregate risk-taking behaviour as the outcome variable.
Models with and without individual controls are presented. All regressions control for po-
tential survey fixed effects as discussed earlier and use heteroskedasticity robust standard
errors. A positive association should occur between risk measures and risk-taking be-
haviours (or a negative association with precautionary attitudes). It is clear that that
the empirical evidence is mixed. The BEG risk measures are positively correlated with
risk-taking while cycling, but the coefficient is not statistically significant. The SOEP-G
risk measure is also positively associated and statistically significant at the 10% level. The
SOEP-H measure, on the other hand, is positively associated and statistically significant
at 1% (for example in model (6), beta = 0.214, S.E. = 0.068, p = 0.002). This finding
implies that for a one unit increase in the SOEP-H score, the odds of having the high-
est aggregate risk-taking versus the combined lower scores is 1.234 times higher, holding
other variables constant.
[Table 4.4, Table 4.5 and Table 4.6]
Moving onto the association between Lights and Helmets and risk-taking, the coeffi-
cients are negatively signed as expected, and significant at 1%. The magnitude of both
these coefficients are also higher (e.g. in model (8) with Lights, beta = -0.485, S.E. =
0.147, z = -3.29, p = 0.001 and in model (10) with Helmets, beta = -0.791, S.E. = 0.134,
z = -5.89 , p = 0.000). This result implies that for a one unit increase in the Lights
and Helmet score, the odds of having the highest aggregate risk-taking versus the com-
bined lower scores is 0.615 and 0.453 times lower respectively, keeping all other variables
constant. When we consider the linkages between individual covariates and risk-taking
behaviour (full specifications are reported in Appendix D), three main empirical results
hold and is consistent with previous work. Firstly, identifying as female is negatively
associated with higher risk-taking relative to males in all specifications. Secondly, those
falling in higher age categories (35-54 years and over 55 years, the omitted category is
18-34 years) is negatively associated with higher risk-taking in all specifications. Thirdly,
those reporting household incomes of over £64,000 also report less risk-taking compared
to those earning below £32,000 in all specifications.
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Turning to individual risk-taking behaviours in Table 4.5 and 4.6, we see that the
picture become a bit more varied. Consider self-reports on cycling through red lights
(Table 4.5, models (A1) to (A5). SOEP-H is positively correlated with the outcome (at
10% significance level), and the coefficients on Lights and Helmets remain negative and
significant at 1%. However, SOEP-H is positively correlated to listening to music while
cycling (at 5% significance level) and using mobile while cycling (at 1%) significance level.
Indeed, the BEG risk measure is positively and significantly related only to the Mobile
outcome (Table 4.5, model (D1)). As expected both the Lights and Helmet variables are
strongly negatively associated with cycling without Lights and Helmet ( Table 4.5, model
(C4) and Table 4.5, model (E5)).
When we consider how individual covariates predict individual risk-taking behaviours
the picture is more mixed (full specifications are reported in Appendix D). Firstly, iden-
tifying as female is negatively associated with Mobile (compared to males), but with no
other risk-behaviour (coefficients are negative but not statistically significant). Secondly,
those falling in higher age categories (35-54 years and over 55 years, the omitted category
is 18-34 years) is negatively associated and statistically significant only for Mobile use
and Music. Thirdly, those reporting household incomes of over £64,000 are negatively
and significantly associated with No helmet, compared to those earning below £32,000
in all specifications. More broadly, these results indicate variation in risk-taking across
behavioural contexts according to different socio-economic categories.
Overall these results suggest that domain-specific risk measures are more strongly as-
sociated with risk-taking while cycling, and aggregated behavioural outcomes. Aggregate
risk-taking while cycling is more correlated with the domain (SOEP-H) and sub-domain
specific (Lights, Helmet) risk measures rather than general risk attitudes (SOEP-G). Also,
the BEG measure is not significantly associated with (aggregate) risk-taking while cy-
cling. This provides empirical support to the idea that domain and sub-domain-specific
risk measures (risk measures in health and cycling) are more strongly correlated with
risk-taking behaviour. This is particularly evident from the strong correlations between
risk-taking behaviours and risk measures regarding lights and helmets. These results are
consistent with studies which highlight that risk preferences vary across domains and de-
cision contexts within domains (Blais and Weber, 2006; Hanoch et al., 2006; Galizzi et al.,
2016b; Barseghyan et al., 2011). It also suggests that different risk elicitation methods
(i.e., experimental and questionnaire) may capture risk preferences that correspond to
different behavioural contexts. Besides, these results suggest that risk measures are more
strongly associated with aggregated measures in a given domain, rather than discrete be-
haviours across decision contexts within a domain. This is consistent with findings that
individual behaviours may only be weakly correlated with measured preferences, because
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of the idiosyncratic effects (Bradford et al., 2017).
4.4.4 Behavioural validity II: Risk measures and air pollution
avoidance
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 illustrate the responses to the air pollution avoidance questions. We
see some variation both in the number and types of avoidance behaviours undertaken.
While 20.44% of the subjects do not undertake any avoidance, the majority of subjects
(79.56%), undertake at least one avoidance strategy. Incidental avoidance strategies are
most popular, especially avoiding stopping behind vehicles (53.04%) and avoiding busy
roads (41.99%). Deliberate avoidance is markedly less frequent; only around 5% of sub-
jects report using an anti-pollution face-mask and checking air pollution levels on the
news. The aggregate outcome variable of avoidance is the count of avoidance behaviours,
that takes a minimum value of 0 (no avoidance) and a maximum value of 6 (an individual
undertakes all 6 avoidance behaviours). The mean count is 1.734 (S.D. = 1.323), and the
median and the modal number of avoidance behaviours is 2 and 1 respectively.
[Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4]
Tables 4.7 to 4.9 present results of the regressions examining the associations between
risk preferences and self-reported air pollution avoidance, for aggregate and individual
behaviours. First consider Table 4.7, that presents the results on the aggregate avoidance
as the dependent variable (# Air pollution avoidance), with and without individual con-
trols. All models employ robust standard errors and survey controls. Firstly, it is clear
that the standard risk measures, (BEG, SOEP-G and SOEP-H) do not predict the extent
of avoidance undertaken robustly. Indeed models (1) to (4) in Table 4.7 show the expected
negative association between the extent of avoidance and BEG and SOEP-G risk mea-
sures, but none of the coefficients is statistically significant. Models (5) and (6) show that
SOEP-H is positively associated with the aggregate avoidance, but the relationship is
not statistically significant at conventional levels. There is a positive association between
precautionary attitudes towards Lights and Helmets as expected, but only the coefficient
on Lights is weakly significant at the 10% level when individual controls are added (in
model (8) beta = 0.091, S.E. = 0.055, z = 1.66, p = 0.097).
[Table 4.7]
113
The risk measures that does predict the extent of avoidance undertaken is precaution-
ary attitudes to Facemasks and Air Pollution Risk Perception (APRP). The coefficient on
Facemasks is positive and significant at the 1% level with and without individual controls
(from model (12) beta = 0.191, S.E. = 0.054, z = 3.52, p = 0.000). This suggests that
for a one unit increase in the Facemasks variable, the incident rate ratio of the number
of avoidance behaviours increases by 1.210 times, holding all other variables constant.
The coefficient on APRP is also positive and significant at the 1% level for models with
and without individual controls (in model (14) beta = 0.088, S.E. = 0.030, z = 2.90, p
= 0.004). This suggests that for a one unit increase in the APRP variable, the incident
rate ratio of the number of avoidance behaviours increases by 1.092 times. Thus both
the economic magnitude and significance of both these risk measures are similar. From
Table 4.7, we also see that the coefficient on Air Pollution (AP) knowledge is positive
and significant at the 1% level in all specifications. No other individual covariate is as-
sociated with aggregate avoidance in a robust manner (full specifications in Appendix D).
To consider the association between risk measures and individual avoidance strate-
gies, we consider the four most popular avoidance behaviours namely, Avoiding main
roads, Avoiding Peak travel, Avoiding stopping behind diesel vehicles and Biking short
distance.14 Tables 4.8 and 4.9 present results of the logistic models, where the coeffi-
cients are in log-odds units. The empirical picture is mixed and reiterates the limited
behavioural validity of standard measures. For instance, consider models (A1) to (A7) in
Table 4.8, where Avoiding busy and main roads as the binary outcome variable. There is
a negative association between avoiding main roads and SOEP-G (weakly significant at
10%), suggesting those who are report greater risk seeking in life are less likely to avoid
main roads. Conversely, there is a positive association between precautionary attitudes
towards Lights and Facemasks and the likelihood of avoiding main roads (both signifi-
cant at 5%, in models (A4) and (A6)). More generally, the coefficient on Facemasks is
positive and significant at 5% for two other avoidance strategies, namely Avoiding Peak
travel (model (B6) significant at the 1% level) and Stopping behind vehicles (model (C6)
significant at the 5% level). Also, APRP is positively associated with the likelihood of
Stopping behind vehicles (significant at 10%, model (C7)) but not other individual avoid-
ance behaviours.
When we consider models with individual covariates, AP knowledge is positively and
significantly related only to Avoiding peak travel and Biking short distances. We also ob-
serve that those earning higher household incomes over £64,000 (relative to those earning
below £32,000) are less likely to avoid peak travel times (significant at 1%, models (B1)
14There are too few responses to the other two avoidance strategies, namely Wearing Facemasks and
checking air pollution news.
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to (B7) in Appendix D, Table D.5 ).
[Table 4.8] and [Table 4.9]
To summarise the data reveals that standard risk preference measures are not corre-
lated with air pollution avoidance, but air pollution risk perception is. More precisely, the
BEG, SOEP-G and SOEP-H showed no significant associations with both aggregated and
discrete air pollution outcome measures in this sample. This result does not provide sup-
port for the proposition that preventive heath to protect against environmental risks are
predicted by risk preferences in the context of air pollution avoidance. Only risk preference
measures specific to the context of air pollution risks, was attitudes towards Facemasks
which was positively and significantly associated with avoidance. These results provide
empirical support for the notion that correlations are stronger between risk measures
specific to a given behavioural context (Facemasks) and behaviour within that context
(avoidance). It also highlights that even domain-specific risk attitudes, namely SOEP-H,
need not predict behaviour across health contexts. Secondly, the results show that asso-
ciations between risk measures (only Facemasks) and aggregated behavioural outcomes
(aggregate avoidance) are stronger. Lastly, it highlights that subject risk beliefs, like air
pollution risk perception, are an important explanatory variable, which deserves more
policy and research attention.
4.4.5 Cross-context validity
Lastly, the analysis in two steps to consider the question how stable risk measures are
across different behavioural contexts. First considering pairwise correlations across the
risk measures, and then regression analysis using individual and survey controls.
Table 4.10 reports results of the pairwise correlations together with the significance
levels across the different risk measures. First, consider correlations between BEG and
other risk measures. If there is stability of risk preferences in the across different con-
texts, there should be a strong and positive association between SOEP-G (or SOEP-H)
and BEG risk, such that those who self-report that they are unwilling to take risks are
also the subjects most likely to pick the safer lotteries in the BEG task (e.g. lotteries 1
to 4). Only the SOEP-G shows a small but statistically significant positive correlation
of 0.165 (p = 0.035). This relationship is more modest than reported in Dohmen et al.
(2011) but is in line with Galizzi et al. (2016a), who reported a correlation coefficient of
0.095 (p =0.058) between BEG measure of risk aversion with the SOEP-G. However, they
also report a correlation between BEG and SOEP-H of 0.103 (p =0.015), which is not
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statistically significant in the current study. Note that the BEG measure is not correlated
with any other risk measure robustly.
[Table 4.10]
The SOEP-G and SOEP-H measures are positively and significantly correlated at
0.651 (p = 0.000), in line with Dohmen et al. (2011) who found correlation coefficient =
0.476 (p = 0.000) and Galizzi et al. (2016a)who found correlation coefficients of around
0.531 and 0.420 across different samples (p = 0.000 for both samples). As expected, Lights
and Helmets are positively and significantly associated with each other (correlation coef-
ficient = 0.380, p = 0.000). The importance of face-masks is positively and significantly
associated with lights (correlation coefficient = 0.259, p = 0.014) but not Helmets. None
of the standard measures of risk (i.e., BEG, SOEP-G and SOEP-H) is significantly corre-
lated with any of the sub-domain specific precautionary attitudes towards Lights, Helmets
or Facemasks. Finally, Facemasks and APRP are positively and significantly correlated
(correlation coefficient = 0.461, p = 0.000). Somewhat counter-intuitively, we find a low
but positive and significant correlation between SOEP-G and APRP as the correlation
coefficient = 0.162 (p = 0.027), and it is unclear why this relationship exists.
The results from the correlations are corroborated from the ordered probit regression
models and are qualitatively similar. I briefly summarise the key results in the text, noting
that the full specifications are available in Appendix D (Tables D.7 to D.9). For instance,
when SOEP-G is regressed on BEG risk with and without survey and individual controls
(in Table D.7, models (2)), the coefficient on the BEG risk measure is positive and sig-
nificant at the 5% level. When SOEP-H is the outcome variable, the coefficient on the
BEG risk measure is positive and but not significant, even when survey and individual
controls are added. Only APRP positively and significantly predicts Facemasks (at 1%
level, Table D.8 model (4)).
When we consider models that include individual control variables, several other re-
sults are to be noted. First, we obtain mixed results on the association between reporting
gender as female and risk aversion. The current analysis does not replicate the well-
established empirical observation that women are more risk-averse than men (e.g. in
Eckel and Grossman (2002) and Dohmen et al. (2011)) when gender is regressed on BEG
and SOEP-G risk measures. More precisely, the coefficient on female is negative but
not statistically significant (in model (1) and (4) from Table D.7, male is the omitted
category). However, the coefficient on female is negative and weakly significant when re-
gressed on SOEP-H, suggesting that women are more risk-averse in the health domain.
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This is also consistent when we consider the relationship between gender and precaution-
ary attitudes towards Lights, Helmets and Facemasks. When the gender variable regressed
on Lights, Helmets and Facemasks, the coefficient on females is positive and significant
across specifications (with different measures of risk and individual and survey controls).
These results suggest that women are not necessarily more risk averse in this sample
and depend on the behavioural context. This result is in line with studies which observe
that differences in risk aversion by gender can depend on the decision task at hand and
its contextual features (Schubert et al., 1999; Filippin and Crosetto, 2016). Conversely,
women perceive higher risk from air pollution relative to men (Table D.9, without and
with individual controls and risk measures) and this is in line with the literature on the
while male effect (e.g. in Finucane et al. (2000)).
Second, higher age also associated with risk measures; as expected we find falling in
the highest age category (i.e., over 55 years) is associated with higher risk aversion by
the BEG measure (significant at 5%, model (1) from Table D.7, omitted variable is age
category of 18 to 35 years) but not SOEP-G and SOEP-H (negative but not significant
at conventional levels). However, there is a weak negative relationship between Helmets
and being over 55 years old (significant at 10%) and a stronger negative association with
Facemasks (significant at 5%, Table D.9). Third, we also find that income is not a reli-
able predictor of different risk measures in this sample. Lastly, greater cycling frequency
is negatively associated with Helmets and positively associated with Facemasks (all co-
efficients significant at the 5% level, models (B1) to (B3) and (C1) to (C4) respectively
in Table D.8).
To sum up, the data reveals weak support for strong cross-context validity across dif-
ferent risk preferences measures across domains. First, there is a significant and positive
association between BEG and SOEP-G but no significant association between BEG and
any other risk measure. Second, there is a positive and significant association between
SOEP-G and SOEP-H. However, there is also no relationship between standard risk mea-
sures and sub-domain precautionary attitudes (towards Lights, Helmets or Facemasks).
There is also no linkage between BEG and SOEP-H with APRP. But a positive and signif-
icant relationship (that is unexpected) exists between APRP and SOEP-G. Fourth, there
is a stable correlation between sub-domain specific attitudes within behavioural contexts:
risk-taking while cycling (Lights and Helmet) and air pollution avoidance (Facemasks
and APRP), and to a limited extent across behavioural contexts (Lights and Facemasks).
These mixed results are consistent with previous studies findings like Galizzi et al. (2016a),
who also find low correlations between different risk preferences across types of methods
and behavioural domains.
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4.4.6 Robustness checks and limitations
To increase the robustness of the estimated results, all the models include survey con-
trols and individual controls for socio-demographic and behavioural differences across
subjects. Overall our results suggest that the introduction of additional explanatory vari-
ables through survey and individual controls does not alter results on the behavioural
validity or cross-context correlations of the risk measures. I also replicate the entire anal-
ysis by using a restricted sample of observations collected in the main survey location.
The analysis is also replicated using binary outcomes for risk-taking and avoidance with
qualitatively similar results. To account for small sample bias, I replicate the analysis
using Firth-Logistic regressions where the results show weaker associations but remain
more or less similar. All these results are omitted for brevity but available on request.
This study is not without several limitations. The experimental survey follows a val-
idated lab paradigm and has the advantage of yielding greater control and therefore
internal validity. Also, targeting the relevant population and setting increases the appli-
cability of the results to a broader population of urban cyclists. I also attempt to mitigate
ordering and anchoring effects by randomising the order of questions in the survey (as pre-
viously discussed), and cross-check observed values to the previous literature. However,
a possible threat to internal validity is the imprecise measurement of the risk measures.
This can be due to noise as discussed more extensively in Filippin and Crosetto (2016)
and Dave et al. (2010).
Secondly, like previous studies on the topic, the empirical relationship between risk
measures and behaviour is not causal. There are numerous other variables which can
impact the directed of the observed relationship, such as cognitive ability or mood, omit-
ted from this study. In addition, the study does not measure risk perception of cycling
itself, has also been linked to risk-taking transport behaviour in other studies (Ulleberg
and Rundmo, 2003; Machin and Sankey, 2008). Other types of economic preference pa-
rameters, which are of interest in this setting include ambiguity aversion, prudence and
temperance, and time preferences to name a few (Eeckhoudt and Gollier, 2005; Galizzi
et al., 2017; Bradford et al., 2017). There is also possible reverse causality between self-
reported behaviour and some covariates: for instance, if the number of avoidance actions
determines air pollution risk perception (e.g. someone who avoids main roads and peak
travel time and therefore believes more actively in the air pollution health risks). Keep-
ing in mind these limitations, I attempt to assess the robustness of these associations, by
using individual and survey covariates, and restricting the sample, as previously discussed.
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Thirdly, given the different types of behavioural outcome considered, it may be possi-
ble that significant results could occur due to chance. However, it is clear from the results
that there are mixed results across behaviours and risk measures, and significant results
are often in the expected direction according to previous empirical evidence and theory.
Moreover, we do not find expected associations on numerous fronts- especially regarding
aggregate air pollution avoidance, as well as numerous individual risk-taking and avoid-
ance choices. Like previous studies, this one also relies on self-reports of behaviour, which
may suffer from hypothetical bias, recall error and Hawthorne effects. To reduce potential
Hawthorne effects, the subject completed the survey alone on the tablet, and the surveyor
could not see the responses.
Lastly, the convenience sampling method used in the field attracted only those cyclists
with the time and the inclination to participate in the survey, rather than a representa-
tive sample from across London. This can reduce the external validity of the results if
the population of cyclists excluded from the study have vastly different preferences and
behaviour.
4.5 Discussion and conclusion
Risk preferences are widely considered a primitive to understand health behaviours. The
choice of risk measure is an essential question to verify if an empirical relationship between
risk preference and behaviour exists. There is no agreement about the ‘ideal’ method
given the range experimental and questionnaire methods developed by both economists
and psychologists. This debate is interlaced with those about whether and how risk pref-
erences vary across behavioural domains and methodologies. To further this debate, there
is a need to accumulate more evidence on the behavioural and cross-context validity of
risk preferences.
This study contributes to the literature by exploring how experimental and survey
risk measures that capture the willingness to take risks in different domains correlate with
behaviour in two novel settings: risk-taking and air pollution avoidance while cycling. It
uses a lab-in-the-field experiment to elicit incentive-compatible risk preferences (through
the Binswanger-Eckel-Grossman task or BEG), and self-assessments of the willingness to
take risks in general and health domains (SOEP-G and SOEP-H respectively). It also
measures self-assessments of precautionary attitudes towards items in the cycling safety
kit, namely Lights, Helmets and Facemasks (sub-domain attitudes), and Air Pollution
Risk Perception (APRP). It is one of the few studies to bring together different risk and
behavioural measures, alongside precautionary attitudes and subjective risk beliefs in the
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field setting.
The main result is that domain-specific risk preferences are closely associated with
risk-taking while cycling, but risk preferences are not associated with air pollution avoid-
ance. More specifically, SOEP-H and precautionary attitudes towards items in the cycling
safety kit, namely Lights and Helmets are more strongly associated with the aggregate
measure of risk-taking while cycling. However, none of the standard risk measures pre-
dicts either the extent of avoidance undertaken or individual avoidance behaviours. The
only variables which do so, are APRP and Facemasks. More generally, there are stronger
correlations between aggregated behavioural outcomes and risk measures, rather than
individual behaviours, suggesting studies should collect more detailed data to study un-
derlying associations. Also, although different risk measures correlate with each other,
their associations are imperfect (e.g. BEG correlated with SOEP-G but not SOEP-H or
Lights, Helmets and Facemasks). Taken together, these results lend support for the idea
that risk preference measures need not strongly associate across multiple behavioural
domains and both the risk preference and behavioural outcome measure determines ob-
served empirical patterns.
One implication of these results is that future researchers need to use risk measures
that are lie close to the behavioural domain under study. By measuring a more compre-
hensive set of both risk preference and behavioural outcome measures, they could detect
more robust underlying behavioural tendencies. But given the weak cross-context valid-
ity, it is not clear that risk preferences that are elicited using context-specific tasks are
particularly good at capturing risk preferences in other behavioural contexts. Another
implication, is that risk perception rather than risk aversion is correlated with air pollu-
tion avoidance, and future studies can systematically assess whether this result holds in
other samples and behavioural contexts. This is also interesting from a policy standpoint,
as it suggests that changing risk perception may have behavioural implications. However,
this line of policy should be pursued with cautio, as risk perception is associated with
affect-based decision making form worry or anxiety about air pollution. There may be
limited scope of behavioural change due to emotional numbing, apart from the well-being
implications of a population excessively worried about air pollution risks (Weber, 2010).
Methodologically, the study employs a standardized paradigm in the field context, to
maintain tight control and enhance internal validity, while allowing for direct compar-
isons across contexts and populations. However, this study is not without some limitations
as discussed in the previous section. A replication across new contexts and populations
could reveal whether these results are externally valid. Along these lines, future research
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could also consider a wider range of behaviours from a more representative sample to re-
evaluate the associations between risk measures and behavioural outcomes. The current
study also raises some other questions for future research. For instance, would the results
persist with different risk elicitation methods or different incentives? Apart from the be-
havioural validity and cross-context validity, are risk preferences of an individual stable
across time across different contexts? Can avoidance be better explained by jointly elicited
time and risk preferences, or other higher-order preferences like prudence? More gener-
ally, does the mixed evidence between risk measures and behavioural outcomes persist
across a broader set of behaviours? In the last case, it is important to note that both the
risk measure and behavioural outcome in a context matters for the empirical relationship.
Bibliography
Aldred, R., Woodcock, J., and Goodman, A. (2016). Does more cycling mean more
diversity in cycling? Transport reviews, 36(1):28–44.
Anderson, L. R. and Mellor, J. M. (2008). Predicting health behaviors with an experi-
mental measure of risk preference. Journal of health economics, 27(5):1260–1274.
Arrow, K. J. (1965). Aspects of the theory of risk-bearing. Yrjo¨ Jahnssonin Sa¨a¨tio¨.
Arrow, K. J. (1968). The economics of moral hazard: further comment. The American
Economic Review, 58(3):537–539.
Attanasi, G., Georgantz´ıs, N., Rotondi, V., and Vigani, D. (2016). Lottery-and survey-
based risk attitudes linked through a multichoice elicitation task. Theory and Decision,
pages 1–32.
Barham, B. L., Chavas, J.-P., Fitz, D., Salas, V. R., and Schechter, L. (2014). The
roles of risk and ambiguity in technology adoption. Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization, 97:204–218.
Barseghyan, L., Molinari, F., O’Donoghue, T., and Teitelbaum, J. C. (2018). Estimating
risk preferences in the field. Journal of Economic Literature, Forthcoming.
Barseghyan, L., Prince, J., and Teitelbaum, J. C. (2011). Are risk preferences stable across
contexts? evidence from insurance data. American Economic Review, 101(2):591–631.
Barsky, R. B., Juster, F. T., Kimball, M. S., and Shapiro, M. D. (1997). Preference
parameters and behavioral heterogeneity: An experimental approach in the health and
retirement study. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(2):537–579.
121
Becker, A., Deckers, T., Dohmen, T., Falk, A., and Kosse, F. (2012). The relationship
between economic preferences and psychological personality measures. Annual Review
of Economics, 4(1):453–478.
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., and McCabe, K. (2005). Risk preference instability across insti-
tutions: A dilemma. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United
States of America, 102(11):4209–4214.
Binswanger, H. P. (1980). Attitudes toward ris: Experimental measurement in rural india.
American journal of agricultural economics, 62(3):395–407.
Binswanger, H. P. (1981). Attitudes toward risk: Theoretical implications of an experi-
ment in rural india. The Economic Journal, 91(364):867–890.
Blais, A.-R. and Weber, E. (2006). A domain-specific risk-taking (dospert) scale for adult
populations. Judgment and Decision Making, 1(1).
Blondel, S., Lohe´ac, Y., and Rinaudo, S. (2007). Rationality and drug use: An experi-
mental approach. Journal of health economics, 26(3):643–658.
Borghans, L., Duckworth, A. L., Heckman, J. J., and Ter Weel, B. (2008). The economics
and psychology of personality traits. Journal of human Resources, 43(4):972–1059.
Bradford, D., Courtemanche, C., Heutel, G., McAlvanah, P., and Ruhm, C. (2017). Time
preferences and consumer behavior. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 55(2–3):119–145.
Brick, K. and Visser, M. (2015). Risk preferences, technology adoption and insurance
uptake: A framed experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 118:383–
396.
Briys, E., Schlesinger, H., and vd SCHULENBURG, J.-M. G. (1991). Reliability of risk
management: market insurance, self-insurance and self-protection reconsidered. The
Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, 16(1):45–58.
Carman, K. G. and Kooreman, P. (2014). Probability perceptions and preventive health
care. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 49(1):43–71.
Charness, G. and Gneezy, U. (2012). Strong evidence for gender differences in risk taking.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 83(1):50–58.
Charness, G., Gneezy, U., and Halladay, B. (2016). Experimental methods: Pay one or
pay all. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 131:141–150.
Charness, G., Gneezy, U., and Imas, A. (2013). Experimental methods: Eliciting risk
preferences. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 87:43–51.
122
Chataway, E. S., Kaplan, S., Nielsen, T. A. S., and Prato, C. G. (2014). Safety perceptions
and reported behavior related to cycling in mixed traffic: A comparison between bris-
bane and copenhagen. Transportation research part F: traffic psychology and behaviour,
23:32–43.
Chuang, Y. and Schechter, L. (2015). Stability of experimental and survey measures of
risk, time, and social preferences: A review and some new results. Journal of Develop-
ment Economics, 117:151–170.
Collard, L. and Oboeuf, A. (2013). Do dangerous sports specialists play more danger-
ously? an experimental study on sample selection. Journal of Risk Research, 16(1):39–
50.
Coppola, M. (2014). Eliciting risk-preferences in socio-economic surveys: How do different
measures perform? The Journal of Socio-Economics, 48:1–10.
Cox, J. C. and Harrison, G. W. (2008). Risk aversion in experiments: An introduction.
In Risk aversion in experiments, pages 1–7. Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
Crosetto, P. and Filippin, A. (2013). The “bomb” risk elicitation task. Journal of Risk
and Uncertainty, 47(1):31–65.
Crosetto, P. and Filippin, A. (2016). A theoretical and experimental appraisal of four
risk elicitation methods. Experimental Economics, 19(3):613–641.
Croson, R. and Gneezy, U. (2009). Gender differences in preferences. Journal of Economic
literature, 47(2):448–74.
Csermely, T. and Rabas, A. (2016). How to reveal people’s preferences: Comparing time
consistency and predictive power of multiple price list risk elicitation methods. Journal
of risk and uncertainty, 53(2-3):107–136.
Dave, C., Eckel, C. C., Johnson, C. A., and Rojas, C. (2010). Eliciting risk preferences:
When is simple better? Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 41(3):219–243.
Deck, C., Lee, J., and Reyes, J. (2008). Risk attitudes in large stake gambles: evidence
from a game show. Applied Economics, 40(1):41–52.
Deck, C., Lee, J., Reyes, J. A., and Rosen, C. C. (2013). A failed attempt to explain
within subject variation in risk taking behavior using domain specific risk attitudes.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 87:1–24.
DFT (2015). Reported road casualties in great britain: main results 2015. Technical
report, Dpartment for Trasport.
123
Dionne, G. and Eeckhoudt, L. (1985). Self-insurance, self-protection and increased risk
aversion. Economics Letters, 17(1-2):39–42.
Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D., Sunde, U., Schupp, J., and Wagner, G. G. (2011).
Individual risk attitudes: Measurement, determinants, and behavioral consequences.
Journal of the European Economic Association, 9(3):522–550.
Dolan, P. and Galizzi, M. M. (2015). Like ripples on a pond: Behavioral spillovers and
their implications for research and policy. Journal of Economic Psychology, 47:1–16.
Dulleck, U., Fooken, J., and Fell, J. (2015). Within-subject intra-and inter-method consis-
tency of two experimental risk attitude elicitation methods. German Economic Review,
16(1):104–121.
Eckel, C. C. and Grossman, P. J. (2002). Sex differences and statistical stereotyping in
attitudes toward financial risk. Evolution and human behavior, 23(4):281–295.
Eckel, C. C. and Grossman, P. J. (2008). Forecasting risk attitudes: An experimental
study using actual and forecast gamble choices. Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization, 68(1):1–17.
Eeckhoudt, L. and Gollier, C. (2005). The impact of prudence on optimal prevention.
Economic Theory, 26(4):989–994.
Ehrlich, I. and Becker, G. S. (1972). Market insurance, self-insurance, and self-protection.
Journal of political Economy, 80(4):623–648.
Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Pascu, I., and Cullen, M. R. (2012). How general are risk pref-
erences? choices under uncertainty in different domains. American Economic Review,
102(6):2606–38.
Falk, A., Becker, A., Dohmen, T. J., Enke, B., and Huffman, D. (2015). The nature
and predictive power of preferences: Global evidence. Technical Report IZA Discussion
Paper Number 9504, Maastricht University.
Filippin, A. and Crosetto, P. (2016). A reconsideration of gender differences in risk
attitudes. Management Science, 62(11):3138–3160.
Finucane, M. L., Slovic, P., Mertz, C. K., Flynn, J., and Satterfield, T. A. (2000). Gender,
race, and perceived risk: The’white male’effect. Health, risk & society, 2(2):159–172.
Fischbacher, U., Schudy, S., and Teyssier, S. (2015). Heterogeneous preferences and
investments in energy saving measures. Technical report, Munich Discussion Paper.
124
Fishman, E. (2016). Bikeshare: A review of recent literature. Transport Reviews, 36(1):92–
113.
Frey, R., Pedroni, A., Mata, R., Rieskamp, J., Hertwig, R., and Hertwig (2017). Risk
preference shares the psychometric structure of major psychological traits. Science
advances, 3(10):e1701381.
Galizzi, M. M., Harrison, G. W., and Miraldo, M. (2017). Experimental methods and
behavioral insights in health economics: Estimating risk and time preferences in health.
Working Ppaper.
Galizzi, M. M., Machado, S. R., and Miniaci, R. (2016a). Temporal stability, cross-validity,
and external validity of risk preferences measures: Experimental evidence from a uk
representative sample. Working paper.
Galizzi, M. M., Miraldo, M., and Stavropoulou, C. (2016b). In sickness but not in wealth:
Field evidence on patients’ risk preferences in financial and health domains. Medical
Decision Making, 36(4):503–517.
Ganzach, Y., Ellis, S., Pazy, A., and Ricci-Siag, T. (2008). On the perception and oper-
ationalization of risk perception. Judgment and Decision Making, 3(4):317.
Gneezy, U. and Imas, A. (2017). Lab in the field: Measuring preferences in the wild. In
Handbook of economic field experiments, volume 1, pages 439–464. Elsevier.
Gneezy, U. and Potters, J. (1997). An experiment on risk taking and evaluation periods.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(2):631–645.
Goldzahl, L. (2017). Contributions of risk preference, time orientation and perceptions
to breast cancer screening regularity. Social Science & Medicine, 185:147–157.
Gollier, C., Hammitt, J. K., and Treich, N. (2013). Risk and choice: A research saga.
Journal of risk and uncertainty, 47(2):129–145.
Halek, M. and Eisenhauer, J. G. (2001). Demography of risk aversion. Journal of Risk
and Insurance, pages 1–24.
Handy, S., Van Wee, B., and Kroesen, M. (2014). Promoting cycling for transport:
research needs and challenges. Transport reviews, 34(1):4–24.
Hanoch, Y., Johnson, J. G., and Wilke, A. (2006). Domain specificity in experimental
measures and participant recruitment: An application to risk-taking behavior. Psycho-
logical Science, 17(4):300–304.
125
Harrison, G. W., Hofmeyr, A., Ross, D., and Swarthout, J. T. (2017). Risk preferences,
time preferences and smoking behaviour.
Harrison, G. W., Lau, M. I., and Rutstro¨m, E. E. (2007). Estimating risk attitudes in
denmark: A field experiment. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 109(2):341–368.
Harrison, G. W., Lau, M. I., and Rutstro¨m, E. E. (2010). Individual discount rates and
smoking: Evidence from a field experiment in denmark. Journal of health economics,
29(5):708–717.
Harrison, G. W. and List, J. A. (2004). Field experiments. Journal of Economic literature,
42(4):1009–1055.
Harrison, G. W. and Rutstro¨m, E. (2008). Risk aversion in the laboratory. In Risk
aversion in experiments, pages 41–196. Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
Hey, J. D., Morone, A., and Schmidt, U. (2009). Noise and bias in eliciting preferences.
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 39(3):213–235.
Holt, C. A. and Laury, S. K. (2002). Risk aversion and incentive effects. American
economic review, 92(5):1644–1655.
Ioannou, C. A. and Sadeh, J. (2016). Time preferences and risk aversion: Tests on domain
differences. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 53(1):29–54.
Isaac, R. M. and James, D. (2000). Just who are you calling risk averse? Journal of Risk
and Uncertainty, 20(2):177–187.
Josef, A. K., Richter, D., Samanez-Larkin, G. R., Wagner, G. G., Hertwig, R., and Mata,
R. (2016). Stability and change in risk-taking propensity across the adult life span.
Journal of personality and social psychology, 111(3):430.
Kahan, D. M., Peters, E., Wittlin, M., Slovic, P., Ouellette, L. L., Braman, D., and
Mandel, G. (2012). The polarizing impact of science literacy and numeracy on perceived
climate change risks. Nature climate change, 2(10):732.
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under
risk. Econometrica, 47(2):263–292.
Katapodi, M. C., Lee, K. A., Facione, N. C., and Dodd, M. J. (2004). Predictors of
perceived breast cancer risk and the relation between perceived risk and breast cancer
screening: a meta-analytic review. Preventive medicine, 38(4):388–402.
126
Khwaja, A., Sloan, F., and Salm, M. (2006). Evidence on preferences and subjective
beliefs of risk takers: The case of smokers. International Journal of Industrial Organi-
zation, 24(4):667–682.
Lawson, A. R., Pakrashi, V., Ghosh, B., and Szeto, W. (2013). Perception of safety of
cyclists in dublin city. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 50:499–511.
Leiserowitz, A. (2006). Climate change risk perception and policy preferences: The role
of affect, imagery, and values. Climatic change, 77(1-2):45–72.
Lejuez, C. W., Read, J. P., Kahler, C. W., Richards, J. B., Ramsey, S. E., Stuart, G. L.,
Strong, D. R., and Brown, R. A. (2002). Evaluation of a behavioral measure of risk
taking: the balloon analogue risk task (bart). Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Applied, 8(2):75.
Liu, E. M. (2013). Time to change what to sow: Risk preferences and technology adoption
decisions of cotton farmers in china. Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(4):1386–
1403.
Liu, E. M. and Huang, J. (2013). Risk preferences and pesticide use by cotton farmers
in china. Journal of Development Economics, 103:202–215.
Lo¨nnqvist, J.-E., Verkasalo, M., Walkowitz, G., and Wichardt, P. C. (2015). Measuring
individual risk attitudes in the lab: Task or ask? an empirical comparison. Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 119:254–266.
Loomes, G. and Pogrebna, G. (2014). Measuring individual risk attitudes when prefer-
ences are imprecise. The Economic Journal, 124(576):569–593.
Lusk, J. L. and Coble, K. H. (2005). Risk perceptions, risk preference, and acceptance of
risky food. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 87(2):393–405.
Machin, M. A. and Sankey, K. S. (2008). Relationships between young drivers’ personality
characteristics, risk perceptions, and driving behaviour. Accident analysis & prevention,
40(2):541–547.
Mather, M., Mazar, N., Gorlick, M. A., Lighthall, N. R., Burgeno, J., Schoeke, A., and
Ariely, D. (2012). Risk preferences and aging: The “certainty effect” in older adults’
decision making. Psychology and aging, 27(4):801.
Mishra, S. (2014). Decision-making under risk: Integrating perspectives from biology,
economics, and psychology. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 18(3):280–307.
Mousavi, S. and Gigerenzer, G. (2014). Risk, uncertainty, and heuristics. Journal of
Business Research, 67(8):1671–1678.
127
Nash, N., Whitmarsh, L., Capstick, S., Hargreaves, T., Poortinga, W., Thomas, G., Sautk-
ina, E., and Xenias, D. (2017). Climate-relevant behavioral spillover and the potential
contribution of social practice theory. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change,
8(6).
Nelson, J. A. (2015). Are women really more risk-averse than men? a re-analysis of the
literature using expanded methods. Journal of Economic Surveys, 29(3):566–585.
NIHR (2017). Tips to reduce your exposure whilst cycling. http://www.breathelondon.
org/south-east/cycling [Acessed on: June 2017].
Paulsen, D., Platt, M., Huettel, S. A., and Brannon, E. M. (2011). Decision-making under
risk in children, adolescents, and young adults. Frontiers in psychology, 2:72.
Petrolia, D. R., Landry, C. E., and Coble, K. H. (2013). Risk preferences, risk perceptions,
and flood insurance. Land Economics, 89(2):227–245.
Picone, G., Sloan, F., and Taylor, D. (2004). Effects of risk and time preference and
expected longevity on demand for medical tests. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,
28(1):39–53.
Post, T., Van den Assem, M. J., Baltussen, G., and Thaler, R. H. (2008). Deal or no
deal? decision making under risk in a large-payoff game show. American Economic
Review, 98(1):38–71.
Pratt, J. W. (1964). Risk aversion in the small and in the large. Econometrica,
32(1/2):122–136.
Pucher, J., Buehler, R., and Seinen, M. (2011). Bicycling renaissance in north america?
an update and re-appraisal of cycling trends and policies. Transportation research part
A: policy and practice, 45(6):451–475.
Qiu, Y., Colson, G., and Grebitus, C. (2014). Risk preferences and purchase of energy-
efficient technologies in the residential sector. Ecological Economics, 107:216–229.
Reynaud, A. and Couture, S. (2012). Stability of risk preference measures: results from
a field experiment on french farmers. Theory and decision, 73(2):203–221.
Reynolds, B., Ortengren, A., Richards, J. B., and de Wit, H. (2006). Dimensions of
impulsive behavior: Personality and behavioral measures. Personality and individual
differences, 40(2):305–315.
Riddel, M. (2012). Comparing risk preferences over financial and environmental lotteries.
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 45(2):135–157.
128
Riddel, M. and Kolstoe, S. (2013). Heterogeneity in life-duration preferences: Are risky
recreationists really more risk loving? Journal of risk and uncertainty, 46(2):191–213.
Rustichini, A., DeYoung, C. G., Anderson, J. E., and Burks, S. V. (2016). Toward the
integration of personality theory and decision theory in explaining economic behavior:
An experimental investigation. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics,
64:122–137.
Schubert, R., Brown, M., Gysler, M., and Brachinger, H. W. (1999). Financial decision-
making: are women really more risk-averse? American Economic Review, 89(2):381–
385.
Spence, A., Poortinga, W., Butler, C., and Pidgeon, N. F. (2011). Perceptions of climate
change and willingness to save energy related to flood experience. Nature climate
change, 1(1):46.
Spence, A., Poortinga, W., and Pidgeon, N. (2012). The psychological distance of climate
change. Risk analysis, 32(6):957–972.
Starmer, C. (2000). Developments in non-expected utility theory: The hunt for a descrip-
tive theory of choice under risk. Journal of economic literature, 38(2):332–382.
Steinbach, R., Green, J., Datta, J., and Edwards, P. (2011). Cycling and the city: a case
study of how gendered, ethnic and class identities can shape healthy transport choices.
Social science & medicine, 72(7):1123–1130.
Sutter, M., Kocher, M. G., Gla¨tzle-Ru¨etzler, D., and Trautmann, S. T. (2013). Impatience
and uncertainty: Experimental decisions predict adolescents’ field behavior. American
Economic Review, 103(1):510–31.
Szrek, H., Chao, L.-W., Ramlagan, S., and Peltzer, K. (2012). Predicting (un) healthy
behavior: A comparison of risk-taking propensity measures. Judgment and decision
making, 7(6):716.
TfL (2016). Attitudes towards cycling. Technical report, Transport for London.
Truelove, H. B., Carrico, A. R., Weber, E. U., Raimi, K. T., and Vandenbergh, M. P.
(2014). Positive and negative spillover of pro-environmental behavior: An integrative
review and theoretical framework. Global Environmental Change, 29:127–138.
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative repre-
sentation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and uncertainty, 5(4):297–323.
Ulleberg, P. and Rundmo, T. (2003). Personality, attitudes and risk perception as pre-
dictors of risky driving behaviour among young drivers. Safety science, 41(5):427–443.
129
Verschoor, A., D’Exelle, B., and Perez-Viana, B. (2016). Lab and life: Does risky choice
behaviour observed in experiments reflect that in the real world? Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization, 128:134–148.
Vieider, F. M., Lefebvre, M., Bouchouicha, R., Chmura, T., Hakimov, R., Krawczyk, M.,
and Martinsson, P. (2015). Common components of risk and uncertainty attitudes
across contexts and domains: Evidence from 30 countries. Journal of the European
Economic Association, 13(3):421–452.
Volland, B. (2017). The role of risk and trust attitudes in explaining residential energy
demand: Evidence from the united kingdom. Ecological Economics, 132:14–30.
Weber, E. U. (2010). What shapes perceptions of climate change? Wiley Interdisciplinary
Reviews: Climate Change, 1(3):332–342.
Weber, E. U., Blais, A.-R., and Betz, N. E. (2002). A domain-specific risk-attitude scale:
Measuring risk perceptions and risk behaviors. Journal of behavioral decision making,
15(4):263–290.
Woodcock, J., Tainio, M., Cheshire, J., O’Brien, O., and Goodman, A. (2014). Health
effects of the london bicycle sharing system: health impact modelling study. Bmj,
348:g425.
130
4.6 Tables and Figures
Table 4.1: Binswager-Eckel-Grossman (BEG) task: lottery choices, expected payoffs,
and risk
Gamble Event A Event B Probability Expected payofs Risk CRRA range
1 £4.00 £4.00 50/50 £4.00 0.00 r >2.00
2 £6.00 £3.00 50/50 £4.50 2.12 0.669 <r <2.00
3 £8.00 £2.00 50/50 £5.00 4.24 0.382 <r <0.669
4 £10.00 £1.00 50/50 £5.50 6.36 0.197 <r <0.382
5 £12.00 £0.00 50/50 £6.00 8.49 r <0.197
Notes: Risk is measured as standard deviation of expected payoff. The value of the ranges of r are
estimated from the function U = x
(1−r)
(1−r) , assuming constant relative risk aversion utility (CRRA).
Table 4.2: Sample characteristics
Variable Variable category % Share Mean SD Min Max
Cyclist type Rec 24.86 2.436 0.864 1 3
Com 6.63
Rec + Com 68.51
Cyling frequency <1pm 2.21 4.094 1.037 1 5
1-2pm 8.84
1 pw 9.39
2-4 pw 36.46
>= 5pw 43.09
AP knowledge 1 12.71 2.928 1.243 1 5
2 29.83
3 22.1
4 22.65
5 12.71
Age 18-34 37.02 1.768 0.700 1 4
35-54 50.83
>55 10.50
PNTS 1.66
Gender Male 66.30 1.359 0.546 1 3
Female 32.60
PNTS 1.10
Ethnic group White 76.80 1.304 0.598 1 3
BAME 16.02
Other/PNTS 7.18
Income <£32,000 17.68 2.663 0.938 1 4
£32,000 to ≤ £64,000 13.26
>£64,000 54.14
DK/PNTS 14.92
Education <UG 20.99 2.138 0.787 1 4
UG 48.07
>UG 27.07
PNTS 3.87
Sample (N, number of observations) 181
Notes: Rec: Recreational; Com: commuter; pm: per month; pw: per week; AP knowledge: Air pollution knowledge score
(values can range from 0 (minimum) to 5 (maximum)); BAME: Black Asian Minority Ethnic; UG: Undergraduate degree;
DK: Don’t know; PNTS: Prefer not to say.
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Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics: Risk measures and (aggregate) dependent variables
Variable, brief description Mean SD Max Min
BEG, incentive-compatible risk preferences 2.619 1.575 1 5
SOEP-G, self-assessment general risk attitude 7.050 2.242 1 11
SOEP-H, self-assessment health risk attitude 6.287 2.520 1 11
APRP, self-assessment air pollution risk perception 7.956 2.035 1 11
Lights, self-assessment importance of item in a cycling safety kit 3.967 1.048 1 5
Helmet, self-assessment importance of item in a cycling safety kit 4.249 1.110 1 5
Facemask, self-assessment importance of item in a cycling safety kit 1.983 1.098 1 5
# Avoidance, self-report of air pollution avoidance behaviour (aggregate) 1.735 1.323 0 6
Risk-taking, self-report of risk-taking while cycling (aggregate) 9.569 2.833 6 20
Notes: BEG: Binswanger-Eckel-Grossman risk measure; SOEP-G(H): German Socio-Economic Panel General (Health) risk
attitude; APRP: Air Pollution Risk Perception; # Avoidance : Event (aggregate) count of different avoidance behaviours;
Risk-taking: Aggregate score of different risk-taking behaviours while cycling.
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Table 4.10: Correlations between different risk measures
Risk measures BEG SOEP-G SOEP-H Lights Helmet Facemask APRP
BEG 1
SOEP-G 0.164 ** 1
SOEP-H 0.106 0.651 *** 1
Lights -0.070 -0.031 0.070 1
Helmet 0.057 0.044 -0.101 0.380 *** 1
Facemask -0.015 0.110 0.087 0.259 ** 0.045 1
APRP -0.030 0.162 ** 0.051 0.113 0.086 0.461 *** 1
Notes: BEG: Binswanger-Eckel-Grossman risk measure; SOEP-G(H): German Socio-Economic Panel General
(Health) risk attitude; Lights, Helmet and Facemask: rating of importance of item in a cycling safety kit;
APRP: Air Pollution Risk Perception. The table reports pairwise correlation coefficients between variables.
Pearson correlation coefficients are displayed for pairs between the following variables; SOEP-G and SOEP-H
risk attitudes and APRP (they are treated as continuous variables, as their range is at least as large as 10).
Polychoric correlations are reported for pairwise correlations between ordinal variables, BEG risk preference,
Lights, Helmet, and Facemask. Polyserial correlation coefficients are reported for pairwise correlations between
a ‘continuous’ and ordinal variable (e.g. between BEG and SOEP-G variables). Significance levels reported at
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Figure 4.1: Distribution of responses for risk-taking while cycling: By behaviours
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of responses for risk-taking while cycling: All behaviours
(aggregate)
Figure 4.3: Distribution of responses for air pollution avoidance: By behaviours
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of responses for air pollution avoidance: All behaviours
(aggregate)
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Chapter 5
Optimistic about air quality, but
avoiding polluted air? Unpacking the
effects of social norm messages
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5.1 Introduction
Traffic-related ambient air pollution is a life and death problem in cities worldwide. Over
80% of people in urban areas lived in places where air quality levels were deemed harmful
by the World Health Organization and urban pollution levels increased by 8% annu-
ally during 2008 to 2013 (WHO, 2016). Higher air pollution is linked to the increased
risk of traffic-accidents (Sager, 2016) and reduced cognitive functioning and performance
(Ebenstein et al., 2016; Clifford et al., 2016), apart from increased morbidity and mor-
tality risk.1 Individuals can undertake short-run avoidance strategies to reduce exposure
to toxic pollutants and particulates. Examples include reducing time spent outdoors on
polluted days, or changing travel behaviour on-route by using segregated side-walks or
reducing travel speed if cycling or running, and investing in defensive goods like anti-
pollution facemasks, anti-asthmatics, or other medication if going outside is unavoidable
(Giles and Koehle, 2014; Bigazzi et al., 2016; Descheˆnes et al., 2017).
As these avoidance strategies have direct implications for individual welfare (Zivin
and Neidell, 2013), encouraging avoidance through informational strategies is an increas-
ingly important policy lever deployed by governments. The small but essential set of
studies that analyse avoidance behaviour explore how informational alerts reduce time
spent outdoors (Zivin and Neidell, 2009; Janke, 2014). There is limited evidence about
other behavioural strategies that could be used in public information campaigns. This
reflects the lacuna in our understanding about the avoidance strategies adopted by in-
dividuals when going outside in unavoidable and the psycho-social factors underpinning
these decisions.
This paper aims to address this gap by exploring the prospect of employing social
norms in informational interventions to encourage avoidance. Social norms are the cus-
tomary expectations, beliefs or rules governing behaviour, within a social group, to which
group members try to conform (Young, 2015). Some prominent studies suggest that refer-
encing social norms in informational interventions can change behaviour in a wide variety
of contexts including driving safety (Linkenbach and Perkins, 2003; Lawrence, 2015), en-
ergy, water and other conservation behaviours (Allcott, 2011; Ferraro and Price, 2013;
Goldstein et al., 2008; Cialdini et al., 2006; Dolan and Metcalfe, 2015), voter turnout
(Gerber and Rogers, 2009), retirement savings (Beshears et al., 2015), and antibiotics
1Adverse health effects include cardiovascular, pulmonary, and respiratory diseases, including stroke,
impaired lung function, asthma and cognitive function (Guarnieri and Balmes, 2014; Hoek et al., 2013;
Power et al., 2011). Short-term effects include irritation of the eyes, nose, throat, and lungs (Pope III,
2000; Pope III et al., 2002). Ambient air pollution is also associated with neurological diseases such as
Alzheimer’s and dementia, negative affect, happiness and life satisfaction (Underwood, 2017; Zeidner and
Shechter, 1988; Dolan and Laffan, 2016; Welsch, 2006; Luechinger, 2009). See Currie et al. (2014) for a
review about the short-term and long-term effects of air pollution from the economics literature.
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over-prescription (Hallsworth et al., 2016).
While these results are promising, there is also evidence of social norm messages fail-
ing to change behaviour in replication studies conducted in new populations or other
decision-making contexts. To illustrate, Bohner and Schlu¨ter (2014) replicated Goldstein
et al. (2008)’s social norms and towel reuse experiment in Germany, but found no dif-
ference between an appeal and a descriptive norm message on towel reuse amongst hotel
guests (the original study was conducted in the USA).2 In another natural field experi-
ment, Silva and John (2017) found no difference between an informative and descriptive
norm email on the likelihood of students paying university fees on time. Yeomans and
Herberich (2014) also found negatively-worded descriptive norms had no impact on de-
cisions to inflate tires to improve fuel efficiency, compared to an informational control
message. Thus, the types of contexts and populations in which normative social interven-
tions may be most useful are unclear. These mixed findings also raise additional puzzles:
who responds to social norms messaging and why? Are social norms messaging a useful
strategy to encourage air pollution avoidance?
Thus, this study is aimed at evaluating not only whether individuals change avoid-
ance behaviour in response to social norm interventions but also how responses may vary
across different types of individuals. It builds on the data collected in the lab-in-the-field
experiment reported in Paper 3 by implementing an informational intervention towards
the end of the survey. In the intervention, subjects were either exposed to a persuasive,
informational message about air pollution health risks in the control condition or a mes-
sage augmented with social norms in the treatment condition. After this, individuals
could choose between anti-pollution facemasks and an alternative prize in a lottery draw.
This is a relevant avoidance behaviour because there has been a growth in the use of
anti-pollution facemasks across cities globally, and it has been prescribed as an avoidance
strategy for those cycling and exercising outdoors (Zhang and Mu, 2017; Ross, 2015; Giles
and Koehle, 2014) The conceptual framework and interventions are explained in greater
detail in the body of the paper.
There are three main contributions of this exploratory study. First, the effect of so-
cial norms messaging are considered in a new behavioural setting and sample, i.e., air
pollution avoidance through the choice of face-masks amongst cyclists. There is little
empirical evidence on how to persuade active travellers, like cyclists, to undertake air
pollution avoidance (Giles et al., 2011), although they can be especially vulnerable to
2Schultz et al. (2008) and Reese et al. (2014) also failed to replicate Goldstein et al. (2008)’s experiment
in Europe.
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accident risk and inhale more pollutants and particulates along high traffic routes com-
pared to those in cars (Panis et al., 2010; Zuurbier et al., 2011).3
Second, we explore whether making social norms salient in a message confers an ad-
ditional benefit, over and above providing information on air pollution health risks and
the role of face-masks in reducing exposure. This approach addresses Dolan and Metcalfe
(2015)’s concern that there is limited field-based evidence that explicitly differentiates
the behavioural effects of provisioning information and knowledge versus social norms.
This evidence may be particularly relevant to the study context because both everyday
air pollution health risks and many avoidance strategies (like avoiding busy routes) are
mostly invisible. In the face of such uncertainty, it is possible that individuals look to
others to learn about the ‘appropriate’ choice but also don’t know about existing risks
and avoidance options. Given this, the current study tests the impact of social norms
over and above the knowledge of how to avoid air pollution.4
Third, keeping in mind that toxic air quality is difficult to decipher directly, the last
contribution is to determine whether underlying beliefs about air quality influences re-
sponses to social norms information in systematically different ways. This builds on the
growing literature about the heterogeneous behavioural effects of social norms and envi-
ronmental information interventions (Ferraro and Price, 2013; Brown et al., 2017).
The main result of this paper is that individuals who held more optimistic beliefs
about air quality, i.e., those who perceived air quality was better and were exposed to
the social norms message, were more likely to choose facemasks in the lottery. That said,
although a higher proportion of cyclists exposed to the social norms message chose face-
masks, this difference is not statistically significant compared to the control condition
for the whole sample. Taken together, these findings are part of an increasing body of
evidence that suggests that the way normative messaging works is not as simple as first
thought (Silva and John, 2017). More broadly, these findings highlight need to under-
stand how underlying individual factors drive heterogeneity in responding to persuasive
3Previous work has shown that Short-run traffic-related air pollution negatively impacts cardiac
autonomic function amongst urban cyclists (Weichenthal et al., 2011). But given the recent policy push
towards active travel and lifestyles in cities, there is an ongoing debate about the extent to which active
travellers are more or less at risk from pollution, compared to those using other modes of transport.
Epidemiological studies estimate the long-term health benefits of cycling can outweigh health risks in
all but the severest cases of ambient air pollution (Tainio et al., 2016; Go¨tschi et al., 2016). The models
assume that cyclists inhale more pollutants compared to non-active travellers, e.g. an inhalation factor
of 3 is assumed for cyclists in most studies. But they omit the impact of short-term air pollution episodes
and increased morbidity risk, both of which have adverse health and productivity impacts in the short-
run (Tainio et al., 2016). Giles and Koehle (2014) note that exercise improves some of the physiologic
mechanisms and health outcomes that air pollution exposure exacerbates, but identifies avoidance as a
key behavioural strategy to reduce potential adverse consequences.
4I did not test the effect of information provision alone due to uncertainty about the final sample size.
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messaging and calls for more research to establish how robust the behavioural effect of
social norms are in real-world settings.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the
related literature, and section three lays out the conceptual framework used in the study,
by discussing why social norms matter for avoidance and the role of prior beliefs about
air quality. It also outlines the hypotheses for investigation. Section four describes the
experimental design, and section five presents the results. Section six concludes with a
discussion.
5.2 Related literature
In this section, I review the literature on existing informational interventions to promote
avoidance behaviour, followed by the existing evidence on existing social norm interven-
tions to change preventive health and active travel behaviours.
5.2.1 Air pollution information
Informational interventions are critical to empowering individuals to undertake avoid-
ance to improve their health by reducing exposure. The assessment of everyday pollution
threats is a challenging task because pollutants like PM and Nitrogen dioxide (NO2)
are unobservable to the naked eye. Moreover ambient air quality depends on variable
atmospheric and environmental conditions like wind, rain, vegetation and proximity to
water. In addition, ambient air quality is a complex environmental risk, involving mul-
tiple diffuse polluters, intricate chains of causality, and ambiguity about the best way
to protect against poor air quality (Barker, 1974; Bickerstaff, 2004). Informational in-
terventions can help individuals take avoidance decisions outdoors amidst uncertainties
regarding the threats posed by everyday air pollution.
Governments use the standard approach of information alerts based on air quality
banding to increase individual-level avoidance. Typically, they rely on forecasted air qual-
ity and advise individuals to avoid strenuous outdoor activities on high smog days. Most
studies rely on cross-sectional surveys and quasi-experimental approaches, to find that
alerts reduce time spent on outdoor activities (like zoo visits) (Bresnahan et al., 1997;
Roberts et al., 2014; Wen et al., 2009; Zivin and Neidell, 2009; Janke, 2014) and outdoor
physical activity (Noonan, 2014; Ward and Beatty, 2016; Saberian et al., 2017). Noonan
(2014) found joggers and the elderly use parks less in response to smog alerts, but car
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drivers do not change their behaviour. Saberian et al. (2017) estimated that such alerts
reduced cycle traffic by around 13% on the first day, and 1.6% on the second day. Overall,
these studies suggest that information alerts on high pollution days reduce time spent
outdoors, especially amongst those perceived as vulnerable, such as the elderly and those
exercising outdoors. While providing useful evidence on the impact of alerts and ambient
pollutant levels on avoidance, these studies do not explore avoidance strategies employed
by cyclists when going outdoors is inevitable, or the psychological factors underlying
avoidance decisions.
Alternately, public health advisories provide information on everyday air quality data
information to give people the scientific knowledge about air pollution levels and equip
them with the information to take decisions to protect themselves. This approach largely
rests on the Knowledge-Deficit model, which assumes the public lacks technical and sci-
entific information about environmental risks. Assuming agents are rational and scientific
literacy is generally low, transferring technical information like air quality data from ex-
perts to the public will give the latter the informational basis to either change their
behaviour and / or attitudes to emerging technologies to counter these risks (Simis et al.,
2016). But growing evidence reveals that even if information provision increases awareness
of the issue, it can nevertheless be relatively ineffective in producing behaviour change
due to varous factors such as the complexity and mode of science communication, cog-
nitive biases such as the availability heuristic or confirmatory bias, and / or affective
reasoning (Abrahamse et al., 2005; Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002; Sunstein, 2007). Along
these lines, qualitative evidence shows that the public finds air quality information such
information overly complicated, technical, or even irrelevant (Bush et al., 2001; Bicker-
staff and Walker, 2003, 2001).5
5.2.2 Social norms
Given concerns over relying purely on the provision of scientific information to change
public responses to environmental risks, subsequent efforts in both behavioural economics
and psychology explore whether informational interventions are more effective at chang-
ing behaviour when they leverage social norms (Farrow et al., 2017; Nyborg et al., 2016).
However, both economists and psychologists have dissimilar conceptualizations of social
norms (Nyborg, 2018). In psychology, social norms tend to refer to people’s beliefs about
5Others, like (Kahan et al., 2012) point out that public divisions over climate change stem not from
the public’s incomprehension of science but from a distinctive conflict of interest: between the personal
interest individuals have in forming beliefs in line with those held by others with whom they share close
ties and the collective one they all share in making use of the best available science to promote common
welfare.
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the behaviour and evaluations of group members, influence individual-level behaviour
(Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004). For example, the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct
distinguishes between descriptive norms (what most people do) and injunctive norms
(what people ought to do). The Theory of Planned Behaviour also defines norms as so-
cial norms as the subjective beliefs about the expectations of others which can exert
effects on an individual’s behaviour (Ajzen, 1985, 1991). Following a social norm may be
linked to conformism (i.e., a wish to fit in by being or acting like others), as an indication
of the behaviour’s individual pay-offs and / or social or moral appropriateness.
Psychologists also often note that descriptive and injunctive norms need not coin-
cide, and a given situation may contain multiple (at times conflicting) norms. Given this,
there is a consensus that social norms can influence behaviour when they are activated
or made salient through channels like persuasive messaging (Cialdini et al., 1990; Cial-
dini and Goldstein, 2004). As noted by Dolan et al. (2012), messages that make social
norms salient may influence behaviour through both conscious and unconscious processes:
individuals may either learn about the appropriate course of action, update beliefs and
change behaviour, or conversely, they may have no recollection of conforming to the norm
or the choices of others, because they act ‘automatically’ instead.
But social norm messages may be ineffective if descriptive norms highlight that many
people do not follow social norms and get away with their non-adherence (Cialdini et al.,
2006). Additionally, interventions informing people that they behave better than average
can also result in a worsening of behaviour, as exemplified by energy and water conser-
vation studies (e.g. in Allcott (2011) and Schultz et al. (2007)). Consequently, there is a
growing consensus in the psychology literature that aligned normative messages, where
both high group involvement (descriptive norm) and group approval (injunctive norm)
are salient, elicit stronger behaviour shifts in the desired direction (Hamann et al., 2015;
Van Der Linden, 2015; Allcott, 2011; Schultz et al., 2008; Cialdini et al., 2006).6
In economics, Nyborg et al. (2016) define a social norm as ‘predominant behavioural
pattern within a group, supported by a shared understanding of acceptable actions, and
sustained through social interactions within that group’ (also see Ostrom (2000)). This
implies that a social norm has to be both descriptive and injunctive, as demonstrated
theoretically in Benabou and Tirole (2011). From a game theoretic standpoint, a social
norm typically apply to some behaviour that is self-enforcing or constitutes the group
equilibrium, because people want to adhere to the norm if they expect others to do so
6But there are also studies failing to establish this: for example, Kormos et al. (2015) found descriptive
normative information did not affect non-commuting behaviour but had a positive effect on commuting
behaviour, contrary to the ‘boomerang’ effect.
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(Young, 2015). As noted by Nyborg (2018), if someone believes that the majority of guests
staying in her hotel room before her reused their towels, reusing one’s towel would not
necessarily be defined as a social norm in the game-theoretic sense, but it would count
as a social norm in the Focus theory of Normative Conduct in social psychology. This
is because it is common but not necessarily generally viewed as more acceptable than
the alternatives, i.e., opting for a clean hotel towel in a context where this appears to be
usual default choice.
In addition, social norms need to be at least partly enforced through extrinsic social
forces such as (dis-)approval, inclusion, exclusion or social sanctions or rewards within
the group. Thus economic models pay special attention to the role of social sanctions
and rewards in enforcing norm-based behaviours (Nyborg, 2018; Young, 2015; Benabou
and Tirole, 2011; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). 7 The literature on social norms in co-
ordination games or cooperation over shared public and common pool resources typifies
this approach (Nyborg, 2018; Ostrom, 2000; Bowles and Gintis, 1998). The application
of social norms to self-protective and / or preventive health behaviours in economics is
rather limited in comparison.8
In the case of preventive health behaviours, studies (predominantly from psychology)
have remarked that the adherence to social norms - even at a personal cost - can be
associated with higher chances of survival and safety-enhancing functions (Griskevicius
et al., 2006; Maner et al., 2005). Individuals can be especially susceptible to social in-
fluence and situational cues for self-protection and disease avoidance because following
others while personally uncertain, can often lead to better and more accurate decision
making (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955; Cialdini et al., 1990; Griskevicius et al., 2006, 2008).
There is also evidence that individuals often overestimate the prevalence of many un-
desirable behaviours (and underestimate the prevalence of healthy behaviours) (Borsari
and Carey, 2003; Prentice and Miller, 1993). This literature on ‘pluralistic ignorance’
shows that individuals who assume their attitudes about specific normative behaviours
are different from others - whereas most people share the same beliefs - leading them to
underestimate the extent of healthy behaviours (Prentice and Miller, 1996). In this way,
people can inadvertently behave in ways that endorse erroneous or unhealthy norms, be-
cause of (mis-)perceptions about how people behave. Thus, when the appropriate course
of preventive action is uncertain, social norm messages can make the avoidance of others
7From this perspective, Nyborg (2018) notes that certain actions like abstaining from littering when
alone and unobserved in the wilderness, implies following an internalized moral norm rather than a social
norm, due to the lack of social enforcement.
8(Nyborg and Rege, 2003) is an excellent exception, as they examine the evolution of social norms
around considerate smoking behaviour (which is a risky health behaviour) from the introduction of a no
smoking regulation.
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‘known’ or publicly observable (i.e., descriptive norm), and clarifies people’s perceptions
that self-protection is socially appropriate behaviour (i.e., injunctive norm).
Current evidence on how social norms messaging impacts preventive health and sus-
tainable travel behaviours is mixed. Studies largely rely on behavioural intentions, self-
reported and observational data from university staff and students, although natural field
experiments are increasingly common.9 Few studies consider how social norms impact pre-
ventive behaviour while travelling. In early field evidence on the topic, Linkenbach and
Perkins (2003) reported results from a social media campaign to encourage seatbelt use
in the USA. They found that self-reported seatbelt used increased after the campaign: in
2000, 77.6% of those interviewed reported wearing a seatbelt at least 90% of the time,
which went up to 82.6%, after the campaign. While promising, it is difficult to conclude
that the effect was causally attributable to the social norms campaign, as the interven-
tion was not randomised, and the study relies on before and after data. More recently, in
an observational study, Lawrence (2015) used a pre-post design to study phone-related
distracted driving, which was directly observed. Strong and weak injunctive norms were
displayed on signboards by the gates of a university campus, where only the former made
social disapproval explicit (‘97% of Dukes disapprove when you text and drive’ versus
‘Please don’t text and drive’). She found that the strong injunctive norm-framing re-
duced phone-related distracted driving, but that the weak injunctive norms condition
had no behavioural impact. That said, the effects of the strong-injunctive norms con-
dition washed out two weeks after the study because phone use was not significantly
different from the pre-intervention period.
In the domain of sustainable transport behaviour, Yeomans and Herberich (2014)
found negatively-worded descriptive norms had no impact on decisions to inflate tires to
improve fuel efficiency compared to an informational control message, in a natural field
experiment. Kormos et al. (2015) also found descriptive norm information had no effects
on total transportation behaviour of a sample of university students and staff, in a field
experiment with self-reported data. But they reported that the amount of sustainable
transportation use (e.g., bus, carpool, ride-share, cycling, or walking) relative to private
vehicle use increased as the proportion of people stated in the descriptive norm increased
across experimental groups (especially amongst students).
9I focus on preventive and travel behaviours in this review, as it is beyond the scope of the study to
undertake an exhaustive investigation and refer the reader to Miller and Prentice (2016) and Farrow et al.
(2017) for some recent reviews of how social norm messaging has been applied to health and risk-taking
behaviours like alcohol and drug consumption, and environmental behaviours.
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There is also related work on how social norm messages impact choices to exercise.
Burger and Shelton (2011) saw a decline in elevator use among people exposed to the de-
scriptive norm sign in university campus locations, measured through direct observation.
Priebe and Spink (2015) use a pre-post experimental design, where a sample of office
workers was randomly assigned to receive email messages containing descriptive norms
about co-workers’ behaviour. They found that those who received descriptive norm emails
about co-workers’ lower sedentary behaviour and greater stair use and walking, reported
decreasing their own sitting time while increasing stair use and walking at the office.
A small but growing number of studies explore how social norm messaging encourages
healthier food consumption. Croker et al. (2009) found normative information increased
intentions to consume fruits and vegetables amongst men, but not women, based on self-
reported survey data from home-based in-person interviews in the U.K. Staunton et al.
(2014) found no effect of injunctive norms on intentions to eat healthily amongst Aus-
tralian university students but found a negative effect when negative descriptive norms
were salient. Finally, in a natural field experiment, Thorndike et al. (2016) found no
difference in the proportion of ‘green’ items bought from a hospital cafeteria, between
American hospital employees receiving a monthly letter with social norms feedback, and
a control condition without any contact. While the rate of green purchases was higher in
another treatment group receiving a monthly social norms feedback plus a small financial
incentive, behaviour reverted to the baseline levels after three months.
The current study adds to the literature in the following ways. First, it extends the
research on social norm messaging to a new behavioural context, i.e., preferences for face-
masks amongst urban cyclists. By doing so, it moves beyond the university campus and
student sample into a field setting. Second, the study measures the revealed preference for
face-masks, by using an incentive-compatible task, as explained in the experimental de-
sign section. The current study attempts to address extant concerns that about drawing
inferences from behavioural intentions directly to choice, as demonstrated by the litera-
ture on the intention-behaviour gap (Sheeran, 2002). Bridging this gap may be especially
challenging in the domain of physical activity: Rhodes and Bruijn (2013) assessed concor-
dance/discordance of physical activity intention and behaviour in a meta-analysis, and
found the intention-behaviour gap at 48%. They noted that the discordance is from inten-
ders who do not act. In light of this, studying revealed choice is arguably complementary
to studies measuring observed and self-reported behaviour, and behavioural intentions.
Lastly, as seen from the literature, e.g. in Yeomans and Herberich (2014), it is not al-
ways clear the messages with social norms change behaviour compared to informational
messages. Thus, the current exercise also addresses the need for more empirical evidence
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about the comparative benefits of using social influence messages versus persuasive, in-
formational messages, to study what works and what doesn’t (Dolan and Metcalfe, 2015).
It also addresses the question of why treatment effects may be mixed by considering the
impact of underlying beliefs about air quality, as discussed in the following section.
5.3 Hypotheses
Based on the literature reviewed in the previous section, I consider two hypotheses to be
tested in this paper. The starting point of the analysis is that health risks from poor air
quality are often unknown or uncertain to people, or they remain inattentive to them,
although self-protection against poor quality air is desirable, at least in the short run
while large-scale improvements in air quality occur. People may also be unaware of the
instrumental value of facemasks to reduce exposure to poor quality air. Thus in the con-
trol condition, individuals are presented with information on air pollution health risks
and facemasks. However, messages augmented with social norms may be more effective
at inducing air pollution avoidance compared to basic information provision. Individuals
may be more responsive to social norm messaging if it provides new information on indi-
vidual payoffs from self-protection or possible self-protection strategies (or call people’s
attention to the same) or through conformism (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955; Allcott, 2011;
Nyborg, 2018).10 Thus, the first hypothesis to be tested is as follows:
Hypothesis I: Subjects exposed to informational messages augmented with social
norms (treatment condition) are more likely to choose facemasks to protect against air
pollution than subjects exposed to the informational message without social norms (con-
trol condition), i.e., there is a positive treatment effect.
It is possible that the impact of the information interventions that make health risks
salient may vary across individuals based on underlying perceptions of air quality. Per-
ceived air quality is an integral cognitive component of the perceptual experience of air
pollution, which in turn is critical for shaping public attitudes and behaviour to protect
against poor air quality. The Protection Motivation Theory suggests people first ap-
praise health threats from poor environmental quality and then consider self-protective
behaviours to manage the threat (Rogers, 1975; Lazarus, 1968). Similarly, the Health Be-
lief Model proposes people are more prone to act if they believe they are more vulnerable
10Even if there is an injunctive norm to protect one’s health, there may not be a widespread self-
protective behaviour which is observable to that effect - which arguably implies a weak descriptive norm
and therefore limiting the role of social sanctioning. Note that the distinct effect of each of the pathways,
i.e., new information on individual payoffs or social / moral appropriateness of air pollution avoidance
or conformity cannot be disentangled in the current study design, as discussed in the following section.
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to adverse health outcomes from poor environmental quality (Rosentock, 1974). Higher
ambient pollution levels are linked to higher air pollution avoidance (Zivin and Neidell,
2009; Janke, 2014; Saberian et al., 2017) and the purchase of facemasks in urban centres
(Zhang and Mu, 2017; Sun et al., 2017). Given this, individuals who are pessimistic about
air quality, i.e., they perceive air quality is poor, may be more influenced by the social
norm message.
Conversely, it is possible that those who hold optimistic beliefs about air quality are
more likely to revise their beliefs upon receiving information about health risks, and are
more likely to take self-protection.11 Along these lines, a field experiment by Brown et al.
(2017) found that households who held initially optimistic beliefs about water quality
(i.e., they perceived water quality was higher at the baseline), increased their short-term
demand for water purification products after being informed that water quality was poor
(also see Hamoudi et al. (2012) and Jalan and Somanathan (2008)). In light of this, it is
possible that individuals who hold optimistic beliefs about air quality may be more prone
to change their beliefs and behaviour in response to messages with social norms, com-
pared to those who are already pessimistic. Social norm messages may draw attention to
how avoidance is socially approved, as previously discussed. Moreover, as noted by Frank
(2007), people tend to rely more on their social groups for sources of information about
medical and health goods and services, and it is likely that higher weight is placed on
new information coming from these familiar sources.
Given these two divergent possibilities, the direction of the interaction effect is an
open empirical question. Also, I am currently unaware of any studies that have experi-
mentally examined if the effects of social norm messages elicit heterogeneous treatment
effects based on perceived air quality measured before the intervention. Thus, the follow-
ing null hypothesis is investigated:
Hypothesis II: There is no difference in the likelihood of choosing face-masks amongst
cyclists who are exposed to the aligned social norms message based on their prior beliefs
about perceived air quality, i.e., there is no heterogeneous treatment effect based on per-
ceived air quality.
11Other studies which have explored how information effects are heterogeneous consider the role of
baseline characteristics like pre-treatment water and energy resource use (Allcott, 2011; Ferraro and Price,
2013), and consumer’s tastes and socio-demographic characteristics like the degree of environmentalism
and wealth (Costa and Kahn, 2013; Ferraro and Price, 2013) See Ferraro and Hanauer (2014) for a recent
review.
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5.4 Experimental design
5.4.1 Study context: Air pollution, facemasks, and cyclists in
London
Air pollution in the UK has been recognised as a ‘public health emergency’ (EFRA,
2016). An estimated 59% of the U.K. population lives in areas where the level of air
pollution is above the legal limits by some estimates (Laville, 2017). Recent assessments
showed nearly all diesel cars emit far higher levels of NOx on the road, than permissible
in laboratory tests (DFT, 2016). Poor air quality is becoming a salient issue for the public
after the government lost a series of court cases for failing to protect citizens from ambi-
ent air pollution. Anecdotal evidence and media coverage suggest that cyclists in London
increasingly use facemasks to protect themselves against air pollution (Ross, 2015; Batch-
elor, 2017). Facemasks are recommended for those exercising in poor quality air (Giles
and Koehle, 2014), and the consequent health benefits have been demonstrated amongst
populations vulnerable to cardiovascular problems (Langrish et al., 2012, 2009).12 There
is empirical evidence on the increasing popularity of facemasks amongst active commuters
and urban residents (Zhang and Mu, 2017; Sun et al., 2017; Ban et al., 2017). Finally,
facemasks have some useful properties for this study’s purpose: they are unambiguously
linked to poor air quality and not conjoint environmental stressors such as noise pollu-
tion or noxious odours. Compared to other transitory avoidance strategies which are not
directly revealed in markets (e.g., reducing travel speed), face-masks incur a measurable
monetary cost, and their uptake can be directly measured by recording purchasing deci-
sions in an experimental survey.
5.4.2 Participants
The study was held at the Prudential Ride London festival held during 28-31 July 2017.
This annual three-day cycling festival has numerous events for professional and amateur
cyclists, and the public. It offered a unique opportunity to access a sample of cyclists of
different types and abilities, including commuters, recreational cyclists, as well as those in-
terested in cycling. A random ballot determined event participation and spectators could
attend cycling- themed festivities with their families. Subjects were recruited through
convenience sampling. Surveyors were stationed at fixed locations in the festival zones
and directly approached potential participants.13 Participants were told that the study
was about cycling in London and air pollution, that it would incur a time commitment
12For instance, Langrish et al. (2009) found that wearing an anti-PM facemask reduced personal
exposure by up to 96.6% in a field trial in Beijing.
13See Appendix H for further details and field notes on data collection.
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of around 10 to 15 minutes, and that they could win a prize in a lottery draw for their
participation. They could participate if they were residents in the Greater London Area,
cycled in London for either recreation, commuting, or both, and were over 18 years of age.
After the surveyor entered affirmative responses to these screening questions, electronic
tablets were handed to the participants, who completed the remainder of the survey alone.
A total of 188 responses were initially gathered, and the final sample consisted of 181
observations, after screening out incomplete and interrupted responses. Most subjects
were 35-54 years old (50.83%), male (66.30%), white (76.80%), with a reported house-
hold income of over £64,000 (41.96%), and at least an undergraduate degree (48.07%).
This roughly mirrors the socio-demographic profile of London and UK cyclists in more
representative surveys (Aldred et al., 2016; Steinbach et al., 2011; TFL, 2016).
5.4.3 Procedure
After the consent form, a preamble asked subjects to read the questions carefully, and
to answer truthfully and by themselves, to promote clarity about the survey protocol
and tasks. Then, subjects responded to questions on cycling and air pollution.14 The
question order was randomized to mitigate ordering and anchoring effects. Following
this, subjects saw either the control or treatment message, both of which consisted of
a single page of textual information with graphical illustrations. The computer program
randomly assigned subjects to either the control or treatment conditions, unbeknownst to
the surveyor, thus using a double-blind experimental protocol. After this, subjects could
decide whether to select a facemask for a prize in a lottery draw, as explained below. The
experimental survey concluded with questions on socio-demographic attributes and the
lottery draw. Surveyors were available to clear any doubts but took care not to look at
the control or treatment conditions, comment on air pollution, or facemasks.
5.4.4 Interventions and variables
Figures 5.1a and 5.1b present snapshots of the control and treatment messages.
Information message (control condition, N = 90): Subjects were exposed to
a persuasive, informational message about air pollution in London, the health conse-
quences, and risks for cyclists, and facemasks. The information was taken from an article
14The survey also included measures of stated and incentive-compatible risk attitudes, cycling fre-
quency, risk-taking while cycling, and types of avoidance behaviour which are discussed in Paper 3. The
effect of the subjects answering these questions on their subsequent choice behaviour cannot be ruled
out, thus should be kept in mind while examining the results.
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published by the GLA (2017) and supplemented with information from the London Air
Quality Network advice page (LAQN, 2017). Both sources were included to increase mes-
sage credibility, as previous work notes that public mistrust about air quality and health
information is a behavioural barrier (Bickerstaff and Walker, 2001). Two graphical illus-
trations were included to capture attention - one to illustrate poor air quality and traffic
pollution, and another to illustrate a cyclist wearing a facemask. Beneath the pictures was
an informational tip written in bold red text, that using facemasks can reduce pollution
exposure and improve health (supplementary materials).
Social norms message (treatment condition, N = 91): Subjects were exposed
to the same informational message, appended with information on aligned social and de-
scriptive norms, and graphical illustrations. The textual normative message (printed in
bold red font) read, ‘Please don’t leave yourself unprotected while breathing toxic air. An
increasing number of cyclists are using facemasks to protect themselves. Furthermore,
90% of Londoners think air pollution is a big problem requiring further action’. This
aligned social norms message has both an injunctive norm and descriptive norms compo-
nent.
The injunctive norm component is: ‘Please don’t leave yourself unprotected while
breathing toxic air’. This is a negatively worded injunctive norm (‘Please don’t’) because
previous experimental evidence found that negatively worded injunctive norms are better
at capturing attention and has a stronger impact on behaviour (Baumeister et al., 2001;
Cialdini et al., 2006).
Two descriptive norms were used, namely: ‘An increasing number of cyclists are using
facemasks to protect themselves. Furthermore, 90% of Londoners think air pollution is a
big problem requiring further action’. This format differs from descriptive norm messages
typically used (e.g. 97% of the reference group undertake the social norm) because of
the lack of publicly available and reliable data on face-mask use or purchase amongst
cyclists in London and preference to not use deception in the manipulation. Given this,
the descriptive norm used in this paper has two sub-components. The first descriptive
norm is ‘An increasing number of cyclists are using facemasks to protect themselves’,
which is used to draw attention to the self-protection of the relevant reference group of
cyclists. This also follows Cialdini et al. (2006), who use ‘an increasing number’ rather
than stating a majority figure.
The second descriptive norm is ‘Furthermore, 90% of Londoners think air pollution
is a big problem requiring further action’ (this is taken from GLA (2017)). This second
descriptive norm was added because previous studies have noted that many who cycle
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in London do not identify as ‘cyclists’ and find the identity label less appealing (e.g.,
in Steinbach et al. (2011). More broadly, the first descriptive norm is a local norm and
the second a global norm, going by Goldstein et al. (2008) who define provincial or local
norms, as ‘the norms of one’s local setting and circumstances’ (for example, hotel guests
in the same room as the subject or cyclists use of facemasks in this experiment) and global
norms as the norms of an individuals less immediate surroundings (i.e., hotel guests in
the hotel itself or Londoners in this experiment).
To summarise, the social normative message used aligned injunctive, local and global
descriptive norms. The same graphical illustrations used in the control condition are also
used in the treatment condition. But the picture of the cyclist was modified such that
she made a thumbs-up gesture to signal social approval, illustrating the injunctive norm.
Besides this, there were three more illustrations of cyclists wearing facemasks to make
evident the descriptive norm.15
Perceived air quality (pre-treatment): To minimise the cognitive burden and
to factor in time constraints, a single item measure was used to measure Perceived Air
Quality in London (PAQL), modified from the Environmental Health component of the
Perceived Residential Environment Quality Indicators (Bonaiuto et al., 2003). Subjects
could report how much they agreed with the statement ‘The air quality in London is
good’, using a 7-point Likert scale from ‘Strongly disagree’ (0) to ‘Strongly agree’ (7).
The mean and median PAQL score were 1 and 1.33.
Facemask choice (behavioural outcome measure): After subjects read the in-
formation page, they were led to a page presenting them with the choice task. They could
either choose an anti-PM facemask for urban cyclists worth £40, or a voucher for cycling
goods worth the same amount or to opt-out of the lottery draw. It was explicitly stated
that the voucher could not be redeemed for a facemask. The choice order was randomised
to mitigate order effects. Immediately after subjects chose their preferred prize, they were
asked to indicate the main barriers to using facemasks as a manipulation check (discussed
in the following section in greater detail). The list of options was identified from the pilot
stage. The outcome variable of interest was binary and took the value of 1 if the subject
chose the facemask for the prize draw, and 0 otherwise.
Payment and lottery: After subjects completed the experimental survey, they read
instructions for the prize draw and handed back the tablet to the surveyor. Subjects had
15As noted previously it was decided not to have a control group that received no message because of
the uncertainty about the number of responses that would be obtained in the field. Thus, the current
design cannot reveal whether social norms message would have had a positive effect on the uptake of
facemasks relative to a group which saw no message.
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to pick a number between 1 and 50 for the surveyor. After this, they were offered a bag
of tokens, labelled 1 to 50, from which they could pick one token. If the token number
matched the number vocalised to the surveyor, the subject won the draw. Upon winning,
subjects had to input their email address, to obtain their chosen prize. Thus, only a
subset of participants received their choice, and everyone had an equal 1-in-50 chance of
winning the prize draw.
5.5 Results
The treatment is defined as being ‘exposed to social norms message’ for the whole sample
(N=181). With perfect randomisation, the difference between the control and treatment
groups yields the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) of the normative message for the
entire sample. There was some attrition, as 17 subjects chose to not participate in the
prize draw. Given this, we also considered the sub-sample who opted into the prize draw
as the ‘treated’ population (N=164). In this sub-sample, we anticipated that differences
in the uptake of facemasks between the control and treatment group of the sample of
‘treated’ subjects should yield estimates of the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated
(ATT). As both populations are of theoretical interest, results on the ATE and ATT are
reported in the following subsections. There is balance on covariates between the control
and treatment conditions (including pre-treatment subjective variables and individual
attributes, and survey variables such as location and surveyor, Appendix E, Tables E.1
and E.2).
5.5.1 Treatment effects: Social norm messages
To test Hypothesis I of a positive treatment effect of the social norms message on the
choice of facemasks in the lottery draw, the analysis proceeds in two steps. First, the
Pearson’s chi-squared test of association is used, as both the explanatory and outcome
variables are categorical. Then, a binary logistic regression analysis is used to examine the
probability that subjects chose the facemasks when exposed to the normative message.
The main advantage of the latter technique was that we could control for potential sur-
veyor and location fixed effects, through the addition of surveyor and location dummies
in the regression model.
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 display the proportion of subjects who chose the facemask for the
control and treatment conditions for the whole sample (ATE, N = 181) and the treated
sample (ATT, N = 164). The empirical pattern was in line with Hypothesis I because a
higher share of cyclists exposed to the normative message chose the facemask. However,
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the difference was not statistically significant. For the whole sample, 28.89% chose the
facemask in the control group, versus 38.46% in the treatment group (chi-square with
one degree of freedom = 1.856, p = 0.173). In the sub-sample who opted to participate
in the prize draw, 31.71% of the subjects chose the facemask in the control group, versus
42.68% of the subjects in the treatment group (chi-squared = 2.114, p = 0.146).
[Figures 5.2, Figure 5.3 and Table 5.1]
The results of the logistic regression models are consistent with the chi-squared test.
The independent variable (treatment dummy) is regressed on the binary outcome variable
(choice of facemask). Table 5.1 presents the coefficients on the treatment variable, with
and without survey dummies (for surveyor and location), for the whole sample, and those
who opt into the prize draw. The logit coefficients on the treatment dummy, represent
the ATE in model (1) (b = 0.431, S.E. = 0.318, z = 1.36, p = 0.175) and model (2) which
includes survey dummies (b = 0.410, S.E. = 0.325, z = 1.26, p = 0.206). Similarly, the
ATT shown in model (3) (b = 0.472, S.E. = 0.326, z = 1.45, p = 0.148) and (4) (b =
0.468, S.E. = 0.332, z = 1.41, p = 0.159), show a positive difference which is not statis-
tically significant. Thus, both the chi-squared test and binary regression results yield no
empirical support for Hypothesis I.
Robustness checks: As an additional robustness check, the sample is restricted to
responses collected at the main survey location (N = 129). The treatment effect is pos-
itive and significant at the 10% level in the chi-squared test of association (chi-squared
= 2.7613, p = 0. 097), and the logit regression (b = 0.641, S.E. = 0.388, z = 1.65, p =
0.099). Once survey dummies are added, the coefficient on the treatment dummy is not
significant at conventional levels (b = 0.611, S.E. = 0.393, z = 1.55, p = 0.120). One
conceivable explanation for the lack of a treatment effect is that subjects did not read
the message properly or did not find the normative message persuasive. Three manipula-
tion checks were performed to address this concern. As the treatment message contained
aligned descriptive and injunctive norms, it was hypothesised that fewer subjects would
select ‘No-one else wears facemasks’, and ‘Embarrassing, very visible’, when asked about
the perceived barriers to wearing a facemask. It is also possible that subjects in the
normative message group would perceive fewer overall barriers to wearing a facemask
than in the control group if the social norms message was more persuasive. The results
showed that a lower proportion of subjects chose ‘No-one else wears one’ in the treat-
ment condition compared to the control and that the difference is significant at the 10%
level (chi-squared with one degree of freedom = 3.267, p-value = 0.071). The number of
perceived barriers chosen is also lower in the treatment condition at the 5% level (t =
2.222, degrees of freedom = 179, p-value = 0.028). However, the groups did not differ in
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the proportion of subjects choosing “Embarrassing very visible” as a perceived barrier.
By and large, these results suggest that the treatment manipulation was not ineffective.
5.5.2 Heterogeneous treatment effect: Perceived air quality
The analysis proceeds to test for heterogeneous treatment effects using logistic regres-
sions with two-way interactions. The interaction term should be statistically significant
in the regression models (e.g., in Aiken et al. (1991); Ferraro and Hanauer (2014)). In
the following section, results on both the whole sample (N=181, ATE) and the restricted
treated sample (N= 164, ATE), with and without surveyor and location dummies, are
provided. I also plot the predicted probabilities of the interactions to facilitate the inter-
pretation of the moderation effects.
Hypothesis II proposes that there are no heterogeneous treatment effects by baseline
perceived air quality, i.e., cyclists who perceived lower air quality in London, would not
be influenced any differently by normative messages, than cyclists who perceived higher
air quality. The sample is divided into those which report perceived air quality above
or below the sample median, and a binary dummy for the high and low sub-groups was
created to differentiate between those who hold higher and lower beliefs about the air
quality in London is created: it takes a value of 1 if the value falls at or above the median
score of PAQL. Recall that this value is also nearly equivalent to the mean score. The
low sub-group, i.e., those who believe in poorer air quality, takes the value of 0 and is the
omitted category. This follows standard approaches used in literature to test for hetero-
geneous treatment effects in field experiments (e.g. in Brown et al. (2017); Ferraro and
Price (2013); Ferraro and Hanauer (2014)). As both the treatment dummy and moderator
are dichotomous, the moderation analysis used a 2 x 2 design.
[Figure 5.4 and Table 5.2]
For the whole sample without survey fixed effects, the logistic coefficients on the in-
teraction term was positive and significant a the 10% level (b = 1.288, S.E. = 0.740, z
= 1.75, p = 0.081, N = 181; Table 5.2). This result implies that the odds of choosing a
facemask amongst cyclists who believe air quality was better increased by 28.8% when
exposed to the normative message. When survey dummies were added, the size of the
interaction term coefficient and significance level marginally increased and the interaction
terms is positive and significant at the 5% level (b = 1.545, S.E. = 0.763, z = 2.09, p =
0.043, N = 181).
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Fitted probabilities obtained from the model also illustrate this difference. Figure 5.4
shows cyclists with pre-treatment beliefs that air quality in London was better were more
likely to choose facemasks compared with the control group after receiving the normative
message (predicted probability = 0.537, S.E. = 0.094, z = 5.71, p < 0.001), whereas the
choices of cyclists who believed air quality was poorer, were not markedly different com-
pared to the control condition. The results on the interaction terms were nearly identical
when the sample was restricted to those selecting into the lottery draw (b = 1.600, S.E.
= 0.763, z = 2.09, p = 0.036, N = 164). In short, the fitted probabilities and odds ratios
provide initial empirical support against null Hypothesis 2. For cyclists who believed air
quality was higher, the odds of selecting a facemask is multiplied by 3.62 to 4.68, com-
pared to subjects who held beliefs that air quality was poorer.
Robustness checks: Given the assignment to the treatment group was random, and
there was balance on observables, the analysis excluded controls for socio-demographic
variables. I check if the heterogeneous treatment effect remains significant with the addi-
tion of individual controls as a robustness check. Both the magnitude and direction of the
interaction term remains qualitatively similar and is significant at the 10% for both ATE
and ATT samples. The results were qualitatively similar when the sample was restricted
to those perceive optimistic air quality, both with and without survey and individual
controls (see Appendix E, Tables E.3 and E.4). In addition, it is possible that either risk
preferences or risk perception influence the subjective perception of air quality (which
may depend on information acquisition, which in turn may depend on risk). Therefore
I first check whether the treatment effect interacts with BEG, SOEP-G, SOEP-H risk
preferences and air pollution risk perception elicited in Chapter 4. As seen in the previous
chapter, none of the risk preference measures are positively associated with the treatment
effect and the interaction terms with the treatment dummy are also not statistically sig-
nificant. On the other hand, air pollution risk perception is positively and signifcantly
associated with the uptake of facemasks (in line with the findings of Chapter 4) but the
interaction term between the treatment dummy and air pollution risk perception is not
significant. I also check whether there are any three-way interaction effects between risk
preferences (or perception), perceived air quality and the treatment dummy, but the ef-
fects are not statistically significant either. These results are also omitted for brevity, but
available on request.
5.6 Limitations and thoughts for future research
This exploratory study is not without some limitations. In this section, I touch upon
these and also try to unpack the various reasons why we fail to see a positive average
treatment effect in the current study. This serves to highlight considerations for future
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work, and the issues are organised by the study design and context.
The lab-in-the-field experimental method is likely to afford greater generalizability
than a lab experiment, given the field setting, sample population, and double-blind ex-
perimental protocol. However, external validity is threatened by the opt-in design with
convenience sampling. Given average treatment effects were in the expected direction,
using a larger and more representative sample could yield stronger results, and is another
promising path for subsequent research.
The paper measured revealed preferences for face-masks, as opposed to a cycling
voucher for the same amount. While this approach has the advantage of being incentive-
compatible compared to studies using behavioural intentions or self-reported behaviour,
the observed choice may be contingent on the choice set used and experimental survey
setting. Measuring ‘use’ over time is an important consideration for future work, in the
light of past evidence showing that treatment effects of social norm messages tend to
wash out over the long run in some settings (e.g. in Thorndike et al. (2016); Lawrence
(2015)).
Other points about the study design are also of note. I followed Cialdini et al. (2006)
to use a negatively valenced injunctive norm (‘Please don’t. . . ’) due to the possibility of
stronger behavioural effects and the need to capture attention in the naturalistic field
setting. This design choice was perceived as desirable keeping in mind Lawrence (2015)
observed no change in phone-distracted driving with the use of weak, positively worded
injunctive norms. However, proscriptive messages (i.e., what people should not do) may
induce reactance. Specifically, proscriptions may be perceived as demanding and induce
participants to resist conformity by opposing the behavioural request, and it is possible,
that this ‘attention-reactance’ tradeoff may have diluted the impact of the aligned nor-
mative message on behaviour rather than strengthening it (Bergquist and Nilsson, 2016).
Future work could disentangle the individual and interaction effects of different norms
(namely descriptive, injunctive, personal, local and global norms), all of which of which
may have a distinct impact of behaviour (e.g., in Vinnell et al. (2018)).
Social norm interventions may be less effective at changing behaviour when consumers
believe their actions are less likely to improve outcomes or perceive that the preventive
health behaviour is ineffective (Bandura, 2004). Both self-efficacy and perceived barriers
to use are critical factors in the protection motivation and health beliefs models (Lazarus,
1968; Rosentock, 1974; Ban et al., 2017). In this regard, the efficacy of facemasks depends
on the filtration system, product fit, and use behaviour, all of which are hotly debated
topics according to anecdotal evidence. Moreover, using facemasks incurs high personal
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effort and even discomfort – 60.8% of the sample reported that discomfort was a per-
ceived barrier to using the facemask, and 40.9% reported that using one incurred too much
bother. More broadly, qualitative evidence reveals that individuals can hold persistent
beliefs that the solution to air pollution lies outside the individual (on the government
or big polluters), or that they are powerless to act to mitigate such a ubiquitous problem
(Bickerstaff and Walker, 2001; Bickerstaff, 2004). In this case, social norms may be less
influential if people feel the costs and perceived barriers to using facemasks outweigh the
benefits.
Moreover, facemasks are a visually striking and conspicuous avoidance behaviour.
Previous studies show people face predilections to either stand out or fit in (Griskevicius
et al., 2006). As the choice of wearing a facemask makes people stand out, this could
have conflicted with the social norm message which encouraged people to fit in for self-
protection. Interestingly, there is no statistically significant difference in the proportion of
subjects reporting ‘Embarrassing, very visible’ between the treatment and control condi-
tions in the manipulation check. Investigating these inherent tensions could be an exciting
line of future work.
Thøgersen (2006) proposes normative messages have more impact when strongly in-
ternalised norms are present. It is possible that air pollution avoidance is not a strongly
internalised norm in this sample, but it is difficult to conclude this was the case, as per-
sonal norms were not measured. Suggestively, however, few cyclists reported undertaking
avoidance strategies - only 5% of the sample report checking air pollution information,
53% report avoiding large diesel vehicles and 42% report avoiding main roads while cy-
cling (it is unclear whether cyclists undertake these strategies for air pollution specifically,
or also to avoid noise, congestion, and accident risk). Additionally, cyclists arguably pro-
duce lower emissions from their travel mode, which in turn can raise ethical questions to
as to whether individuals believe that they should invest money, time and effort to avoid
poor air quality. Although the current study does not address these issues, the use of
random assignment presumes that the participants’ pre-treatment behaviour, attitudes,
personal norms, and beliefs were evenly distributed across the treatment and control
conditions. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude how these individual factors affect the
observed treatment effects in the current study. Importantly, these issues again present
novel directions for future research.
The results suggest that pre-treatment beliefs drive variations in the effect of social
norm messages, in a potentially counter-intuitive way: cyclists with more optimistic be-
liefs were more likely to choose facemasks in the treatment condition. This result is in line
with studies on risk communication, that also show information effects vary by beliefs
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about water quality (Brown et al., 2017). Extending this work further, I provide new
indicative evidence that normative social information may have an additional impact,
over and above information on environmental quality. A limitation of the current study is
that potential changes in perceived air quality were not measured after the manipulation.
Thus I am unable to shed light on whether beliefs about air quality changed actually after
exposure to the social norm message. Similarly, perceived severity of threats from poor
air quality was also not recorded. Future work can investigate these questions in greater
detail, alongside the role of other individual-level attributes that may impact information
effects.16
5.7 Conclusion
More research is needed to understand the avoidance behaviours undertaken by individ-
uals when going outdoors is inevitable and the psychological processes underpinning this
type of decision-making. There is a growing consensus that social norms are an effective
tool to shift behaviour. However, a closer look at the empirical evidence, especially on
transport and preventive health behaviours, offers somewhat inconclusive results. Inter-
rogating the robustness of social norm messages in different contexts and populations,
and the underlying factors driving differences in responses across individuals can help
furnish insights to advance this discussion.
This exploratory study adds to the literature, by employing a lab-in-the-field experi-
ment to assess the impact of normative social interventions on the uptake of anti-pollution
facemasks, compared to an informational control condition. I also test if treatment effects
were heterogeneous based on prior beliefs about air quality. The study does not find a
statistically significant impact of normative social interventions relative to the control
condition, even though the proportion of cyclists choosing facemasks was higher. How-
ever, prior beliefs about air quality induce heterogeneous treatment effects, i.e., those who
were more optimistic about air quality were more likely to chose facemasks, compared
to those who already believed air quality was poorer when exposed to the social norms
message.
The findings suggest future work could go beyond average treatment effects when
interpreting the effects of social norm messages, in the spirit of Ferraro and Price (2013)
16Treatment effects were not heterogeneous by other covariates as described in chapter 4, including
(a) air pollution risk perception (b) risk attitudes (BEG, SOEP-G and SOEP-H, attitudes to facemasks)
(c) pre-treatment avoidance/use of face-mask (d) gender, age and income. The results are omitted for
brevity, but available on request.
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and Allcott (2011). But it goes further by making a case for researchers and policymak-
ers to better understand underlying subjective beliefs around environmental quality as a
driving force behind the heterogeneity in treatment effects. As this is exploratory work,
more evidence to establish the robustness of social norm messaging to change avoidance
behaviour in a field setting is a promising way forward. From a policy perspective, these
findings highlight that air pollution awareness campaigns could address core beliefs about
air quality and exposure, and investigate the comparative benefits of framing outreach
strategies using social norms. That said, policymakers and researchers would also need
to consider the welfare implications of these arising from the time and effort taken by
individuals to undertake avoidance, apart from the potential psychological costs from
worrying about poor air quality.
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5.8 Tables and Figures
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Figure 5.1: Control and treatment group messages on air pollution health risks, avoidance and face-masks
(a) Control group: Information (b) Treatment group: Information + Social norms
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Figure 5.2: Proportion of subjects choosing face-mask (ATE, N = 181)
Figure 5.3: Proportion of subjects choosing face-mask (ATT, N = 164)
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Table 5.1: Treatment effects
Treatment effect by sample Average Treatment Effect Average Treatment Effect
(ATE) on the Treated (ATT)
Logit models (1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat = 1, Social norms 0.431 0.411 0.472 0.468
(0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33)
Constant -0.901*** -1.131* -0.767*** -0.937
(0.23) (0.60) (0.24) (0.62)
Observations 181 181 164 164
Survey dummies No Yes No Yes
Wald chi2(1) 1.84 6.1 2.09 5.37
Prob >chi2 0.175 0.412 0.148 0.498
Pseudo R2 0.008 0.027 0.01 0.027
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Binary outcome
variable of choice of face-mask (or not). Independent variable: exposure to normative message. The
logistic regression coefficients give the change in the log-odds of the outcome for a one unit increase
in the predictor variable. Surveyor dummies include surveyor and location dummies.
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Figure 5.4: Choice of face-mask regressed onto control versus normative message for
cyclists with Low and High Perceived Air Quality in London (PAQL)
Table 5.2: Heterogeneous treatment effects: Perceived Air Quality in London (PAQL)
Treatment effect by sample Average Treatment Effect Average Treatment Effect
(ATE) on the Treated (ATT)
Logit models (1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat = 1, Social norms 0.067 -0.031 0.078 0.021
(0.38) (0.39) (0.39) (0.40)
High PAQL = 1, Optimistic about air quality -0.497 -0.582 -0.519 -0.593
(0.57) (0.55) (0.58) (0.56)
Treat (=1) x High PAQL (=1) 1.288* 1.545** 1.422* 1.599**
(0.74) (0.74) (0.77) (0.76)
Constant -0.784*** -1.032 -0.644** -0.804
(0.26) (0.66) (0.27) (0.67)
Observations 181 181 164 164
Survey dummies No Yes No Yes
Wald chi2(1) 5.38 11.24 6.06 10.57
Prob >chi2 0.146 0.188 0.109 0.227
Pseudo R2 0.024 0.049 0.029 0.05
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Binary outcome variable of choice of face-
mask (or not). Independent variable: exposure to normative message. Moderator variable: Binary variable of Perceived air
quality in London (High or Low PAQL). The logistic regression coefficients give the change in the log odds of the outcome
for a one unit increase in the predictor variable. Surveyor dummies include surveyor and location dummies.
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Chapter 6
The effect of imperfect monitoring
and punishment networks in a
common pool resource dilemma
181
6.1 Introduction
Peer monitoring and punishment is an important means to mitigate free-riding in social
dilemmas. Ostrom et al. (1992, 1994) demonstrate that individuals monitor and punish
free-riders even at personal cost, in Common-Pool Resource (CPR) appropriation dilem-
mas. Fehr and Gachter (2000) find that cooperation is lower without peer punishment
in Public Goods (PG) experiments. But many extant studies implicitly assume perfect
monitoring and punishment, i.e., everyone can monitor and punish everyone else.1
Recent experimental evidence reveals that imperfect peer monitoring and punishment,
i.e., where all agents cannot monitor and punish eveeryone in the group, represented by
an underlying network that connects agents, impact cooperation in voluntary contribu-
tion mechanism (VCM) PG experiments (Carpenter et al., 2012; Leibbrandt et al., 2015;
Boosey and Isaac, 2016). For instance, Carpenter et al. (2012) find the network architec-
ture impacts contributions, punishment and welfare. Leibbrandt et al. (2015) find that
contributions to the public good are higher when more punishment opportunities are
available, but that punishment is also higher. Boosey and Isaac (2016) note that the net-
work structure affects the incidence of anti-social punishment. We extend this literature,
by providing new experimental evidence on how the monitoring and punishment network
architecture, affects behaviour and beliefs in a CPR appropriation dilemma.
CPR appropriation dilemmas represent strategic situations, where one agent’s con-
sumption of resource units, such as fish or water, removes those units from the resource
system. Unlike public goods dilemmas, an agent’s appropriation inflicts a negative exter-
nality on others through the reduction in payoffs, due to the rivalry of resource units (Os-
trom et al., 1994).2 The baseline appropriation game, pioneered by Ostrom et al. (1992),
uses a non-linear payoff function to locate the socially optimal and selfish equilibria in
the interior of the strategy space. This non-linear payoff structure aims to approximate
the complexity faced by agents in the field, arising from socio-ecological dynamics (Ibid.).
The role of peer punishment in non-linear CPR appropriation dilemmas is under-
examined. Although Ostrom et al. (1992)’s seminal paper is widely cited to demonstrate
the effectiveness of peer punishment, the original study reports punishment is erratic and
1See Anderies et al. (2011); Poteete et al. (2010) and Ostrom (2006) for a review of CPR experiments
in the lab and field, and Sturm and Weimann (2006) and Noussair and van Soest (2014) for a review CPR
experiments alongside other environmental dilemmas. Chaudhuri (2011) and Ledyard (1995) survey PG
experiments.
2A PG game models a ‘provision’ dilemma, where others’ contributions generate a positive supply
externality because the good is non-excludable and non-rival (Ostrom, 2006). While under certain con-
ditions the CPR and PG can can be strategically equivalent (e.g. see Ledyard (1995)), CPR dilemmas
remain theoretically distinct because of the aspect of rivalry or the subtractability of the yield from the
CPR (Apesteguia and Maier-Rigaud, 2006; Ostrom et al., 1992).
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has a limited impact on cooperation (also see Ostrom et al. (1994). In a recent study,
Cason and Gangadharan (2015) also observe that peer punishment has a weaker impact
on appropriation, resulting in outcomes closer to the Nash equilibrium in non-linear CPR
games, compared to linear VCM PG games. They note, ”. . . the effectiveness of peer
punishment could vary in different environments; particularly in situations with more
complexity that makes it more difficult to identify defectors” (in Cason and Gangadha-
ran (2015), pp. 86). Welfare is also lower, as punishment reduces payoffs.3 More research
is required to understand the impact of peer monitoring and punishment, in social dilem-
mas characterised by complex non-linear payoffs, and resource rivalry.
We addressed this literature gap, by exploring the role of the network architecture
in promoting cooperation in a non-linear CPR appropriation dilemma, using a lab ex-
periment. We exogenously varied the monitoring and punishment network, which in turn
jointly determined feedback and punishment opportunities available to agents. Appropri-
ation from the CPR, stated beliefs about other member’s appropriation, and punishment
was compared over fifteen rounds of play, in groups of four using a stranger-matching
protocol.
We selected four regular types of networks with non-trivial local and global network
properties: the complete, the undirected circle, the directed circle and line networks. This
choice of networks yields two advantages. First, it allowed us to examine if outcomes vary
as the number of monitoring and punishment opportunities available to agents systemat-
ically declines. Second, we could focus on the impact of four graph-theoretical properties
of the network architecture, namely completeness, connectedness or directedness, and
node degree (network properties are defined in section two). Thus, our contribution is
primarily an empirical one: highlighting how beliefs and behaviour vary due to the joint
effect of the monitoring and punishment network architecture.
It is not immediately evident that perfect monitoring and punishment networks nec-
essarily increase cooperation. On the one hand, they allow agents a higher opportunity
to punish more agents to mitigate over-appropriation. On the other hand, agents face a
second-order monitoring dilemma, if coordinating costly punishment decisions becomes
more difficult in well-connected networks. In this case, agents in imperfect, less-connected
networks can focus their punishment on their immediate neighbours, and punishment may
be more severe. Besides, agents may find it especially challenging to differentiate between
the free-riding and socially efficient appropriation, due to the complexity of the non-linear
3On the other hand, recent experiments find behaviour in non-linear PG, and CPR games qualitatively
similar, as cooperation starts near the socially optimal level and trends towards but remains below the
selfish equilibrium (Kingsley, 2015; Kingsley and Liu, 2014; Apesteguia and Maier-Rigaud, 2006).
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strategy space. Since perfect monitoring and punishment networks offer greater opportu-
nities for information feedback, it can facilitate a greater (and faster) convergence between
beliefs over other’s appropriation and their actual behaviour, compared to less-connected
networks.4
The primary finding from our study was that complete networks – the baseline with
perfect monitoring and punishment – elicited the lowest payoffs to agents, and are con-
sequently the least efficient. As average appropriation is not significantly different across
networks, this result is primarily driven by heavy punishment received by subjects in the
complete network. While free-riders, i.e., those who appropriate more than the Pareto
appropriation level, were sanctioned in all networks, those who appropriated less than the
Pareto optimal level were sanctioned less in undirected and connected networks. Com-
pleteness was significantly associated with higher punishment and beliefs, and lower effi-
ciency. We also found that subject’s beliefs underestimated other’s appropriation across
networks. The difference between beliefs and other’s (mean) appropriation declined with
time. However, this decline was contingent on the type of network: subjects in the undi-
rected circle and directed circle networks recorded higher average differences in the last
period of play (rounds 11-15), compared to the nodes in the complete network.
Our paper contributes to the experimental literature on how to mitigate the over-
appropriation of common-pool resources with peer monitoring. This includes work on
peer monitoring and punishment (Cason and Gangadharan, 2015; Kingsley, 2015; Janssen
et al., 2010; Casari and Plott, 2003; Ostrom et al., 1992), communication with peer mon-
itoring (Ostrom et al., 1992; Cardenas et al., 2004; Cason and Gangadharan, 2016), and
the relative effectiveness of rewards over fines vyrastekova2008. Ostrom et al. (1992);
Cason and Gangadharan (2015) and Kingsley (2015) are the closest to our study be-
cause they also use a non-linear CPR appropriation game with peer punishment.5 While
they examine the impact of perfect peer monitoring and punishment, we used perfect
monitoring and punishment as the baseline and vary the structure of monitoring and
4The natural resource governance literature provides empirical support that well-connected social
networks elicit both cooperation and over-appropriation. For instance, King (2000) finds that high levels
of social interaction and dense social ties amongst local fisherman enabled them to manage unfavourable
developments related to the local fishery. Conversely, Bodin and Crona (2008), find that despite dense
social ties, fishers in another Kenyan fishing village were reluctant to call out rule-breaking and had
few institutions to overcome over-exploitation of local fisheries. One of the possible reasons they outline,
is the homogeneity of information and behaviour among key individuals, leading to reduced problem
recognition. See Bodin and Crona (2009) for a review of this literature.
5Related studies on peer monitoring in CPR games includes the following. Casari and Plott (2003)
experimentally test a historically-rooted peer punishment institution where punishers receive the ‘fines’
paid by the punished and find punishment improves cooperation. Vyrastekova and Van Soest (2008) use
a quadratic CPR game and find punishment is better than rewards at eliciting cooperation. Janssen
et al. (2010) incorporate complex temporal socio-ecological dynamics in the CPR game but do not find
punishment to be effective in increasing cooperation.
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punishment instead. Other key differences relate to the experimental design: we used a
strangers-matching protocol, to minimise investment in strategic play and reputation,
and to retain our focus on the network architecture.6 We also elicited incentivised beliefs
in the first stage, as discussed in the following paragraphs.
We also extend the literature on how imperfect peer monitoring and punishment im-
pacts cooperation in linear VCM PG games (Boosey and Isaac, 2016; Leibbrandt et al.,
2015; Carpenter et al., 2012).7 A consistent finding was that incomplete but connected
networks elicit at least as many contributions to the public good as complete networks
(Boosey and Isaac, 2016; Leibbrandt et al., 2015; Carpenter et al., 2012). Carpenter et al.
(2012) are most closely related to our experiment, as they examine the joint effect of
the monitoring and punishment network architecture, using a strangers-matching design.
They find that relatively lower punishment in the complete network makes it more ef-
ficient than other network structures. On the other hand, Leibbrandt et al. (2015) and
Boosey and Isaac (2016) vary only the punishment network and find that subjects use
greater punishment when more punishment opportunities are available, but that individ-
ual punishment behaviour depends on the type of network. Apart from using a non-linear
CPR game, we differ from these studies by eliciting incentivised beliefs about the expected
appropriation of others in the network.8
Experimental evidence on beliefs from linear CPR games (Velez et al., 2009) and lin-
ear VCM PG games (Croson, 2000; Neugebauer et al., 2009; Fischbacher and Gachter,
2010; Ga¨chter and Renner, 2010; Smith, 2013) offers two consistent findings: first, sub-
jects consistently state ‘optimistic’ beliefs by overestimating other’s contributions (or
underestimating appropriation), and second, beliefs are positively correlated with con-
tributions. We extend this literature, by eliciting incentivised beliefs across all networks
to empirically explore if stated beliefs and beliefs accuracy varies by network architecture.
One means of increasing beliefs accuracy (i.e., reducing the difference between stated
beliefs and other’s revealed behaviour) is by incentivising beliefs (Ga¨chter and Renner,
2010). Instead, we explored if feedback about other’s appropriations, which is determined
6We also modify the punishment technology, such that punishment points that can be allocated by
subjects depend on their earnings in the first stage (following Carpenter et al. (2012); also see Nikiforakis
(2008).
7See Kosfeld (2004) and Choi et al. (2016) for reviews of experiments on networks in the lab.
8Another difference is that we increase the cost of punishment, such that the cost of receiving one
deduction point is three tokens. This matches a standard fee-to-fine ratio used in CPR experiments but
is higher than Carpenter et al. (2012) who use a fee-to-fine ratio of 0.5:1 (i.e., it costs the punisher
0.5 tokens to assign one deduction point). Leibbrandt et al. (2015) and Boosey and Isaac (2016) also
use a partners-matching protocol, to allow the formation of agent’s reputations. They use a different
punishment technology that endows players with additional tokens in stage two to assign punishment.
Boosey and Isaac (2016) also use a 1:3 fee-to-fine ratio.
185
by the network architecture, impacts stated beliefs and belief accuracy. Given the com-
plexity of the non-linear CPR game, uninformed agents may face greater difficulties in
thinking of other’s expected appropriations because they lack common knowledge about
other’s revealed behaviour in the lab. Conversely, informed agents in better-connected
networks can learn more accurately about the appropriation of other agents in the net-
work in each round.9 Greater feedback may lead to a faster convergence between beliefs
and behaviour, and therefore higher belief accuracy, in better-connected networks, with
a larger share of informed agents.10 To the best of our knowledge, we are unaware of any
other studies which elicit beliefs in either a non-linear CPR dilemma or alongside the
monitoring and punishment network architecture.11
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the networks and the structural
graph properties; this is followed by a description of the CPR appropriation dilemma and
the key hypotheses. Section 3 outlines the experimental design, and section 4 presents
the results. We discuss the potential implications for our results and conclude with a
discussion in section 5.
6.2 Conceptual framework
6.2.1 Network architecture and properties
Figure 6.1 (Panel 1A-D), illustrates the four monitoring and punishment networks used in
the experiment, and their graph-theoretic properties. A network consists of three agents
or appropriators indexed by i = A,B,C,D. An edge between two agents indicates that
they are connected, and the arrowhead points to the agent whose appropriation can be
monitored and punished. For each subject i, Ni denotes the set of subjects j 6=i who can
be monitored by i; in other words, Ni is the monitoring neighbourhood of subject i. An
‘undirected’ or bi-directional edge between any two nodes implies that the pair of extrac-
tors can monitor and punish each other. Conversely, a ‘directed’ or unidirectional edge
denotes that only the extractor to whom the edge points can be observed and punished,
but not vice-versa. Thus, if an edge runs from i to j, then i can monitor j (j ∈ Ni), but
9Notably, previous work has remarked that the greater complexity in non-linear CPR appropriation
dilemmas is an important feature impacting appropriation and punishment behaviour (e.g. in Cason
and Gangadharan (2015)). Others have noted subjects may experience greater confusion in the CPR
appropriation game in the lab (Sturm and Weimann, 2006).
10Some intuition can be obtained from models of social learning on networks, although they do not
directly model appropriation in CPR dilemmas. For instance, Gale and Kariv (2003) predict that subject’s
beliefs and behaviour, ought to converge faster in well-connected networks with more informed subjects,
and this is experimentally verified in guessing game in Choi et al. (2012).
11As the goal of our paper is to examine if the network properties impact reported beliefs in systematic
ways, it we do not systematically explore if beliefs (and beliefs elicitation) impacts appropriations.
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j cannot monitor i (i 6∈ Nj).
[Figure 6.1]
We considered four key properties: completeness, directedness, connectedness, and
node degree. The first three are global properties of the network architecture, while the
fourth is a local property of the monitoring neighbourhoods that characterise the net-
work. The definition of each network property is briefly summarised below.
Completeness [network 0]: each pair of nodes is connected by an undirected edge
to represent perfect monitoring, i.e. everyone can observe everyone’s appropriations and
can choose to punish any extractor in the network. Networks [1-3] are incomplete.
Directedness [networks 1-2]: if the edge between pairs of nodes is not bidirectional,
the network is a directed network [networks 2 and 3]; otherwise it is undirected [networks
0 and 1].
Connectedness [networks 1, 2 and 3]: if every pair of nodes and are connected by a
path, the network is connected [networks 1-3]; otherwise it is disconnected [network 4].
A ‘path’ is a sequence of nodes wherein each node in the graph is used only once.
Node degree: the number of edges that end at a given node. The out-degree (in-
degree) of node i is the number of edges with i as their initial (terminal) node. Specifically,
the out-degree of subject i is the number of subjects j that can be monitored and pun-
ished by i (j ∈ Ni) and the in-degree of subject i is the number of subjects j that can
monitor i (i ∈ Nj). Since nodes are defined by their out- and in-degrees, we can index
them as Nn, in, out where n is the number of each network indicated in Figure 6.1, and
in and out represent the number of in- and out-degrees respectively. For instance, the
complete network consists of four identical or symmetric nodes denoted by N033, where
each node has three in-degrees and three out-degrees.
The complete network (Figure 6.1, Panel 1A) represents perfect monitoring and pun-
ishment and is the baseline. It is complete, connected, and undirected, with symmetric
nodes denoted by N033. The undirected circle network (Panel 1B) is incomplete, con-
nected and undirected, also with symmetric nodes N122. The directed circle (Panel 1C)
is a directed network, which is incomplete and connected with symmetric nodes, N211.
Finally, the directed line network (Panel 1D) is the only disconnected network, which is
incomplete and directed, with asymmetric nodes: N301 (Node A) cannot be monitored
or punished (but can extend punishment to Node B); N311 (Nodes B and C) can be
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monitored and can punish one agent; N310 (Node D), can be monitored and punished,
but cannot monitor or punish anyone.
6.2.2 The CPR appropriation dilemma
We modified the baseline CPR appropriation dilemma from Ostrom et al. (1992). In stage
one, each agent was endowed with an equal initial amount of effort e. Agents simultane-
ously chose how to allocate this initial amount of effort between CPR appropriation and
an outside-option activity that yields a constant marginal rate of return (e.g., agricultural
labour at a given wage rate), w. Specifically, we denoted the appropriation effort of agent
i by xi ∈ [0, e]. Hence, the total appropriation effort of all agents within the network is
X =
∑
i
xi.
The total return on appropriation is given by a concave function: F (X) = aX − bX2.
This concave function captures the dynamic wherein initial appropriation from the CPR
pays an agent better than the opportunity cost of forgone safe appropriation (e.g. return
from agricultural wages, where F (0) = 0 and F ′(0) > w). But if the agent use all their
endowment to appropriate from the CPR (and all agents do the same), then the outcome
is counter-productive (F ′(ne) < 0). Thus, as noted by Ostrom et al. (1992), the yield
from the CPR reaches a maximum net level when individuals invest some, but not all, of
their endowments in the CPR. Therefore, this function yields a non-linear payoff struc-
ture where it is initially more profitable to allocate some portion of the endowment - but
not all of the endowment - to the CPR.
Since the CPR is non-excludable and rival in consumption, the return from appropri-
ation to an individual agent is proportional to the ratio between her appropriation effort
(xi), and the total effort of all appropriators (X). The ratio xi/X is called the individ-
ual distribution factor (Apesteguia and Maier-Rigaud, 2006) and captures the negative
externality from appropriating rival resource units. The higher xi is in relation to X, the
higher is xi’s appropriation from the common pool resource, allowing an appropriator
to capture a larger share of returns from the common pool resource (aX − bX2). This
set-up creates the social dilemma, where each agent has a dominant strategy to appro-
priate at the inefficient level from the CPR. The first-stage payoff of each agent is given by:
Π1i = w(e− xi) + (xi/X)(aX − bX2) (6.1)
In the second stage, agents can observe the appropriation of those they are connected
to by the network and punish over-appropriation at some cost. Each agent, i can punish
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j (j ∈ Ni) to reduce j’s payoff from the first stage by pij at a personal unit cost of c1,
such that 0 < c1 ≤ 1. Each punishment point received reduces j’s payoff by some factor
c2 (0 ≤ c2). The payoff to each agent from stage two is the maximum between 0 and the
net return from stage one;
Π2i = max
0,Π1i − c1 ∑
j∈Ni
pij − c2
∑
i∈Nj
pji
 (6.2)
If we assume rational and self-interested agents, by backwards induction, it follows
that punishment in stage two cannot deter free-riding in stage one, irrespective of the
network architecture. Specifically, as punishment is costly, each subject will issue no pun-
ishment in stage two (pji , for all i and j ∈ Ni). As subjects expect no punishment in stage
two, they will extract at the socially inefficient level in stage one. However, as discussed
earlier, evidence from linear VCM PG games suggest that the underlying structural prop-
erties of the network affect the provision of the public good. Thus, in the following section,
we develop some hypotheses to test the impact of the network architecture for each out-
come.
6.2.3 Hypotheses
First, previous results suggest that average contributions are similar in the complete,
undirected and directed circle networks (Carpenter et al., 2012; Boosey and Isaac, 2016),
but lower in the directed line network, which is a disconnected network (Carpenter et al.,
2012). More broadly, they find network disconnectedness decreases contributions to the
public good. This yields our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Average appropriation is similar across the complete, undirected cir-
cle and directed circle networks, but higher in the disconnected directed line network.
Second, Carpenter et al. (2012) report that subjects in the complete network tend to
use lower punishment, resulting in higher than average net returns compared to many
imperfect networks. They also find that punishment is used more heavily in directed
networks. Conversely, Leibbrandt et al. (2015) also find that contributions are greater in
well-connected punishment networks, but that received punishment is also higher with
greater punishment opportunity, leading to similar payoffs. At the individual level, all
studies find that free-riders (i.e., those who don’t contribute to the public good) and
those who contribute less than the average contribution of others in the group (i.e., low
contributors) are punished more heavily. Thus, we also undertook this analysis for each
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network (for robustness). But given these competing arguments about the effect of the
network, we formulate the following null hypotheses for punishment:
Hypothesis 2: Average punishment is similar across the complete, undirected circle,
directed circle and directed line networks. Free-riders and high-appropriators are pun-
ished more heavily in all networks.
Third, we tested the null hypothesis that stated beliefs about the expected appro-
priation of others in the group, do not vary across networks. Agents in the complete
network are perfectly informed about other’s actual appropriations, and may, therefore,
state more accurate beliefs, i.e., the difference between beliefs and other’s appropriation
may be lower. In particular, less time may be needed for beliefs and behaviour to converge
in the complete network. Conversely, poorly informed agents in less-connected networks,
lack of knowledge of other’s actions, and may need a longer period of learning. The impact
of each network type and property on beliefs accuracy is also an open empirical ques-
tion, and thus we restricted our hypothesis to the effect of network completeness, which is
the baseline with perfect monitoring and punishment. This yields our last two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3: Average beliefs over other’s appropriation is similar across the com-
plete, undirected circle, directed circle and directed line networks.
Hypothesis 4: The average difference between beliefs and other’s actual appropria-
tion is lower in the complete network, relative to incomplete networks. Furthermore, the
convergence of beliefs is also faster in complete networks.
6.3 Experimental design
The experiment was held at the London School of Economics and Political Science Be-
havioural Research Lab (LSE BRL) during November-December 2015. Participation was
open only to students previously registered at the LSE BRL and was executed using
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Each of the ten sessions consisted of 16-20 subjects, who were
randomly assigned to a computer terminal at the start of each session, and given written
instructions.12
12A concerted effort was made to ensure that subjects understood the instructions, incentives and
payoffs, to ensure preferences and beliefs were measured as accurately as possible. Subjects also received
payoffs table, with the written instructions. Instructions were first read by the subjects and then read
aloud by the experimenter. After this, subjects answered five control questions, which were checked
by the experimenter to ensure subjects familiarized themselves with the game, and only then did the
experiment proceed. All instructions were framed in a neutral language (e.g. punishment points are
referred to as ‘deduction points’). Instructions and screen-shots of each stage of the experiment are given
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We follow Carpenter et al. (2012) to hold one of the four network treatments (i.e.,
complete, undirected circle, directed circle, or directed line) constant throughout a given
session. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the node labels labelled A, B, C,
and D, which was also fixed throughout the session. Each of the 15 rounds started with
the computer randomly forming a network group of four, containing one of each type of
node label. The network groups formed in each round were independent of the networks
formed in any of the other rounds, and we emphasised that the groups of four would be
randomly reshuﬄed in each round. We used this stranger-matching protocol to mitigate
investment in reputations from strategic play.13
Each round consisted of two stages. In stage one, subjects simultaneously chose to
‘place’ tokens from their endowment to the common and private account and entered
their beliefs over the appropriation of the other three subjects in the network. The en-
dowment was 25 tokens, and the parameters were: a = 25, b = 0.025, and w = 5 (see
equation (1)). The Nash equilibrium allocation was sixteen tokens, and the Pareto op-
timal allocation was ten tokens. The ratio of the Nash to Pareto equilibrium strategies
was 1.6, and payoffs from the Nash and Pareto equilibrium allocation were 189 and 225
tokens respectively.14
Along with the appropriation decision, subjects also had to input their beliefs about
the expected token placement of the other three group members in the common account,
in stage one, in each round. Subjects were incentivised such that they were paid for the
accuracy of their estimates, in addition to their earnings from the CPR experiment.15
After subjects took their decision, everyone was shown their total payoffs from the first
stage as shown in equation (1), and by the private and common accounts. This first stage
was identical for all subjects in all treatments (including the earnings faced in the CPR
in the Appendices A and B.
13All sessions had 20 subjects, barring two sessions with 16 subjects due to participant absenteeism
(one for the undirected circle and directed line respectively). For a typical session of 20 subjects (16):
(a) the likelihood in round 1 that a player would meet another player once again during the remaining
fourteen rounds was 56% (87.5%) (b) the likelihood that the same group of four players would meet during
the remaining fourteen rounds was 2.24% (5.47%). Since the experiment was conducted anonymously,
subjects were unable to recognise whether they were matched with a specific player in the past, but only
recognised the node label (i.e., A, B, C or D).
14The experimental parameters were chosen to ensure a good spread in values between the Nash and
Pareto equilibrium allocations as integer values, and to be comparable with the existing CPR literature
(Appendix F, Table F.1). The ratio of the Nash to Pareto equilibrium strategies determines the size of
the negative externality from the appropriation from the commons account.
15Participants were paid a financial incentive for stating correct beliefs, but it was small, to avoid
hedging. Subjects received four experimental tokens each correct guess for each of the three other ap-
propriators (' GBP 0.5), in addition to their experimental earnings from the CPR game.
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game and beliefs).
In stage two, subjects obtained feedback about the appropriation decision of those to
whom they are connected in the network, and could choose to assign deduction points
based on their network and node position. Those subjects who were not able to observe
other’s appropriations due to their network position would only see their own decision
(e.g., Node D in the Directed Line network). We held the fee-to-fine ratio of 0.33 constant
in all networks, such that the cost of assigning deduction points is one token (c1 = 1)
and the cost of receiving a deduction point was three tokens (c2 = 3). If subjects did
not wish to reduce the earnings of anyone else, they had to enter zeros. The maximum
deduction points that subjects could have assigned, was bound by the first stage payoffs.
Although negative earnings were possible, this was very uncommon (this occurred in only
7 out of 2880 observations), and was given a value of zero for payment purposes. After
both stages concluded, subjects were informed about their total payoffs according to the
payoff function, and the cost of deduction points assigned and received, from equation
(2). Subjects then proceeded to the next round of the 15 rounds of play, and this number
of rounds was common knowledge, alongside the network structure and payoffs.
After the last round was played, we collected data on the subject’s gender, and whether
they studied economics, followed by a short questionnaire that explores the motivation
behind decisions taken. Data on previous experience in experiments was obtained from
the LSE BRL. One round was selected at random for payment, and all subjects were
paid out for that round (i.e., payoffs from the game and accuracy of beliefs) at the end of
the experiment such that 25 Experimental tokens = GBP 1. Each session usually lasted
for an hour and 192 subjects who attended earned an average payment of GBP 11.5 each.
6.4 Results
We report the results in four subsections, corresponding to each outcome, i.e., appro-
priation, punishment, payoffs and beliefs. In each, we consider if outcomes vary across
networks and nodes, and then explore if there are differences by network properties.
We use random-effects regression models with robust standard errors clustered at the
subject-level, instead of standard statistical tests, due to our experimental design. This
allows us to control for potential session-fixed effects using session dummies and learning
using round dummies. We also include individual-level controls for sex, experience in lab
sessions and economics students.16 Table 6.9 reports the summary statistics for the key
16Of the total sample, 59.35% was female, 16.15% studied economics, and the majority took part in 1-5
experiments (46.35%) and 26% in no experiment previously. Appendix F, Table F.2 presents attributes
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outcomes by treatment for all rounds.
6.4.1 Appropriation
We first consider the complete network, the baseline in the literature. Average appro-
priation pooled across 15 rounds was 61.5% of the endowment, which is close to, albeit
marginally higher than, previous studies with perfect monitoring and punishment: for
example, 56.6% in Cason and Gangadharan (2015) and 59% in Kingsley (2015).
Figure 6.2 illustrates that the average appropriation across networks and for each
round begins close to the mid-point of the choice interval in all treatments and trends
towards the Nash equilibrium. Figure 6.3, which displays average appropriation by node
and sub-period (rounds 1-5, 6-10 and 11-15; with 95% error bars), also echoes this trend.
Notably, average appropriation in the complete network (N033) seems to fall marginally
in the last period (also see N311). But the figures and summary statistics indicate differ-
ences in average appropriation across networks are limited.
[Table 6.1, and Figures 6.2 and 6.3]
Results of random-effects models, reported in Table 6.2, confirm that differences across
networks are not statistically significant. In Table 6.2, model (1), the coefficients of the
network dummies, suggest that appropriation is lower in all networks by around 1-2 to-
kens compared to the complete network, but this difference is weakly significant only for
the undirected circle network (at 10%). In model (2), the coefficient on the Undirected
circle becomes insignificant, when we include controls, including beliefs over other’s ap-
propriation for that round, and lagged appropriation, beliefs and punishment received
(from the previous round). The coefficient of beliefs is negative, but not statistically sig-
nificant, and that of lagged beliefs is positive and significant at 5%. As expected, the
coefficient of lagged appropriation is positive and significant (at 1%), and that of lagged
punishment received is negative and significant (at 1%), as expected. Similar results are
reported in Table 6.3, when node dummies are used instead of network dummies. The
coefficients on Nodes N122 (in the undirected circle) and N301 (player D, in directed line)
are negative and weakly significant (Table 6.3, model (1)), but with the inclusion of the
lagged variables, these effects disappear (Table 6.3, model (2)).
by treatment group, and shows that groups were balanced on these attributes. We replicate the analysis
using Random-effects Tobit regressions with qualitatively similar results, which are omitted for brevity,
but available on request.
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[Tables 6.2 and 6.3]
Next, we examined the impact of the global network properties of completeness, direct-
edness and connectedness. Recall that any differences in outcomes between the complete
and undirected circle, yield the effect of completeness. Thus, we restricted the sample
in Table F.4 (models (1) and (2), Appendix F), to the complete and undirected circle
network, where the omitted category is the complete network. Controlling for session and
round fixed-effects, and individual controls, we found that the dummy on the undirected
circle was negative, but not significant, suggesting completeness had no effect on appro-
priations. Similarly, the effect of directedness was obtained by comparing differences in
outcomes between the undirected and directed circle (Table F.5, models (1) and (2)). The
effect of connectedness was obtained by comparing the differences between the directed
circle and directed line (Table F.6, models (1) and (2)). Again, we found no effect due to
both connectedness and directedness. We summarize these findings in our first result:
Result 1: Average appropriation is similar across the complete, undirected circle,
directed circle and directed line networks, and does not differ by network completeness,
connectedness and directedness or node degree.
Overall, these results support previous findings that average contributions are not sta-
tistically different between the complete, undirected circle and directed circle networks.
On the other hand, we do not find that cooperation is lower due to directedness, as in
Carpenter et al. (2012). As this study differs from previous experiments in numerous
ways, a discussion of why the results may differ are somewhat speculative. For instance,
we also elicit beliefs, which previous work has found to have either no effect on cooper-
ation (Wilcox et al., 2000), a negative effect (Croson, 2000) or a positive effect (Ga¨chter
and Renner, 2010). How belief elicitation affects appropriation across networks in this
setting in an open question. Another possibility for why appropriation is similar across
networks, is that free-riding is more aggressive in non-linear CPR dilemmas, and punish-
ment requires a longer to take effect (Cason and Gangadharan, 2015). We return to this
point briefly in the following section.
6.4.2 Punishment
Table 6.1 shows that received (mean) punishment was the highest in the complete net-
work (11.69 points), especially when compared to the mean punishment received in the
directed circle and line networks (3.05 and 3.54 points respectively), and this is also
evident from Figure 6.4. Punishment is also more erratic in the complete network, in
line with the previous CPR literature (the undirected circle network also records higher
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and somewhat erratic punishment). Figure 6.5 also shows that nodes in the complete
and undirected circle networks received more punishment on average. Notably, received
punishment seems to be marginally declining in the last period (rounds 11-15) in the
complete network, directed circle and directed line.
[Tables 6.2 and 6.3, and Figures 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6]
This suggests that higher punishment opportunities offered in the complete and undi-
rected circle networks (i.e. the total number of punishment opportunities to each subject
and by each round), elicits more positive punishment decisions and at higher levels. In-
deed, Figure 6.6 shows subjects received zero punishment points 54.4% and 56.3% of the
times in the complete and undirected circle networks respectively, compared to 85.8% and
80.95% in the undirected circle and line networks (68.1% for the pooled sample). Simi-
larly, received punishment was over 15 points for 25% of the punishment opportunities
in the complete network, versus 16.3%, 7% and 9.4% in the undirected circle, directed
circle and directed line networks respectively.
Table 6.2 provides formal support that the complete network elicits higher punish-
ment than the directed circle and line networks. The coefficients in model (3) suggest
that controlling for other variables (rounds, sessions and individual controls), received
punishment is on average around five to four points lower in the directed circle and line
networks (significant at 1%). Table 6.3, model (3) also provides support that nodes in
the directed networks receive less punishment than those in the complete network.
We also considered if punishment severity varied by network, i.e., received punishment
divided by the number of punishment opportunities available to all nodes in each round
within each network (i.e., 12 opportunities in complete network, 8 in undirected circle
network, 4 in the directed circle and 3 in the directed line). From Table 6.2, Model (4),
punishment severity was higher in the undirected circle relative to the complete network
(significant at 5%). Similarly, when we considered punishment severity across nodes, the
coefficients on N122 and N311 were positive and significant at 5%.
Network completeness, directedness and connectedness also impact punishment be-
haviour. In Table F.4, we examined the effect of completeness in models (3) and (4),
to find that received punishment is lower in the undirected circle, relative to complete
networks (at 5%), but punishment severity was not significantly different. Model (3) in
Table F.5 reveals the effect of directedness, and shows that received punishment is lower
in the directed line network relative to the undirected circle network (significant at 1%).
Model (4) also shows punishment severity is marginally lower (weakly significant at 10%).
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Finally, disconnectedness is associated with higher punishment, but this relationship is
also not as robust: from Table F.6, model (3), the coefficient on punishment is positive
and significant at 10%. The result on average punishment by network property is sum-
marized as follows:
Result 2: The complete network elicited the highest levels of received punishment.
Completeness was associated with higher punishment, and directedness with lower pun-
ishment.
Our results broadly correspond to Leibbrandt et al. (2015), that sanctioning is higher
in the complete network, versus an incomplete one where only two subjects have sanction-
ing opportunities, but differ from Carpenter et al. (2012) who find that punishment levels
are amongst the lowest in the complete network. As previously noted, appropriation is
more aggressive, and free-riding takes longer to be identified and punished in non-linear
settings. Given this, a more extended period of play may be necessary to realise the
long-run benefit of punishment (including the subsequent fall in received punishment and
appropriations; Ga¨chter et al. (2008)). One possibility is that learning may be faster in
the complete network, as it offers higher feedback and equal punishment opportunities.
Indeed, we see that received punishment is marginally lower in the last period in Figure
6.6.17 This suggests that lower punishment could be realised more quickly in the complete
network, over a more rounds of play. However, we do not have sufficient data to conclude
that is the case, at present.
Next, we proceeded to analyse individual level punishment behaviour, to examine if
received punishment depended on whether subjects are free-riders. We measured ‘free-
riding’ as the absolute positive difference between the subject’s appropriation and the
Pareto optimal appropriation of 10 tokens. Figures 6.7 and 6.8 present the frequency
of punishment and average punishment points received by absolute deviation from the
Pareto optimal appropriation respectively. Both figures show that free-riders who appro-
priated five tokens and above from the Pareto appropriation level received more pun-
ishment. Thus, as expected, free-riders are punished more frequently and severely. This
punishment received by free-riders is typically called pro-social (or altruistic) punishment
in the literature, as it is undertaken at a personal cost to the punisher(Fehr and Ga¨chter,
2002). But we also see some anti-social punishment, albeit at lower levels, i.e., punishment
targeting those who extract at or around the Pareto equilibrium (Herrmann et al., 2008).
This is in line with numerous PG and CPR experiments which report the presence of
17A Pearson χ2 test shows that the difference between average punishment between period two (rounds
6-10) and period three (rounds 11-15) is weakly lower, with χ2 = 44.75, p-value = 0.083 in the complete
network (the corresponding difference is not significant in the undirected circle network, χ2 = 17.19 and
p-value = 0.143).
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anti-social punishment, for reasons such as revenge, spite, confusion or to even discourage
cooperation (Gintis, 2008; Nikiforakis, 2008; Casari and Plott, 2003; Ostrom et al., 1994).
[Figures 6.7 and 6.8]
We formally explore whether the patterns of punishment differs across networks. For
each network, we estimated the following panel regression with individual random effects:
punrecit = β0 + β1posdevit + β2negdevit + β3round+ β4X + β5session+ β6node+ ui + eit
(6.3)
We controlled for session and round dummies, node label and individual controls, and
also included stage one payoffs as an additional control, because the level of received
punishment was bounded by earnings from stage one (the results are robust to omitting
this variable as well). The variables posdevit and negdevit refer to positive and negative
deviations from the Pareto appropriation level. As a robustness check, we also examined
if the (positive or negative) deviation from the (mean) appropriation of those in the net-
work to whom the agent is directly connected to - and can be punished by - influences
the level of punishment received. Note that this figure can be different for each network
depending on the network and node. To illustrate, agents in complete network with per-
fect monitoring and punishment will be aware of the average appropriation of the other
three members in the network.18 But agents in Undirected Circle will only be aware of
those agents whom they can monitor and punish, e.g. A is monitored and punished by B
and D, who both can see C and A - apart from their own behaviour - since the network
is connected but incomplete. Thus the absolute deviation between A and the mean ap-
propriation of B, C and D (and so on for each subject in each round in the undirected
circle). Similarly, agent A in directed line can be punished only by D, who can observe
no one else because the network is directed. Thus, the absolute deviation between D (A’s
only punisher and neighbour) and A’s appropriation is estimated, and so on. Table 6.4
presents the determinants of received punishment at the individual level in each network.
[Table 6.4]
First, we consider the complete network. Model (1) demonstrated that free-riding,
measured by positive deviations from the Pareto allocation receive higher punishment
(significant at 1%). The coefficient on negative deviations from the Pareto appropriation
18This is similar to the absolute deviation from the average appropriation of the others in the group
used in Fehr and Gachter (2000) and Cason and Gangadharan (2015).
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was positive but not statistically significant. However, from Model (2), we see that both
positive and negative deviations from other’s (mean) appropriation receives higher pun-
ishment (both coefficients significant at 1%). This highlights that both those who extract
more than and less than the group norm (i.e., the mean appropriation of the other mem-
bers) receives more punishment.
Models (3) and (4) also confirmed the robust presence of pro-social punishment in the
undirected circle (in fact, both coefficients on the positive deviation from the Pareto and
positive deviation from neighbour-punisher’s appropriation are both marginally higher).
But unlike the complete network, negative deviations from the Pareto, received lower
punishment (significant at 5%). Along these lines, the coefficient on negative deviations
from neighbour-punisher’s appropriation is positive but not statistically significant. For
the directed circle in Model (5), deviations above and below the Pareto optimal allocation
receive higher and lower punishment respectively (significant at 1%, and 5% respectively).
However, from Model (6), the coefficient on both the positive and the negative deviations
from neighbour-punisher’s appropriation was positive but not statistically significant. In
the directed line, we also see that pro-social punishment for positive deviations from the
Pareto is positive and significant (at 1%). But the coefficient on negative deviations from
the Pareto is negative but not significantly different. In this case, negative deviations from
other’s appropriation was positive and significant at 5% (model (8); we also controlled
for the node degree).
More broadly, the analysis so far suggests that different networks elicit specific pat-
terns of punishment behaviour, apart from increasing the overall punishment capacity
available to agents. While, pro-social punishment (punishment directed at subject’s ap-
propriation above the Pareto optimal) is a robust feature across networks, we found that
the undirected and directed circles networks elicited systematically lower punishment for
those who deviate below the Pareto appropriation level.19 These findings are summarized
in our third result:
Result 3: High appropriators and free-riders, i.e., those who appropriation above the
Pareto appropriation level, were punished in all networks. Those who extracted less than
the Pareto efficient allocation in incomplete and connected networks, i.e., the undirected
19This result is robust to the pooled panel specification with network treatment dummies and with
variables positive / negative deviations from Pareto and immediate neighbour-punisher (random effects
with the session / round / individual control dummies specified previously). Similar results also hold
for the probability of receiving punishment, through panel probit regression models (in Table F.11).
Both the marginal effects of positive and negative deviations from the Pareto level (and appropriation of
Neighbour-Punishers) on both E[punrecit] and Pr[punrecit > 0] are computed and presented in Figures
F.1 to F.4. Since the sign and significance levels of all the coefficients translate to each of the marginal
effect, we do not report them here.
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and directed circles, received lower punishment.
6.4.3 Payoffs and efficiency
Next, we compared the level of efficiency (average payoffs) across networks. Figures 9
and 10 plot the average payoffs from stage two across networks and nodes, and we see
that average payoffs start above the Nash equilibrium level, but trends downwards. Table
6.1 also shows that average payoffs are the lowest in the complete network. This finding
is formally supported by the random-effects regressions in Table 6.2, Model (5), which
show that earnings are 17-19 tokens lower in incomplete networks (significant at 1%),
controlling for session dummies, round dummies and individual controls. This is also con-
firmed by regression results across different nodes (Table 6.3, model (5)). We found that
completeness is associated with lower payoffs (significant at 1%), but that payoffs are
not different due to directedness or connectedness (Tables F.5 and F.6). As previously
discussed, this result is driven by high levels of costly punishment, and rather limited
differences in appropriation across networks. To summarise:
Result 4: The complete network was the least efficient network architecture, and
completeness was associated with lower average payoffs.
[Figures 6.9 and 6.10]
6.4.4 Beliefs over other’s appropriations
We start with discussing if beliefs over other’s (mean) appropriation from the common
account, vary across networks and by network property. Figures 11 and 12 disclose that
stated beliefs over other’s appropriation start at the Pareto appropriation and trends
towards the Nash equilibrium, across networks and nodes. From Table 1, average beliefs
tend to be marginally higher in complete networks compared to the undirected circle and
directed circle networks.
[Figures 6.11 and 6.12]
Table 6.2, model (6) provides formal support for this when we regress the network
dummies on stated beliefs, controlling for session and round dummies, and individual
controls. More precisely, stated beliefs is around 2-3 tokens lower in all incomplete net-
works relative to the complete network (significant at 1%). This finding corresponds with
Neugebauer et al. (2009), where subjects report lower beliefs with greater information
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feedback.20 In model (7) we add lagged beliefs and other’s appropriation in the previ-
ous period (following Fischbacher and Gachter (2010)). The coefficient on lagged beliefs
is positively and significantly associated with beliefs (at 1%), but that of other’s ap-
propriation is positive, but the difference is not statistically significant. The coefficients
on the network dummies fall but remain significant. These results are also qualitatively
similar to those in models (6) and (7) in Table 6.3, which assess the impact of node dum-
mies.21 Notably, node N301, who receives no feedback on other’s appropriation stated the
lowest beliefs relative to nodes in the complete network; by a magnitude of around 1.6
tokens (significant at 1%; also see Figure 6.12). From Tables F.5 and F.6, directedness
is negatively associated with higher beliefs, but the difference is not significant, and dis-
connectedness is associated with lower beliefs (significant at 5%, by around one token).
This yields the following result:
Result 5: Stated beliefs over other’s appropriations are the highest in the complete
network. Completeness and disconnectedness are associated with higher beliefs. Node
N301 states lower beliefs.
Next, we consider the deviation between stated beliefs and other’s actual appropri-
ation in more detail. Figures 13 and 14 plot the average deviation between beliefs and
other’s appropriation, by treatment and node, over time. There is a persistent gap between
beliefs and other’s mean appropriations, suggesting subjects hold ‘optimistic’ beliefs. The
absolute difference is two tokens on average for the pooled sample. Keeping in mind dif-
ferences between the current experiment and previous studies, the difference is higher
than observed in Velez et al. (2009) who record that individuals expected other members
would extract a nearly one unit less than their actual appropriation (non-incentivised
total appropriation from others is elicited in a linear CPR game). It is relatively closer to
Ga¨chter et al. (2008) who record that the absolute difference between stated belief and
actual average contribution of others is around two tokens (incentivised average contri-
butions of other is elicited in a linear VCM PG game).
Figures 13 and 14 also reveal some differences across nodes and networks. Firstly, the
absolute difference between beliefs and other’s appropriation systematically falls with
time in the complete network and directed line networks. On the other hand, beliefs in
the undirected circle and directed circle networks seem to marginally increase in rounds
20Note that Neugebauer et al. (2009) provide subjects feedback about payoffs from the linear VCM
PG game, broken up to the sum of partners’ contributions, and from the guessing task, after each period.
In addition, citetcox2015 review the literature on linear VCM PG games, and observe that the effect on
feedback on other’s contributions on cooperation is mixed.
21Notably, economics students state higher beliefs (by a magnitude of 1-0.66, significant at 1%) relative
to non-economics students in Tables 6.3 and 6.4.
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6-10, and then fall. Lastly, if we consider only node N301 who receives no feedback, the
divergence is the highest in the first period, but drops over time.
[Figures 6.13 and 6.14, and Table 6.5]
We examine if differences across nodes are statistically significant by using random-
effects models, controlling for sessions fixed-effects and individual controls.22 We add
period dummies, where period one (rounds 1-5) is the omitted category. The results are
reported in Table 6.5. Model (1) shows that N301 reports the higher divergence between
stated beliefs and appropriation, relative to nodes in the complete network (N033 is the
omitted category). The period dummy for rounds 11-15 is negative and significant at
5%, suggesting that controlling for other variables, the deviation declines over time (or
equally, belief accuracy increases with time).
To examine if this decline is contingent on the node degree, we interact the node degree
dummies with the three-period dummy in model (2). First, the value of the coefficients
on N301 and dummy for rounds 11-15, marginally increases and is significant at 1% each.
Second, the interaction term between nodes in the undirected circle and directed circle
networks (N122 and N311), and the second category of the period dummy (rounds 11-15)
have a positive and significant coefficient (at 5%). This reveals that the nodes in the
undirected circle and directed circle networks maintain relatively more optimistic beliefs
in the last period, i.e., the difference between beliefs and other’s appropriation is higher
compared to nodes in the complete network in the first period (rounds 1-5), controlling for
other variables. This suggests that nodes in incomplete but connected networks, maintain
optimistic beliefs for longer, relative to nodes in the complete network.23 More broadly,
this confirms that the network structure impacts learning through time, and yields our
last result:
Result 6: The difference between beliefs and other’s actual appropriation is highest
for node N301. While the deviation between beliefs and other’s (mean) appropriation
falls over time, trends vary by the network. Relative to the complete network, the devia-
tion between beliefs and other’s (mean) appropriation is higher in the directed circle and
22We focus on differences across nodes rather than networks in the text given the unique position of
N301. Analogous results examining effects across networks are available in Table F.12. The results are
qualitatively similar: we find that the coefficients on the undirected circle, and directed circle and line
networks are not significant, but the second-period dummy for rounds 11-15 is significant. The interaction
terms on the period and undirected and directed network dummies are qualitatively similar.
23On the other hand, Neugebauer et al. (2009) do not find that difference between beliefs and other’s
contributions declines over ten rounds, in groups with and without feedback. Instead, we use fifteen
rounds to allow subjects greater time to learn the game and modify their behaviour, and find that
average differences are more apparent in the last periods during rounds 11-15.
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directed circle networks, in the last period.
6.5 Conclusion
This study contributes to the literature on peer monitoring and punishment in social
dilemmas, by considering how the network architecture impacts outcomes in a non-linear
CPR appropriation game. Broadly, we find evidence that the structure of the network,
impacts efficiency, punishment, and stated beliefs over other’s appropriation, but that it
does not impact appropriation significantly.
Our results suggest the network structure impacts both punishment opportunity and
the type of punishment used. While there was pro-social punishment to sanction free-
riders (i.e., those who appropriate above the pareto appropriation level) in all networks,
there was significantly lower punishment received by those who appropriated less than
the Pareto appropriation level in the undirected and directed circle networks. The high
levels of punishment in the complete network, making it the most inefficient network.
Furthermore, we find that there is faster convergence between stated beliefs and other’s
appropriation in the complete network, relative to incomplete, but connected networks.
Overall, these findings may hold some potential lesson for policy, keeping in mind the
many differences between the field and lab setting. Firstly, it highlights that the struc-
tural variation in the distribution of monitoring and punishment opportunities impacts
welfare. In fact, the excessive use of punishment in the complete network provides a
cautionary lesson about the cost of exclusively relying on perfect peer monitoring and
punishment to enhance cooperation, especially if the primary policy objective is welfare
maximisation. Second, it highlights the limited impact of the network on appropriation
– suggesting the need for investigation into complementary mechanisms to enhance the
effectiveness of peer monitoring, to prevent the destruction of the commons. Some of
these may be especially relevant from the network perspective: for instance, the effect of
restricting communication opportunities or allowing subjects to ostracise high appropria-
tors, by severing network edges. Third, it is possible that long-run benefits of punishment
maybe realised in systematically different ways across network architectures, as they all
offer different opportunities for learning and feedback. Some natural extensions to this
research are therefore examining how behaviour evolves over a larger number of rounds,
allowing for variations in the experimental design to allow for partner-matching and dif-
ferent types of punishment technologies, and the systematic examination of how beliefs
evolve and impact behaviour in more complex, non-linear social dilemmas.
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6.6 Tables and Figures
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics by network and node
Network/Node Sessions Subjects Groups Observations Appropriation Punishment Beliefs Payoffs
Complete 3 60 225 900 15.37 11.69 13.25 172.36
(5.56) (23.78) (4.84) (51.51)
Undirected circle 2 36 135 540 14.51 6.77 12.69 188.77
(4.99) (14.30) (3.75) (37.21)
Directed circle 2 40 150 600 14.8 2.61 12.26 189.26
(5.29) (11.04) (3.85) (40.34)
Directed line 3 56 210 840 14.81 3.05 12.95 188.71
(6.23) (8.99) (5.25) (48.87)
N311 3 28 210 420 15.01 3.54 13.25 187.94
(6.19) (9.92) (5.05) (48.71)
N301 3 14 210 210 14.37 - 13.37 190.39
(5.92) - (5.36) (49.52)
N310 3 14 210 210 14.83 2.09 11.92 188.57
(6.61) (6.68) (5.43) (48.73)
Total 10 192 720 2880 14.93 6.61 12.85 183.73
(5.62) (17.13) (4.61) (46.70)
Notes: Mean (standard deviation) is reported for appropriation, received punishment, beliefs and payoffs. Subjects are assigned to one
network and to a fixed node type of A, B, C or D, in each session (having 16-20 subjects), and in each of the 15 rounds, they are randomly
assigned to a new group.
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Figure 6.2: Appropriation by network
Figure 6.3: Appropriation by node
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Figure 6.4: Received punishment by network
Figure 6.5: Received punishment by node
Figure 6.6: Received punishment as share of punishment opportunities
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Figure 6.7: Frequency of punishment received by deviation from Pareto equilibrium and
network
Figure 6.8: Received punishment by deviation from Pareto equilibrium and network
213
T
ab
le
6.
4:
R
ec
ei
ve
d
p
u
n
is
h
m
en
t
ac
ro
ss
n
et
w
or
k
s
N
et
w
or
k
s:
C
o
m
p
le
te
U
n
d
ir
ec
te
d
ci
rc
le
D
ir
ec
te
d
ci
rc
le
D
ir
ec
te
d
li
n
e
R
an
d
om
eff
ec
ts
m
o
d
el
s:
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
P
os
it
iv
e
d
ev
ia
ti
on
-P
ar
et
o
1
.2
8
7
*
*
*
1
.5
1
9
*
*
*
0
.3
7
8
*
*
*
0
.3
5
1
*
*
*
(0
.1
9
2
)
(0
.3
2
8
)
(0
.1
0
3
)
(0
.0
8
0
)
N
eg
at
iv
e
d
ev
ia
ti
on
-P
ar
et
o
-0
.0
2
1
-0
.6
5
6
*
*
-0
.4
4
9
*
*
-0
.0
4
7
(0
.3
1
3
)
(0
.3
1
4
)
(0
.1
9
2
)
(0
.1
7
1
)
P
os
it
iv
e
d
ev
ia
ti
on
-N
ei
gh
b
ou
r/
P
u
n
is
h
er
’s
ap
p
ro
p
ri
at
io
n
1
.4
3
5
*
*
*
2
.1
8
2
*
*
*
0
.1
7
5
0
.1
4
1
(0
.2
5
6
)
(0
.6
8
8
)
(0
.1
1
2
)
(0
.1
0
8
)
N
eg
at
iv
e
d
ev
ia
ti
on
-N
ei
gh
b
ou
r/
P
u
n
is
h
er
’s
ap
p
ro
p
ri
at
io
n
0
.8
0
9
*
*
*
0
.3
1
7
0
.1
4
3
0
.2
1
3
*
*
(0
.2
2
3
)
(0
.2
1
1
)
(0
.0
9
8
)
(0
.0
8
8
)
S
ta
ge
1
p
ay
off
-0
.0
3
5
-0
.1
2
5
*
*
*
0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
4
8
0
.0
2
1
0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
1
2
-0
.0
2
1
(0
.0
2
3
)
(0
.0
3
1
)
(0
.0
2
2
)
(0
.0
3
2
)
(0
.0
2
1
)
(0
.0
1
7
)
(0
.0
1
3
)
(0
.0
1
3
)
N
o
d
e
d
eg
re
e
=
N
30
1,
Y
es
-1
.2
4
2
-1
.5
0
5
*
(0
.7
8
6
)
(0
.9
0
5
)
C
on
st
an
t
4
.9
9
0
2
6
.2
2
1
*
*
*
3
.3
1
3
1
8
.2
6
4
*
*
-6
.7
6
0
-1
.3
6
2
3
.1
6
2
7
.3
3
8
*
*
(5
.4
5
3
)
(7
.1
4
3
)
(5
.8
4
8
)
(7
.4
1
1
)
(6
.3
4
0
)
(5
.2
8
5
)
(3
.2
4
6
)
(3
.5
1
8
)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
9
0
0
9
0
0
5
4
0
5
4
0
6
0
0
6
0
0
6
3
0
6
3
0
N
u
m
b
er
of
su
b
je
ct
6
0
6
0
3
6
3
6
4
0
4
0
4
2
4
2
S
es
si
on
d
u
m
m
ie
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
d
e
la
b
el
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
R
ou
n
d
d
u
m
m
ie
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
In
d
iv
id
u
al
co
n
tr
ol
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
te
s:
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
su
b
je
ct
le
v
el
,
a
n
d
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
p
<
0
.1
.
T
h
e
C
o
m
p
le
te
n
et
w
o
rk
is
th
e
o
m
it
te
d
ca
te
g
o
ry
.
O
u
tc
o
m
e
v
a
ri
a
b
le
:
R
ec
ei
v
ed
p
u
n
is
h
m
en
t;
O
m
it
te
d
ca
te
g
o
ry
in
m
o
d
el
s
(9
)
a
n
d
(1
0
)
is
N
o
d
e
N
3
1
1
.
214
Figure 6.9: Payoffs by network
Figure 6.10: Payoffs by node
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Figure 6.11: Belief’s over other’s appropriation by network
Figure 6.12: Belief’s over other’s appropriation by node
Figure 6.13: Deviation between other’s (mean) appropriation and beliefs by network
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Figure 6.14: Deviation between other’s (mean) appropriation and beliefs by node
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Table 6.5: Difference between beliefs and other’s (mean) appropriation across nodes
Outcome: Deviation between beliefs and other’s (mean) appropriation
Random-effects models: (1) (2)
Node degree = 1, N122 0.013 -0.715
(0.78) (0.92)
Node degree = 2, N211 1.388* 0.408
(0.82) (0.89)
Node degree = 3, N311 1.032 0.678
(1.11) (1.27)
Node degree = 4, N301 1.137 1.125
(1.00) (1.64)
Node degree = 5, N310 2.662*** 3.202***
(1.02) (1.18)
Period = 1, Rounds 6-10 -0.293 -0.673
(0.25) (0.44)
Period = 2, Rounds 11-15 -0.613** -1.293***
(0.27) (0.35)
N122 X Rounds 6-10 0.897
(0.68)
N122 X Rounds 11-15 1.286**
(0.64)
N211 X Rounds 6-10 1.290**
(0.60)
N211 X Rounds 11-15 1.650**
(0.66)
N311 X Rounds 6-10 0.254
(0.83)
N311 X Rounds 11-15 0.805
(0.92)
N310 X Rounds 6-10 -0.155
(1.45)
N310 X Rounds 11-15 0.193
(1.64)
N301 X Rounds 6-10 -1.127
(0.95)
N301 X Rounds 11-15 -0.492
(0.99)
Sex 0.525 0.525
(0.41) (0.42)
Experience 0.426 0.426
(0.28) (0.28)
Economics -1.412*** -1.412***
(0.45) (0.45)
Constant 1.241 1.595**
(0.77) (0.79)
Observations 2,880 2,880
Number of subject 192 192
Session dummies Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the subject level, and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The Complete network is the omitted category. The Complete network and period 1 (rounds 1-5) are the
omitted categories.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
Understanding and changing human behaviour is crucial to tackling the multiple environ-
mental challenges facing us today. In this spirit, this thesis seeks to advance our knowledge
of the individual and situational factors driving human behaviour in three contexts: con-
tributions towards protecting public goods like biodiversity and the environment, choices
under risk from environmental externalities like air pollution, and cooperation over shared
common pool resources. Each of the five papers uses experimental methods to provide
sharper causal insights to behavioural impacts of information and incentives or to extract
preferences and beliefs in the settings considered.
In this concluding section, I summarise the key result from each paper. After this, I
briefly discuss some overarching concerns that span across the papers which stem from
the methodology of lab and lab-in-the-field experiments, and propose ways to address
this in future the context papers in this thesis. I note that each paper contains its own
conclusion which has more specific discussions relating to the themes in the paper.
Paper 1 explores the direct impact of different types of audiovisual information through
the charismatic megafauna and outrage effect on contributions to biodiversity conserva-
tion. It also signals that mixed emotions could be drivers of pro-sociality in the conserva-
tion context. Paper 2 charts the indirect spillover effects of these video interventions on
subsequent pro-environmental behavioural intentions. Taken together, the papers high-
light the potential of the narratives in videos to encourage public engagement and con-
servation action to address the sixth mass extinction event.
Papers 3 and 4 explore the psycho-social determinants of avoidance behaviours amongst
active travellers, namely cyclists in London. In Paper 3, risk perception rather than risk
preferences seems to be a better predictor of avoidance behaviour in the context and
sample studied. Domain-specific risk preferences via the willingness to take health risks
showed more behavioural validity as regards risk-taking while cycling, and the evidence
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for cross-context validity was not strong. Paper 4 showed that underlying beliefs about
air quality determine how individuals respond to social norm messaging. These results
collectively suggest that subjective beliefs about environmental risks influence choice un-
der uncertainty in the context of air pollution avoidance.
Paper 5 explores how the peer monitoring and punishment network structure affects
cooperation in a commons dilemma. The results suggest that while free-riders (i.e., those
who extracted from the CPR at a level above the Pareto optimal appropriation) were
punished in all networks, incomplete connected networks like the undirected and directed
circle elicited lower punishment towards those who appropriated less than the socially
efficient level, at least in the short-run. These punishment patterns leave the complete
network as the least efficient because the net payoffs after punishment are the lowest.
Although individuals are initially optimistic about others pro-sociality across networks,
beliefs converge to the selfish equilibrium more rapidly in complete networks. These find-
ings open up new questions about how the underlying socio-spatial network of interactions
and information feedback affects how people learn to cooperate to manage shared natural
resources.
En masse, these papers attempt to make a modest contribution to the growing body
of work that constitutes behavioural environmental economics. The papers take advan-
tage of the tight control afforded by the lab to testbed novel interventions or the lab
validated protocol to recover preferences in the field. That said, there are concerns that
findings from lab experiments may not generalise to real-life settings. This is eloquently
discussed in Levitt and List (2007b) and Levitt and List (2007a). They question if the
critical assumption underlying the interpretation of data from lab experiments is defensi-
ble, i.e., if insights gained from lab experiments can be extrapolated to the world beyond.
They argue that the level of scrutiny by the experimenter, the lack of subject anonymity,
the artificial context, the (most often monetary) stakes, and the population (mainly stu-
dents), all deviate significantly from real-world settings.
There has been a lively debate over these issues, with Camerer (2011), Falk and Heck-
man (2009) and Kessler and Vesterlund (2015) amongst others who counter-argue that
lab experiments are particularly useful to isolate general principles and qualitative rela-
tionships between variables, rather than quantitative effects (e.g. direction of the effect,
rather than the precise effect size). This emphasis on qualitative results is useful in part
because it acknowledges that all theoretical and empirical models require simplifying as-
sumptions, which makes it unlikely that the effect size will be accurately captured anyway
(Kessler and Vesterlund, 2015). It is in this spirit that we look to interpreting the results
220
of Paper 1, 2 and 5.
Another means to increase external validity is to design lab experiments to mirror the
environment being studied. This strategy was adopted in Papers 1 and 2, which tried to
bring in more context into the lab: for example by using different design innovations (e.g.
providing donation receipts), framing the issue explicitly in environmental terms with ad-
equate detail, and collecting post-experimental survey data about subject motivations to
uncover alternative explanations. Moreover, the behaviour of those enrolled in university
labs is of interest to charity organisations aiming to conserve biodiversity in the global
south, precisely because it targets these populations in their outreach work.
Nonetheless, the debate is far from settled.1 Most relevant to the work in this thesis
are the concerns about external validity about experimental games attempting to measure
social preferences. Galizzi and Navarro-Mart´ınez (2018) illustrate this by undertaking a
meta-analysis of studies that connect choices in social preference games to field-based
behaviours. They find that only 39.7% of the reported lab-field correlations and 37.5% of
the reported lab-field regressions find a statistically significant association between games
and field behaviours. There was a weak correlation between lab-field based behaviours:
the overall average correlation of all papers was 0.14, and in the papers that report sig-
nificant correlations it is 0.27.
In Papers 3 and 4, I sought to increase external validity by moving from the lab into
the field. That said, there are still some concerns, as I ultimately rely on a convenience
sample as subjects need to select into participating in the experiment, and the subjects
know they are participating in an experiment, which may, in turn, change their behaviour
(as observed in (Levitt and List, 2011) and Gosnell et al. (2016)).
There are some significant methodological implications for future work. The first is
that replications of the papers in the lab and online platforms, amongst bigger and more
diverse samples and varied environments, will reveal the robustness of the results. This
may be especially useful in the case of Paper 3 to recover risk and other preferences us-
ing a larger and more representative sample of cyclists, and even other active travellers.
Papers 1 and 2 would also benefit from replication exercises.
Another direction is to experimentally test these interventions in the field, using a
combination of natural and framed field experiments. For instance, an exciting prospect
1This discussion also follows some contours of the ‘replication crisis’ in social psychology. See Open-
ScienceCollaboration (2015), who report that only one-third to one-half of the original findings in high-
ranking psychology journals were also observed in the replication study, and Gilbert et al. (2016) for a
counter-argument.
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for Paper 1 would be to work with a partner to implement a natural field experiment, one
who is willing to implement the proposed design (e.g. narrative content into the film) and
provide the data needed to estimate the causal effects of interest. Conducting this work
both in countries with conservation sites and donor countries could be fascinating work.
Implementing social norms messaging using a natural field experiment could also be a
possibility for Paper 4, perhaps with the use of observational or revealed data depending
on a refinement of the outcome variable (Lawrence, 2015; Allcott, 2011).
To delve deeper into the dynamics of behavioural spillovers and take the results of
Paper 2 forward, future research could employ a more mixed-methods approach. This
could entail combining experimental interventions with diary-based methods or a lab-
field study to track the evolution of multiple behaviours over a longer time horizon and
across different domains (e.g. in Carrico et al. (2017) and Dolan and Galizzi (2014)). This
could even be used to examine the effects of information and incentives in conservation
projects in the field in transitional countries and those rich in biodiversity resources. For
e.g. Alp´ızar et al. (2017) looks at ‘behavioural leakages’ from targeted incentives.
For Paper 5, an innovative approach would be to combine detailed social network
data about multiple relationships, revealed behaviour in experimental games, and actual
resource management outcomes. For e.g. Chandrasekhar et al. (2012) use a framed field
experiment with real network data to uncover social learning dynamics. While it was not
financially feasible to carry out these proposed projects over the course of this doctoral
dissertation, they are a promising way forward to build on the research contained in this
thesis.
In moving from the lab to natural field experiments one has to keep in mind their
primary limitation, i.e., they may not be external valid in other field settings. This has
been called the ‘transportation problem’ by Deaton (2010). It is not dissimilar to the
notion of ‘parallelism’ referred to in Smith (2010). Ultimately an imaginative use of a
combination of experimental methods is the key to advancing our knowledge of people’s
decisions to protect the environment and protect themselves from environmental risks.
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Appendix A
Literature Appendix for Chapter 1
In this Appendix to Chapter 1, I locate the essays in this thesis and their contributions,
within the fast-growing sub-discipline of behavioural environmental economics. The ob-
jective of this effort is to ground this thesis in the broader trends in the discipline to
provide historical context to my work. Please refer to the introduction for a more concise
version of the key contributions, and each paper for a more specific discussion of the
conceptual themes, methods and results.
In the first part, I propose that standard environmental and resource economics that
has been traditionally preoccupied with ‘market failure’, which is commonly conceptu-
alised as departures from the ideal of the perfectly competitive market. The conventional
analysis rests on the foundational assumption the rational actor model of human be-
haviour. In the second part, I sketch the ascent of behavioural economics, which has
emphasised ‘behavioural failures’, often defined as systematic deviations from this stan-
dard rational choice model. In the third section, I note that it is particularly conducive
- and necessary - to apply behavioural insights to explain human decision-making in en-
vironmental dilemmas. By dwelling on how research at the intersection of market and
behavioural failures is crucial, I extend Shogren and Taylor (2008)’s earlier analysis of the
same themes by focusing on the work presented in this thesis. Then, I situate each essay
and its contributions within three distinct but interrelated strands of literature, firstly
about people’s choices to protect and value public goods, secondly about choices under
environmental risk, and thirdly on cooperation and social dilemmas over shared natural
resources.
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A.1 Market failures and Environmental economics
The field of Environmental and Resource Economics grew swiftly from the 1960s onwards
in response to mounting concerns over the ecological limits of economic activity (Bould-
ing, 1966), rapidly depleting renewable resources such as fish stocks and tropical forests,
and scarcity of non-renewable resources reflected in soaring oil prices towards the end of
the 1970s (Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968; Dasgupta and Heal, 1979). Environmental move-
ments contesting the adverse health and wellbeing effects of environmental pollution,
exemplified in Rachel Carson’s evocative account of the effect of agrochemicals in Silent
Spring (Carson, 2002), further spurred the field to explore the social welfare implications
of anthropogenic environmental degradation.
Market failure – or the deviations from the conditions of an ideal competitive econ-
omy, due to factors like missing markets, externalities, public goods or absent property
rights – is a fundamental organising concept commonly applied to the consumption side
in the field (e.g. in Arrow (1969), Kolstad et al. (2011) and Perman et al. (2003)). But
the economic welfare implications of market failure and resource scarcity have long been
a staple of microeconomic theory within the neoclassical paradigm, which is the intel-
lectual precursor of the environmental and resource economics, as illustrated in works of
Pigou on externalities and taxation (Pigou, 1920), Kaldor and Hicks on welfare economics
(Kaldor, 1939; Hicks, 1939) or Hotelling on the optimal rate of resource use (Hotelling,
1931).1
Within this conceptual framework, the standard assumption in environmental eco-
nomics was that individuals act in a manner prescribed by rational choice and expected
utility theories in choosing whether to protect the environment or themselves from en-
vironmental risk. Bernheim and Rangel (2007) offer a succinct summary of the central
assumptions of the standard model. They note that individuals are believed to have well-
defined preferences rankings over different states of the world that rest on the following
assumptions: (i) preferences are coherent and well-behaved, (ii) the domain of an indi-
vidual’s preference rankings is the set of lifetime state-contingent consumption paths,
(iii) fixed over an individual’s lifetime and states of nature, and (iv) the most preferred
alternatives are chosen from a given choice set (utility maximising), and individual makes
1Heal (2007), Pearce (2002), and Cropper and Oates (1992) provide more detailed historical per-
spectives about the evolution of environmental and resource economics and it’s core areas of inquiry,
including debates about sustainable development and it’s measurement, natural capital and economic
valuation, discounting, and policy appraisal and cost-benefit analysis. While environmental and resource
economics remained strongly rooted in the neoclassical paradigm, ecological economics, which emerged
around the same time, was more interdisciplinary and emphasised the ecological limits of growth, as
discussed in Daly’s steady state economics (Daly, 1973). Spash (2012), Røpke (2005) and Røpke (2004)
discuss the foundations and historical origins of the ecological economics as a distinct field.
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no mistakes. These standard preferences are revealed through individual choices, which
are made subject to a budget constraint. Furthermore, revealed preferences are thought
to represent an agent’s actual interests or their ‘normative’ preferences (Beshears et al.,
2008).
The social cost of market failures provides an argument for government interven-
tion through environmental policy. Altering an agent’s budget constraint by modifying
their incentives, was seen as the primary policy conduit to internalise the external (en-
vironmental) benefits and costs, to ultimately increase social welfare efficiently. Conse-
quently, policy solutions commonly advocated by economists to correct market failure
included the allocation of property rights (especially to privatise open-access ‘commons’)
(Hardin, 1968; Coase, 1974), and market or incentive-based instruments aiming to price
externalities through Pigouvian taxes or subsidies, and tradeable permits (Dales, 1968;
Stavins, 2003). Comparisons between conventional command-and-control regulations and
incentive-based mechanisms repeatedly noted that the former failed to achieve environ-
mental objectives in the least-cost manner (Hahn and Stavins, 1992). Alternately, improv-
ing access to more accurate or complete information would allow individuals to revise their
preferences (if they so wish) over available choice alternatives.
In a nutshell, the standard assumption in environmental economics is that individ-
uals would behave ‘as if’ they were rational actors in their responses to incentives and
information to correct market failures, which in turn would achieve environmental protec-
tion at least cost. This standard approach follows Friedman and Savage (1948)’s famous
argument for adopting a ‘positive’ methodological approach in economics and retaining
the (unrealistic) rational actor assumptions. They used the analogy of an expert billiards
player who made his shots as if he calculated the expected trajectory of the ball based
on complicated formulas, although these calculations were only approximated in a split
second before play.
A.2 Behavioural failures and Behavioural economics
Mounting evidence from behavioural economics has catalogued systematic deviations in
preferences, beliefs and choices, that violate the predictions of the rational actor model
(DellaVigna, 2009). Studies in this field aim to offer a more realistic description of hu-
man behaviour by incorporating insights from social and personality psychology, and
more recently sociology and anthropology, to replace Homo economicus (‘Econs’ or ‘the
rational economic man’) with Homos sapiens (‘Humans’) (Thaler, 2000). The method
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of experimentation was, and remains, a principal means to change thinking about eco-
nomics because it enabled discussions about the conditions under which standard mod-
els were falsified or verified. Importantly, systematic deviations in revealed preferences
across different contexts (e.g. knowledge and resources) and institutions (e.g. rules gov-
erning socio-economic interactions) was quantified in a controlled and replicable manner
(Smith, 1989). Indeed economic experimentation has been critical to advance our under-
standing of human behaviour in environmental dilemmas, as discussed in section 1.3 in
more detail (Ostrom, 2006; Janssen et al., 2010; List and Price, 2016).
Mullainathan and Thaler (2000) distil three traits that offer a more realistic pic-
ture of individual decision-making compared to the standard model: bounded rationality,
bounded willpower and bounded selfishness. Bounded rationality reflects that humans
have limited cognitive capacity that constrains problem-solving (Simon, 1955). People
often make biased probability judgements, are averse to loss and appear overconfident.
They rely on heuristics or rules of thumb in their decision-making, and seem to an-
chor their judgements and choices on the status quo or potentially irrelevant information
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1986; Kahneman et al., 1982; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Ross and Nisbett, 2011). Bounded willpower refers to the tendency for people to take
decisions that run counter to their long-run interest. This is often captured by time-
inconsistent preferences, where measured discount functions decline at a higher rate in
the short run than in the long run (also called present-biased preferences), and is often
captured through hyperbolic utility discounting (Chabris et al., 2010). Time-inconsistent
preferences have been linked to self-control problems and rash decision-making, such
as addictions and procrastination (Laibson, 1997; DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2006).
Lastly, bounded self-interest refers to the idea that individuals care or act as if they care
about other’s wellbeing. They care about fairness, and take personally costly altruistic,
reciprocal and even spiteful decisions, contrary to the assumption of the rational pursuit
of self-interest (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). These anomalies or
behavioural biases, defined against the benchmark standard rational choice model, are
often grouped under the term ‘behavioural failures’ (Shogren and Taylor, 2008).2
There are also attempts to present a more cogent picture of how decisions are made.
For example, dual processes theory emphasises two distinct ‘systems’ operating in the
2Thaler (2016) provides a recent overview of the historical roots of behavioural economics. Ashraf et al.
(2005) point out that classical economist Adam Smith, the father of economics, adopted a behavioural
perspective on economic behaviour in the Theory of moral sentiments, by noting the struggle between
the ‘impartial spectator’ and the ‘passions’ (emotions), morals, and other behavioural anomalies like
altruism or fairness (bounded selfishness), overconfidence, inter-temporal decision-making and self-control
(bounded willpower) and loss aversion (bounded rationality).
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brain, where ‘System 1’ (or Type 1) processes are fast, automatic, associative, fast, un-
conscious and affective, and ‘System 2’ (Type 2) processes, which are slow, controlled,
reflective, rule-based, conscious and rational (Kahneman, 2011; Evans, 2008).3 Accumu-
lating evidence from neuroeconomics shows automatic information processing occurs in
distinct brain regions, and highlights the role of affective processes in decision-making
and learning (Rangel et al., 2008; Glimcher and Rustichini, 2004). For example, Sanfey
et al. (2003) found the anterior insula, an area associated with physical and emotional dis-
gust, was activated amongst individuals who rejected unfair offers in an ultimatum game.4
In summary, behavioural economics pays particular attention to people’s predictable
behavioural failures, the automatic and cognitive processes guiding human decision-
making, and situational factors in the decision context. Behavioural failures provide an
argument for policy-makers to help individuals avoid mistakes by changing the context
in which humans make decisions (e.g. changing defaults), the way or type of information
provided (for e.g. combining social comparisons), and the way incentives are designed (e.g.
combining incentives with social comparison information as a default), as a complement
to traditional command-and-control, information and incentive-based regulations to pro-
mote social welfare. This approach is illustrated in the ‘Libertarian paternalism’, which
advocates changing the context or the ‘choice architecture’ to ‘nudge’ people to take better
decisions (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) and the MINDSPACE approach to changing be-
haviour (Dolan et al., 2012). Behaviourally informed interventions have caught the imag-
ination of policymakers: while the UK, Germany, and the USA established first ‘nudge’
units at the national level, now, over a dozen countries today have them or are actively
incorporating behavioural insights into the formulation of policy (Afif, 2017). Croson
and Treich (2014) note that the popularity of nudges arises from their cost-effectiveness,
propensity to be tested through experimentation in the field (in which they seem to per-
form well), and lack of strong objections on the basis of fairness and cost concerns (as
they can be applied equally to everyone, versus polluters or victims of pollution).5 The
3A counter-perspective is offered by Gerd Gigerenzer, and others, who propose that non-standard
decision processes like heuristics evolved in humans to allow us to take ‘fast and frugal’ rule-based deci-
sions under uncertainty, and that single process accounts of decision-making are sufficient to account for
observed empirical patterns of decision-making (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011). Evans and Stanovich
(2013) discuss this debate alongside advances in dual-process accounts of decision-making.
4In an ultimatum game, the first player conditionally receives a sum of money and proposes how
to divide the sum between herself and another player. The second player chooses to either accept or
reject this proposal. Other notable studies include McCabe et al. (2001) on cooperation in trust games,
Rustichini et al. (2005) on choice under risk, and McClure et al. (2004) on immediate and delayed
monetary rewards.
5‘Nudges’ are interventions that don’t impose significant material incentives but can nonetheless
steer people in particular directions and also allow for them to go their own way (Sunstein, 2015). The
most common objections to behavioural interventions and nudges are that they can violate consumer
sovereignty and have unclear welfare foundations. See Sunstein (2015) for a counter-perspective and
Schubert (2017) for a discussion on ethics and green nudges.
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increasing acceptance of the ‘real third way’ to regulation (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008),
signals a movement away from the rationality assumptions and Friedman’s as if reason-
ing, precisely because it fails empirical tests of behaviour, in line with the requirements
of the positivist method used in economics (Thaler, 1980).
A.3 Towards a convergent analysis of market and
behavioural failures: Behavioural environmental
economics
Environmental issues provide a rich terrain for the convergent analysis of market and be-
havioural failures for several reasons. Natural environments produce a stream of ecosystem
services beneficial to humans in the absence of markets. For example, the provisioning
of biodiversity enhances ecosystem resilience and regulates climate, and increases human
wellbeing through non-use existence and bequest values (Atkinson et al., 2012). This
implies that individuals have limited opportunities to gain experience through market-
like transactions. Market inexperience has been put forward as a possible explanation
for irrational behaviour in environmental settings (see Shogren and Taylor (2008) for a
discussion). Correspondingly, market experience has been found to reduce the impact of
behavioural biases on behaviour in settings involving the exchange of private goods (List,
2003, 2004; List and Millimet, 2008). But others argue market competition, arbitrage,
and learning through experience do not necessarily lead to unbounded rationality, even
on theoretical grounds (Mullainathan and Thaler, 2000). Furthermore, Thaler (2016)
notes that ‘thinking that markets will eradicate aberrant behaviour shows a failure to
understand how markets work’ (pp. 1585), and notes that firms often devise strategies to
profit from self-control problems and cognitive biases.6 Similar arguments are presented
in Akerlof and Shiller (2015) in the context of finance, politics, advertising and sin goods.
Along these lines, Thaler (1980) notes that Friedman and Savage (1948)’s analogy
focuses on ‘expert’ billiards players. Although they may act more rationally with their
cumulative experience, understanding and mapping the behaviour of all humans, includ-
ing intermediates and novices, is arguably as crucial if not more. This need is clearly
evident in the environmental domain, where studies have established that public and
expert evaluations of risk often diverge (Slovic, 1987), and preferences are heterogeneous
6He cited DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006)’s finding of how monthly payments gym - which is more
popular - generate higher profits for the gym compared to pay-as-you-go schemes, despite the latter being
underutilised by members.
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both within and across societies, i.e., people can be selfish, or conditionally or uncondi-
tionally cooperative (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Rustagi et al., 2010)), but also have distinct
norms for cooperation that rest on local economic patterns of everyday life (Henrich et al.,
2001). Understanding behaviour and aggregating preferences across a diverse pool of peo-
ple are especially relevant to address global environmental challenges like climate change,
which is considered ‘the greatest market failure the world has ever seen’ because of miss-
ing markets (Stern, 2008).
Individual contributions to environmental goods and many ‘green’ consumption be-
haviours are influenced by a host of standard or self-interested (e.g. if it is cost-saving),
and non-standard motivations (e.g., moral or normative motivations if it is the ‘right’
thing to do, or affective or hedonic motives if it ‘feels good’), which impacts individual’s
beliefs, preferences, and responses to environmental policies (Steg et al., 2014; Bamberg
and Mo¨ser, 2007; Nyborg et al., 2006). Many existing behaviours are ‘grey’ by default
because consumers do not actively make choices, for example on their electricity providers
or printer settings (Egebark and Ekstro¨m, 2016; Sunstein and Reisch, 2018). The exter-
nal costs of these grey behaviours can be persistent due to barriers to change habitual
behaviours and aggressive third-party marketing (Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002; Akerlof
and Shiller, 2015; Sunstein and Reisch, 2018).
Moreover, global environmental changes are notoriously complicated, because they
stretch across different spatial and time-scales. Effects are unevenly distributed across
the current population, many other (often unknown) costs will be borne by future gen-
erations. For this reason, the discount rate is pivotal to determine how best to distribute
benefits and costs from economic and environmental projects across time and space (Ar-
row et al., 2013). Concerns about uncertainty (e.g. growth in consumption and returns
to investment), ethics, and expert judgement impact the choice of discount rate; but
behavioural biases such as time inconsistent preferences additionally complicate policy
decisions. Against the standard assumption that individuals/planners discount the future
in a dynamically consistent manner, time-inconsistent preferences imply that plans made
at one point in time are contradicted by later behaviour (Pearce et al., 2003). Although
some note that the case for incorporating inconsistent time preferences into policy eval-
uation is weak especially if declining discount rates are used (Groom et al., 2005), there
are still resource management implications: for example, Hepburn et al. (2010) show that
if a planner is unable to commit to policy due to time-inconsistent preferences, the temp-
tation to re-evaluate the plan in future could lead to an inadvertent collapse in the stocks
of a natural resource stock.
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This brings into focus the uncertainty regarding interactions between and within dif-
ferent components of the socio-economic and biogeochemical systems, and their potential
economic and ecological consequences. This uncertainty is epitomised in debates about
the magnitude and effects of climate change, or the benefits or rate of loss of biodi-
versity, suggesting these changes are inherently unpredictable, and the associated ‘risks’
(i.e., known probabilities over different states of the world) unknowable. Based on this
fact, authors like Heal and Millner (2014) argue that the expected utility model, which
assumes exogenously given probability distribution over states of the world and prefer-
ences over uncertain choices, is a poor match to explain decision-making in these settings.
Finally, most environmental goods and services have public goods or common-pool
characteristics and exist across multiple geographical scales, and different (often conflict-
ing) institutional regimes: for example, climate regulation is a global public good and
rivers are shared by numerous nation-states and various communities within each (Kaul
et al., 1999). Thus, the resolution of environmental problems requires communication
and collective action over shared resources between heterogeneous agents under condi-
tions of uncertainty, and even the imminent threat of ecosystem collapse: for example
through negotiating environmental agreements over global emissions or water (Barrett,
1994; Carraro et al., 2007; Tavoni et al., 2011; Barrett and Dannenberg, 2012), or peer-
based arrangements over local common pool resources (Ostrom et al., 2002; Richter et al.,
2013). In these cases, understanding the social dimension of preferences, norms and re-
lationships between agents within their socio-ecological context is critical to facilitate
cooperation (Ostrom, 2000; Sethi and Somanathan, 1996).
In fact, the issues discussed above align with the five factors that Beshears et al.
(2008) call ‘red flags’ because they increase the likelihood of a wedge between revealed
and normative preferences and lead to bounded rationality: passive choice, complexity,
limited personal experience, third-party marketing, and inter-temporal choice. Conse-
quently, environmental policies that aim to correct market failures may go awry or be
ineffective at achieving its objective if it ignores behavioural failures or is based on in-
appropriate models of the standard rational agent (Hepburn et al., 2010). Going further,
behaviourally informed environmental policy may result in more protection at lower costs
(Shogren et al., 2010).
In light of this, I contend that both market and behavioural failures must inhabit the
minds of policy-makers and academics to glean rigorous insights into human behaviour
in environmental settings. Support for this stance and the need to have a more realistic
picture of human behaviour for environmental policy is reflected recent efforts to con-
solidate relevant studies under the umbrella ‘behavioural environmental economics’ over
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the past decade. I refer the reader to the following review papers for emerging debates
in this rapidly growing sub-discipline: Dasgupta et al. (2016), Croson and Treich (2014),
Hammitt (2013), Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman (2012), Shogren et al. (2010), Shogren
and Taylor (2008), Venkatachalam (2008), and Gowdy (2008), and a special volume in
the Environmental and Resource Economics journal in 2010.
However, neither the call for more research at the intersection of behavioural and
market failures nor apprehensions regarding the suitability of the rational actor model to
explain behaviour in environmental settings, are new. Indeed, some of the earliest writ-
ings that systematise behavioural failures does so within the context of market failure via
non-market valuation using stated preferences (SP) methods. Knetsch and Sinden (1984)
experimentally demonstrated that the divergence between the stated willingness to pay
(WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) persisted even with the use of actual money
payments and compensations, and in market transactions where individuals could bar-
gain to test the predictions of the Coase theorem (Kahneman et al., 1990). Behavioural
explanations put forward to explain the WTP-WTA divergence included anomalies like
the endowment effect, loss aversion and the status quo bias (Kahneman et al., 1990).7
Likewise, there are also methodological similarities between experiments and stated pref-
erence studies, as evident in the use of experimental methods to test values elicited from
hypothetical surveys (Carlsson, 2010). A challenge to the dominance of the rational actor
model also came from Ostrom et al. (1992) and others, who were experimentally illus-
trating bounded self-interest through and brought to light cases where self-governance of
the commons was possible.
This is much like the two-way traffic between environmental economics and be-
havioural economics noted by Heal (2007), who highlighted the environmental contri-
butions made by leading economic thinkers, such as Vernon Smith, Kenneth Arrow, and
Joseph E. Stiglitz amongst others. A similar argument can be made to illustrate the in-
terconnections between environmental and behavioural economics, by thinking of those
whose research advanced both fields and went on to win the The Sveriges Riksbank Prize
in Economic Sciences, including Vernon Smith, Elinor Ostrom, Daniel Kahneman, and
Richard Thaler, for their direct contributions to the discipline as previously discussed
in the body of this essay, as well as Amartya Sen (for his work on sustainable human
development, well-being and famines), Jean Tirole (who has worked on inter-linked issues
such as self-image and moral motivations, social norms, motivated reasoning, apart from
7The endowment effect refers to the increased value of a good to an individual when the good becomes
part of the individual’s endowment. This effect is seen as a manifestation of loss aversion, which is the
generalisation that losses are weighted substantially more than objectively commensurate gains. Status
quo bias refers to the tendency for people to adhere to the status quo because the disadvantage of leaving
it looms larger than the benefits of doing so (Kahneman et al., 1991).
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energy, climate change and environmental regulation), and Thomas C. Schelling (a pio-
neer in strategic analysis using game theory, which is used extensively to study behaviour
environmental dilemmas, and who has also written on climate change). Despite these
early intellectual connections, there is still scope for a more considerable convergence
in behavioural and environmental economics in several areas, including contributions to
and cooperation over shared natural resources, and choices under environmental risks
(Ostrom, 1998; Shogren et al., 2010; Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2012). The re-
search in this thesis attempts to bridge some of these gaps. It is inspired by and draws
on existing research at the intersection of environmental and resource economics, and
behavioural economics in a series of five papers using experimental methods as described
below in more detail.
A.4 Locating the papers in existing debates
In the following sections, I locate each paper within the larger debates and existing gaps
in the literature to outline it’s key contributions.
A.4.1 People’s choices to protect and value biodiversity, and
the environment: Papers 1 and 2
Global biodiversity loss is arguably one of the most urgent and intractable market failures
facing us today. Through an economic lens, it can be conceptualised as a case of complex
multiple overlapping public goods across different scales, because various species are lo-
cated in ecological niches within their natural habitats, which in turn can be aggregated
into different ecosystems. Given this, market prices - if present at all - are poor reflec-
tions of the underlying value of these assorted public goods. Consequently, biodiversity
is under-provisioned as reflected in the rapid and irreversible sixth mass extinction event
(Ceballos et al., 2015). But as noted by Helm and Hepburn (2012), the question of re-
source allocation towards biodiversity has been largely ignored by mainstream economics
despite the urgency of the issue.
There are arguably economic and ecological arguments to conserve biodiversity due
to the range of ecosystem, climate regulation, and wellbeing benefits it offers, besides the
ethical case for protection based on its intrinsic value (Polasky et al., 2012).8 Economic
8Other studies highlight leveraging co-benefits from conservation, poverty alleviation, and develop-
ment through market-based schemes like payment for ecosystem services and bioprospecting (Ferraro
and Hanauer, 2014; Palmer and Di Falco, 2012).
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arguments largely rest on how the net benefits of biodiversity are valued. Monetary values
are estimated through either revealed (e.g. travel cost) or more commonly stated prefer-
ence methods. As a case in point, Bartkowski et al. (2015) reports that more than 80% of
the studies applied either contingent valuation (CV) or choice experiments (CE) to value
biodiversity, in a comprehensive survey. From a policy perspective, valuing species con-
servation enables their inclusion in resource allocation decisions by ranking them against
competing for economic projects, allows for (possible) compensation, and most critically
communicates conservation needs in the language of economics which can be persuasive
to a wider (sometimes sceptical) audience (Atkinson et al., 2012).
However, several limitations to stated preference methods exist, many of which stem
from their inherent vulnerability to behavioural biases, not unlike other survey-based
methods. An interlinked issue is that the way and type of information provided to the
subjects influence their responses. Apart from the WTP-WTA disparity discussed briefly
in the previous section, the classic debate around the embedding effects and scope in-
sensitivity also illustrate this. Kahneman pointed out that the WTP increased taxes to
prevent the drop in fish populations in all Ontario lakes was only slightly higher than
the WTP to preserve the fish stocks in only a small area of the province, by Toronto
residents, whereas we may expect that the WTP should have been higher (in Kahne-
man and Knetsch (1992)).9. Another quintessential albeit under-explored finding is that
including information about intentionally caused ecological harm by humans in CV sce-
narios elicited higher WTP compared to the damage caused by nature. As people reported
feeling more upset and interested, this empirical result was termed the ‘outrage effect’
(Kahneman et al., 1993).
These and other anomalies lead to debates about the ability of CV method to cap-
ture ‘true’ preferences or WTP for conservation on the basis that stated WTP expressed
environmental attitudes and ideological values, the purchase of moral satisfaction, or the
‘warm glow’ from contributions instead. A core concern voiced by Kahneman and Knetsch
(1992) and others like Diamond and Hausman (1994) was that CV respondents tend to
disregard the characteristics of the public good – like it is magnitude – because they have
a certain amount they are prepared to contribute. While subsequent methodological ad-
vances such as the split sample scope test have addressed this issue, debates around these
questions are not settled. Carson (2012) notes that scope insensitivity is more likely when
a program is seen to provide multiple outputs, such as protecting different endangered
species. A fundamental challenge is to operationalise ecological science and the many
9See Carson (2012) and Kling et al. (2012) for excellent discussions on recent advances in the debates
on contingent valuation, including in relation to neoclassical economics, and Hausman (2012) for a critical
counter-perspective.
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definitions and measures biodiversity within an economic valuation framework because
it directly affects the valuation of benefits (Nunes and van den Bergh, 2001; Bartkowski
et al., 2015).
Instead of using SP methods or existing administrative data (e.g. in Metrick and
Weitzman (1998)), Paper 1 approaches these questions from a new angle by using an
incentive-compatible charitable giving game to explore people’s choices to protect biodi-
versity using a series of lab experiments. This allows us to study the robustness of the
‘charismatic megafauna effect’ and the ‘outrage effect’ in a new type of decision setting,
and with new informational interventions. It also allows us to check whether complex
habitats composed of both species elicit systematically different pro-social revealed pref-
erences. It additionally maps the causal effect of narrative-based audio-visual information,
and a non-pecuniary incentive of the public recognition of donors also impacts donations,
as this is strategy commonly employed by charitable organizations (Karlan and Mc-
Connell, 2014).
The potential for audio-visual media as an instrument for behaviour change is clear
from Paper 1, and numerous other studies which have the causal effect of movies on other
behaviours including voting turnout and preferences, fertility choices, even migration de-
cisions (DellaVigna and La Ferrara, 2015). But more empirical evidence is required in the
environmental domain. Most studies consider effects on climate documentaries by using
before-after surveys to look at changes in range of self-reported environmental behaviour
and intentions, attitudes, and beliefs (Howell, 2011). While promising and novel, they
are prone to endogeneity and sample selection concerns, thus complicating causal infer-
ence of the movie on actual behaviour (Howell, 2014). A notable exception is Jacobsen
(2011), who uses a difference-in-difference specification to show an increase in carbon
offset purchases of about 50 percent relative to the baseline for individuals living within
10 miles of a theatre showing An Inconvenient Truth. Moreover, most studies moreover
focus on movie exposure rather than content because exogenously varying content while
holding exposure constant (or a corresponding causal identification strategy) is challeng-
ing in field settings. Another open question, is whether behavioural change persists in the
long-run and the factors underpinning these behavioural dynamics: both Jacobsen (2011)
and Howell (2011) find that the increases in revealed and self-reported environmental
behaviour wash out over time.
Paper 2 builds on Paper 1 to investigate some of these questions and reports results
of a companion lab experiment. We analyse if watching biodiversity conservation videos
(with exogenously varied exposure and content) and donating, has unintentional spillover
effects on an individual’s the subsequent willingness to pay a green fee (WTP fee), and
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the willingness to donate time to an environmental campaign (WTD time). Our contri-
butions are as follows. First, we add to the literature on media effects on environmental
behaviour by attempting to measure both the direct and indirect causal short-run ef-
fects on different environmental behaviours and intentions. Second, we adopt a spillovers
framework, which pays special attention to the sequential nature of behaviour, and thus
maps out potential positive, negative or no spillovers. In this way we contribute to the
spillovers literature by looking at the unintentional pro-environmental consequences of
media interventions, rather than text or graphic information or incentives (see Dolan and
Galizzi (2015) and Truelove et al. (2014) for surveys).10 Third, we attempt to disentangle
some of the mechanics behind the spillover effects, by considering whether behavioural
similarity and subject pro-sociality, i.e., if they were past donors, affect the direction
and magnitude of any spillover effect. This builds on the nascent findings in environmen-
tal psychology, which flag these as probable but under-examined factors that influence
spillover effects (Whitmarsh and O’Neill, 2010; Margetts and Kashima, 2017).
To sum up, Papers 1 and 2 contribute to the behavioural environmental economics
literature by attempting to unpack factors driving people’s choices to protect biodiversity,
and identifying potential pathways to increase pro-socially. They highlight that people’s
choices could be influenced through innovative informational interventions like audio-
visual media, and careful attention needs to be paid to the narratives and stories pre-
sented in them, given the direct and indirect effects that they have on behaviour, and
the emotional reactions they elicit in audiences. Also, pre-existing differences across in-
dividuals (e.g. demonstrated pro-sociality through donations outside the lab) determine
responses to these interventions, and the extent to which behavioural spillovers occur.
The methodological approach, results, potential limitations, and way forward are dis-
cussed in Chapter 2 and 3 for Papers 1 and 2 in more detail.
A.4.2 People’s choices to protect themselves from air pollution:
Papers 3 and 4
Poor air quality from air pollution is another pressing challenge which has adverse effects
on human health and well-being, which exacerbates other environmental problems like cli-
mate change. It can be conceptualised as a negative externality and public bads problem
arising from the excessive release of pollutants like Carbon monoxide (CO), Nitrogen ox-
ides (NOx), and other particulate matter (PM) into the atmosphere from diffuse sources.
Worldwide, over 80% of people in urban areas lived in places where air quality levels were
10Conventionally unintentional behavioural spillovers of media content have been used to elicit inci-
dental emotion states (Dolan and Galizzi, 2015).
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deemed harmful by the World Health Organization, and 59% of the U.K. population lives
in areas where the level of air pollution is above the legal limits by some estimates (Lav-
ille, 2017). The adverse effects of polluted air have been linked to the higher likelihood of
traffic accidents (Sager, 2016), lower test scores (Ebenstein et al., 2016), poorer cognitive
function (Clifford et al., 2016), reduced subjective well-being including life satisfaction
and happiness (Dolan and Laffan, 2016), and even suicide attempts (Szyszkowicz et al.,
2010), apart from detrimental long-term and short-term health metrics like increased mor-
tality risk, cardiovascular and respiratory illnesses (Pope III et al., 2009; Currie et al.,
2014). Vehicular traffic is a crucial contributor: on average, transport is responsible for
one-quarter of the PM in the air. Keeping in mind that emissions need to be curbed on
the supply side, a fundamental question on the demand side is what motivates people to
protect themselves by reducing exposure or avoiding air pollution?
Economic research has placed a considerable focus on understanding avoidance be-
haviour, which is conceptualised as a type of preventive health behaviour undertaken
by individuals to reduce their exposure to environmental pollutants. Zivin and Neidell
(2013) note that ignoring the costly (in money and effort terms) actions individuals take
to protect themselves is problematic on three fronts. It can cloud pure biologic signals
in epidemiological research and lead to mischaracterizations of the welfare function in
economics. Encouraging avoidance through informational approaches is also an impor-
tant policy lever to empower citizens to take better decision to enhance their health and
wellbeing. That said, the bulk of literature on avoidance focuses on the effects of informa-
tion alerts on extreme pollution or smog days and their behavioural effects on reducing
outdoor activity (Zivin and Neidell, 2009; Janke, 2014; Saberian et al., 2017). There is
limited research on the ‘everyday’ avoidance choices taken by individuals to self-protect
against daily exposure or the psychological mechanisms underpinning individual these
avoidance decisions, both of which are crucial to painting a more comprehensive picture
of individual avoidance behaviour.
Expected utility theory (EUT) is foundational for how environmental economists think
about valuing and controlling risks to health and the environment. In this framework,
the degree of risk aversion is commonly put forward to explain inter-individual differ-
ences in the propensity of individuals to take risks or conversely protect themselves by
engaging in preventive health measures. But insights from behavioural economics show
that the EU model performs poorly in describing choices under risk: for instance, peo-
ple overestimate the likelihood of suffering from low probability but serious events but
underestimate high probability events (e.g. aeroplane versus car accidents) (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992). While some alternatives have been proposed, most notably cumulative
prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), they are yet to be widely incorporated
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into environmental economics to explain behaviour and as an input into policy (Shogren
and Taylor, 2008). Starmer (2000) provides a comprehensive review and highlights that
more field-based data can help advance the debates. Similarly, Gollier et al. (2013) note
that EUT is still most widely used to describe choice under risk, despite considerable
evidence of violations from lab experiments. The question then is, does risk aversion con-
sistently predict self-protection from air pollution in the field?
Due to the limited empirical evidence on this question, we can look to existing studies
that map risk preferences onto choice in other contexts. No clear answers are available
because the results are mixed. To illustrate, on the one hand, Anderson and Mellor (2008)
found that higher seat belt usage, lower smoking and drinking is associated with higher
risk aversion in a sample of students and adults from the USA. But on the other hand,
Rustichini et al. (2016) found no association between risk aversion and the number of
traffic accidents, credit scores or the body mass index in a sample of trainee truckers, also
from the USA, but they found a significant association with smoking status. Three dis-
tinct but interconnected explanations emerge from the literature. Firstly, psychologists,
and more recently economists point out that an individual’s propensity to take risks varies
across domains, i.e., an individual maybe risk-taking in the finance domain but not the
health domain (Weber et al., 2002; Barseghyan et al., 2011). Secondly, the type of risk
preferences measure and method, i.e., incentive-compatible lotteries using experimental
methods or self-reported surveys using questionnaire methods, can influence observed
empirical patterns partly because they capture risk-taking in specific behavioural con-
texts (Galizzi et al., 2016; Ioannou and Sadeh, 2016).11 Thirdly, studies considering a
narrow set of behaviours to represent decision-making in a domain are likely to present
an incomplete picture because of the propensity of individuals to compensate across a
range of actions within a domain as is evident from the previous discussion on behavioural
spillovers. For example, an individual may not wear a seatbelt because she drives on safer,
low-traffic routes.
To add to these debates, Paper 3 in Chapter 4 explores the links between risk aversion,
and everyday air pollution avoidance and risk-taking using a lab-in-the-field experiment
amongst a pool of urban cyclists. We know less about the everyday air pollution avoid-
ance and risk-taking choices made by cyclists despite the fact that cycling is an important
pro-environmental and health behaviour. There is also a concerted push to increase active
travel in global cities to reduce individual emissions from transport and tackle diseases
associated with sedentary lifestyles like obesity (Giles-Corti et al., 2016). The contribu-
tions of this paper are empirical and methodological, because it explores whether risk
11Galizzi et al. (2016) provides a comprehensive review on debates over the ability of different risk
measures to predict behaviour.
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preferences predict choices in two new behavioural domains amongst active travellers,
i.e., air pollution avoidance and risk-taking while cycling, and tests a variety of risk pref-
erence measures against self-reported behaviours in the field.
Paper 4 in Chapter 5 takes a new slant on understanding air pollution avoidance, by
considering whether persuasive social norms messaging can change avoidance behaviour.
In doing so, it aims to augment existing literature by looking at how to promote avoidance
using behavioural insights when individuals are outdoors. It also explores the psycho-
social underpinnings of such choices by considering the role of social norms. Persuasive
messaging that makes desirable social norms salient is widely considered a robust be-
havioural lever in diverse contexts including driving safety (Lawrence, 2015), energy,
water and other conservation behaviours (Allcott, 2011; Ferraro and Price, 2013; Gold-
stein et al., 2008; Dolan and Metcalfe, 2015), and antibiotics over-prescription (Hallsworth
et al., 2016). But it has failed to have impacts in other contexts like fees repayment (Silva
and John, 2017) and decisions to inflate tires for fuel efficiency gains (Yeomans and Her-
berich, 2014) (relative to informational control conditions), and in replication studies
using different populations (Bohner and Schlu¨ter, 2014). Other research has remarked
that treatment effects are heterogeneous, based on prior individual/household attributes:
for example, Ferraro and Price (2013) found that appeals to social norms elicited the
most considerable reductions in water use amongst among high-use households (also in
Allcott (2011)). These mixed and heterogeneous treatment effects raise questions about
whether and how informational interventions vary across contexts, and what factors can
explain underlying variations. Moreover, whether social norms messaging can change air
pollution avoidance behaviour is an open empirical question, as I am unaware of other
studies which have explored this question. The chief contributions from this exploratory
study are: to explore the additional benefits of using persuasive social norms messaging
compared to a control condition with health-risk information in a new behavioural con-
text and to underscore the role of prior beliefs as a driver of responses to social norms
information.
To recap, Papers 3 and 4 augment the existing literature by exploring various psycho-
social factors that could drive people’s everyday choices to protect themselves from en-
vironmental risks like air pollution while cycling, which is an increasingly policy-relevant
pro-environmental and health behaviour in urban contexts. In Paper 3, the data showed
that air pollution risk perception - rather than risk aversion - was correlated with avoid-
ance in this sample. The findings of Paper 4, suggest that prior beliefs about air quality
seem to guide responses to social norm interventions, which in turn augment debates
on which factors affect the efficacy of persuasive messaging to change behaviour across
different contexts. The methodological approach, results, potential limitations, and way
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forward are discussed in Chapter 4 and 5 for Papers 3 and 4 respectively.
A.4.3 People’s choices to cooperate and protect common pool
resources: Paper 5
The management of shared natural resources is a continuing struggle: for example, around
90% of the world’s fish stocks now fully or overfished and a 17% increase in production
forecast by 2025, with unfortunate environmental, food and livelihood security implica-
tions (FAO, 2016). Such scenarios have usefully been characterised as social dilemmas,
i.e., those interdependent situations where individuals face short-term incentives to max-
imise their self-interest leaving all those in society worse off. The pursuit of rational self-
interest is predicted to result in the over-extraction from the shared resource in the case
of an appropriation dilemma (e.g., in common pool resource (CPR) extraction games) or
under-provide the shared resource in a provision dilemma (e.g., public goods games).12
However, contrary to the standard ‘tragedy of the commons’ model (Hardin, 1968),
lab and field-based insights paint a more complex picture of behaviour in social dilem-
mas, because they reveal examples of both individuals acting pro-socially to cooperate
and failing to do so (Ostrom et al., 2002). For example, a standard finding from experi-
ments using linear voluntary contribution public goods game is that individuals contribute
around 40-60% of their endowment versus the predicted zero level of investment at the
Nash equilibrium in the first period, after which contributions typically tend to decline
(Chaudhuri, 2011). Similarly, in non-linear appropriation CPR games, individuals show
a pulsing pattern where seemed to increase their appropriation from the CPR until there
was a substantial reduction in returns, at which time they tended to reduce their invest-
ments (Ostrom, 2006). Subsequent work has aimed to unpack the drivers of cooperation,
by disentangling the effects of attributes of the resources systems and dynamics (e.g. sys-
tem dynamics and replacement rate), governance systems (e.g. monitoring institutions,
property rights, network structure), users (e.g. social norms and capital, types), and in-
teractions between them (Ostrom, 2009).
A policy question in the face of this possible pro-sociality is whether governments
should focus on strengthening local institutions which can support cooperation. Apart
from the fact that many successful case studies of local management rely on decentralised
12Ostrom (2006) defines a common-pool resource as ‘an irrigation system, a fishing ground, a forest,
the Internet, or the stratosphere is a natural or man-made resource from which it is difficult to exclude
or limit users once the resource is provided by nature or humans’ (pp. 151).
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local institutions (Ostrom et al., 2002), another concern is the worrying potential of top-
down policy incentive-based interventions to ‘crowd-out’ pro-social preferences due to
undermining moral sentiments or by changing the way obligations to preserve nature are
perceived by agents, reducing cooperation in the long-run (Bowles, 2008; Gneezy et al.,
2011). As noted by Noussair and van Soest (2014), communication and the use of peer-
to-peer enforcement mechanisms like punishments and rewards have received maximum
attention in the experimental literature. Communication, even if it is non-consequential
for payoffs, have been found to improve cooperation particularly if it is face-to-face, pos-
sibly because it allows players to coordinate their actions and enhances understanding
of the socially efficient strategy. Other studies similarly note that pro-sociality increases
with public visibility in strategic situations (Bohnet and Frey, 1999).
However, the effects of peer monitoring and sanctioning on cooperation are far less
robust. Peer monitoring which imposes some positive cost to the individual can be seen
as another type of pro-social behaviour, as it confers an environmental benefit to so-
ciety. Experimental evidence - most commonly from public goods experiments in the
lab - show that peer sanctioning can increase cooperation especially over the long-run
(Fehr and Gachter, 2000; Boyd et al., 2003; Ga¨chter et al., 2008). However, there are also
cases of anti-social punishment where cooperators are punished instead which can impede
the evolution of cooperation (Herrmann et al., 2008; Rand et al., 2010). Other features
which determine the effectiveness of peer monitoring include the institutional features
modelled in the experimental design like the group composition, punishment cost and
severity including the threat of expulsion, the opportunities for counter-punishment, and
more recently the structure of the monitoring and punishment network which restricts
the punishment opportunities available to agents (Nikiforakis, 2008; Cinyabuguma et al.,
2005; Carpenter et al., 2012; Leibbrandt et al., 2015; Boosey and Isaac, 2016). For exam-
ple, Leibbrandt et al. (2015) found that contributions to the public good are higher when
more punishment opportunities are available, but that punishment is also higher. Boosey
and Isaac (2016) observed that the network structure affects the incidence of anti-social
punishment.
Somewhat surprisingly, there is less research on peer punishment in non-linear CPR
appropriation dilemmas. The two main differences between linear voluntary public goods
games and non-linear CPR appropriation games are (i) the returns from appropriation
are non-linear to stimulate resource dynamics found in the field resulting in the increased
complexity of the payoff space, and (ii) the subtractability of resource units implying that
individuals can take from the shared resource endowment and reduce payoffs to others
in the group (Ostrom et al., 1992). In this setting pro-sociality by some agents can be
undone due to the selfish behaviour of others, making harvesting from the CPR ‘strategic
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substitutes’ (Noussair and van Soest, 2014). Existing research primarily investigates per-
fect peer sanctioning institutions, i.e., everyone can monitor and punish each other, and
paints a more pessimistic picture because it has a weaker effect on appropriation result-
ing in outcomes closer to the Nash equilibrium (Cason and Gangadharan, 2015; Ostrom
et al., 1992). This gap in the literature underlines the observation by Currarini et al.
(2016) that our understanding of factors related to more complex resource characteristics
and the role of network interactions in facilitating or hindering cooperation is relatively
limited.
The effect of imperfect peer monitoring and punishment on cooperation is empiri-
cally unclear. Thus, Paper 5 contributes to the existing literature by exploring how the
structure of imperfect monitoring and punishment networks affect appropriation and
punishment in a non-linear CPR dilemma, by using a lab experiment. To the best of
our knowledge, we are unaware of any other studies which elicit beliefs in either a non-
linear CPR dilemma or alongside the monitoring and punishment network architecture,
or applies network architectures to study imperfect peer monitoring institutions in a CPR
dilemma.
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Appendix B
Data Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Estimation strategy: Cragg-Hurdle model
We assume that all subjects are faced with a two-step decision problem i.e. the first step is to decide
whether to make a positive contribution, and the second step is then the decision of how much to give,
conditional on the willingness to give at all. This can be estimated using a Cragg-Hurdle model, which
treats the boundary value of £0 donations as a variable of analytical interest (Cragg 1971, Woolridge
2010). We can conceptualize donations as yi = di ∗hi, where yi is the quasi-continuous observed value of
the dependent variable, which are the donations made by subjects. The selection variable is di and takes
the value of 1 if subjects choose a positive donation amount (given the set of explanatory variables) and
0 otherwise (which act as a lower limit that binds the dependent variable). Thus;
di =
{
0 : ciγ + riδ + xiβ + i > 0
1 : otherwise,
}
(B.1)
From (B.1), ci and ri are the treatment dummies for species-habitat and cause-pubic recognition
treatment groups, and γ and δ are their coefficients respectively. xi and beta are the vector of other
explanatory variables and their coefficients, and i is the associated standard normal error term. Once
the subject has decided to donate, the second step of the decision problem is;
h∗i = ciα+ riθ + xiρ+ υi (B.2)
From (B.2), is the quasi-continuous latent dependent variable which is observed when di = 1. The
explanatory variables remain the same i.e. ci and ri are the treatment dummies for species-habitat and
Cause-Pubic Recognition treatment groups, xi is the vector of other explanatory variables. α and θ are
the coefficients on the treatment dummies and is the vector of coefficients on the explanatory variables,
and is the error term. Importantly the parameters of the treatment dummies in for both the selection
and latent dependent variables (i.e., di and h
∗
i ) may differ. This allows us to account for the fact that
the decision to give may be influenced by different factors than the decision on the amount to give. The
analysis was carried out in Stata using the churdle command in conjunction with the margins command
to estimate the average marginal effect.
References:
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Cragg, J. G. (1971). Some statistical models for limited dependent variables with application to the
demand for durable goods. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 829–844.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2010). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. MIT press.
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B.2 Additional tables and figures
Figure B.1: Distribution of donation for all observations (N=377)
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Table B.3: Donation with covariates: Study 1
Sample All Past Donors
Estimation method Tobit CH, Probability CH, Amount CH, Probability CH, Amount
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Species = 1, Lions 1.903** 0.428** 1.465 0.425* 1.506
(0.87) (0.21) (1.37) (0.25) (1.47)
Species = 2, Savanna 0.6 -0.102 0.66 -0.044 1.14
(0.92) (0.19) (1.46) (0.23) (1.53)
Cause = 1, Human 1.970** 0.165 2.953** 0.17 4.999***
(0.93) (0.21) (1.39) (0.24) (1.41)
Cause = 2, Human + Recognition 0.208 -0.085 1.084 0.111 3.822**
(0.92) (0.21) (1.49) (0.24) (1.58)
Past donor = 1, Yes -0.847 0.03 -1.31
(0.95) (0.20) (1.41)
Pro-environmental behaviour 1.380*** 0.164 1.529** 0.141 2.581***
(0.51) (0.13) (0.75) (0.15) (0.76)
Age 0.028 -0.006 0.074 -0.012 0.104
(0.06) (0.01) (0.09) (0.02) (0.11)
Gender = 1, Female 1.219 0.278 1.109 0.366 0.779
(0.86) (0.19) (1.40) (0.23) (1.50)
Job status = 1, WFT -3.113** -0.303 -5.731** -0.151 -5.637**
(1.37) (0.33) (2.62) (0.37) (2.61)
Job status = 2, WPT -3.26 4.329*** -7.539 4.249*** -10.475**
(2.27) (0.47) (4.69) (0.40) (5.21)
Job status = 3, Other -2.822* -0.14 -4.629* -0.373 -5.679**
(1.53) (0.37) (2.56) (0.43) (2.87)
Constant 12.78 0.658 14.377 0.946 -2.988
(14.87) (3.41) (21.88) (4.05) (24.91)
Observations 377 377 377 289 289
Session controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: donations (£0-25), all models use robust standard errors, with *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1. The Cragg-hurdle
model (CH) treats the hurdle (£0 donations) as probit (Probability, models 1 and 3) and the amount (£1-25) spent as a truncated linear
regression (Amount, models 2 and 4). For a one unit change in the predictor, the probit regression coefficients give the change in the z-score
or probit index, and the truncated regression coefficients give the predicted change in the dependent variable. The omitted groups are Bats
treatment group (control video without anthropogenic cause of endangerment and public recognition), Gender = 0-Male, Job = 0-Full time
student (FTS; WFT: Working full time, WPT: Working part time).
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Figure B.2: Reasons for not donating: Share of responses
Notes: Subjects could select their top two reasons for choosing to not donate from the drop down
list of options which included (in a randomized order): (a) Rather keep the money (keep£) (b) I can’t
afford to (c) I don’t trust the charity (CNT) (d) I don’t believe that my donation will make a difference
(no diff) (e) Other reason (other) (f) I already do my bit to help the planet (do my bit) (g) I don’t trust
this experiment (ENT) (h) The government should ensure that wildlife and their habitats are protected
(govt).
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Data Appendix for Chapter 3
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Table C.3: Direct effect: Media content on donations (with individual controls)
A ll S ub-group analysis
Hurdle type: Probability Amount Probability Amount
Hurdle models: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Cause = 1, Cause Video 0.249 2.282 0.19 -2.837
(0.22) (1.49) (0.57) (3.03)
Past Donor = 1, Yes -0.407 -5.812**
(0.41) (2.56)
Cause Video X Past Donor 0.0725 6.991**
(0.64) (3.32)
Video = 1, Lions 0.516* 2.301 0.474* 1.541
(0.27) (1.77) (0.27) (1.77)
Video = 2, Savanna 0.0246 -0.63 0.00817 -0.737
(0.25) (1.72) (0.25) (1.62)
Age -0.0169 -0.0082 -0.0169 0.017
(0.02) (0.12) (0.02) (0.11)
Gender = 1, Female -0.0738 -1.119 -0.0775 -0.809
(0.26) (1.77) (0.25) (1.79)
Full-time student = 1, Yes 0.0127 5.538** -0.00975 5.735**
(0.34) (2.45) (0.34) (2.42)
PEB 0.244 0.963 0.277 0.991
(0.19) (1.04) (0.20) (0.96)
Constant 7.259*** -0.712 8.595*** 4.411
(0.83) (7.01) (0.93) (7.02)
Observations 223 223 223 223
Session controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Video controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at subject-level in parentheses, *** p¡0.01, **
p¡0.05, * p¡0.1. Linear Cragg-hurdle model with donations is truncated at 0: the hurdle
is modelled as a probit regression model, and the amount donated as a truncated linear
regression. Session controls include subjects per session and session dummies. Video controls
includes dummies for video type (i.e., bats, lions and savanna videos). Individual controls
include age, dummies for gender and full-time student status, and PEB score.
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Appendix D
Data Appendix for Chapter 4
D.0.1 Distribution of responses across risk measures
Figure D.1: Histogram of responses Binswanger-Eckel-Grossman lottery task (BEG)
269
Figure D.2: Histogram of responses to General risk attitude measure (SOEP-G)
Notes: The SOEP-G question is recoded to take a minimum value of 1 and a maximum value of 11 from
the original SOEP question.
270
Figure D.3: Histogram of responses to Health risk attitude measure (SOEP-H)
Notes: The SOEP-H question is recoded to take a minimum value of 1 and a maximum value of 11 from
the original SOEP question.
271
Figure D.4: Histogram of responses to Lights (importance in cycling kit)
Notes: The question is reported in H.6 and the variable takes a minimum value of 1 and a maximum
value of 5.
Figure D.5: Histogram of responses to Helmets (importance in cycling kit)
Notes: The question is reported in H.6 and the variable takes a minimum value of 1 and a maximum
value of 5.
272
Figure D.6: Histogram of responses to Facemasks (importance in cycling kit)
Notes: The question is reported in H.6 and the variable takes a minimum value of 1 and a maximum
value of 5.
Figure D.7: Histogram of responses to Air Pollution Risk Perception (APRP)
Notes: The question is reported in H.7 and the variable takes a minimum value of 1 and a maximum
value of 11.
273
D.1 Behavioural validity I: Risk-taking
The results below provide the full specifications of the models in Chapter 4.
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D.2 Behavioural validity II: Avoidance
This section presents the full specifications of the regression models on risk measures and avoidance
presented in the Chapter 4. Due to limited space, some notes about the regression models are pre-
sented here. First, the variables of risk measures include BEG: Binswanger-Eckel-Grossman risk measure;
SOEP-G(H): German Socio-Economic Panel General (Health) risk attitude; Lights and Helmet: rating
of importance of item in a cycling safety kit. Second, the coefficients are the ordered log-odds (logit)
regression coefficients, where the response variable level is expected to change by its respective regression
coefficient in the ordered log-odds scale for a one unit increase in the predictor, while the other variables
in the model are held constant. Third, individual controls include cyclist type, cycling frequency, air
pollution knowledge, age, gender, ethnicity, income and education covariates. Omitted categories: Age:
<35; Gender = Male; Ethnicity = White; Income: <£32k; Education: <UG. Note the abbreviations:
BAMEO = Black Asian Minority Ethnic + Other, UG = Undergraduate degree. Survey controls include
surveyor, location and time of day factor covariates.
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D.3 Cross-context validity
Table D.7: Cross-stability I: BEG, SOEP-G and SOEP-H
Dependent variables: BEG SOEP-G SOEP-H
Ordered probit regressions: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
BEG 0.107** 0.123** 0.122** 0.066 0.090* 0.075
(0.049) (0.050) (0.055) (0.048) (0.049) (0.053)
Age = 2, 35-54 -0.060 -0.171 -0.045
(0.188) (0.166) (0.171)
Age = 3, >55 -0.630** -0.547 -0.342
(0.306) (0.353) (0.307)
Gender = 2, Female -0.187 -0.267 -0.319*
(0.196) (0.180) (0.175)
Ethnicity = 2, BAMEO -0.101 0.176 0.108
(0.209) (0.258) (0.235)
Income = 2, £32k to ≤ £64k 0.413 -0.053 -0.183
(0.300) (0.293) (0.282)
Income = 3, >£64k 0.462* -0.148 -0.053
(0.238) (0.229) (0.222)
Education = 2, UG -0.075 0.218 0.200
(0.236) (0.234) (0.241)
Education = 3, >UG -0.015 0.362 0.285
(0.279) (0.243) (0.256)
Observations 181 181 181 181 181 181 181
Survey controls Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is the score of each risk-taking behaviour from 1 (Never) to 5 (Always). All
models use robust standard errors. Significance levels reported at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table D.9: Cross-context validity III: Air pollution risk perception and risk measures
Ordered probit models: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BEG -0.019
(0.053)
SOEP-G 0.087**
(0.040)
SOEP-H 0.034
(0.035)
Lights 0.086
(0.082)
Helmet 0.099
(0.070)
Facemask 0.436***
(0.107)
AP knowledge 0.041 0.028 0.040 0.050 0.055 0.011
(0.072) (0.075) (0.073) (0.073) (0.076) (0.072)
Age = 2, 35-54 -0.205 -0.168 -0.199 -0.223 -0.181 -0.170
(0.175) (0.178) (0.175) (0.176) (0.177) (0.170)
Age = 3, >55 -0.475* -0.337 -0.429 -0.502* -0.412 -0.226
(0.283) (0.285) (0.284) (0.288) (0.286) (0.291)
Gender = 2, Female 0.393** 0.463** 0.425** 0.349* 0.368** 0.278
(0.188) (0.189) (0.188) (0.188) (0.186) (0.182)
Ethnicity = 2, BAMEO 0.281 0.286 0.280 0.278 0.260 0.144
(0.232) (0.229) (0.233) (0.235) (0.235) (0.233)
Income = 2, £32k to ≤ £64k 0.243 0.238 0.249 0.229 0.208 0.239
(0.306) (0.316) (0.311) (0.304) (0.303) (0.305)
Income = 3, >£64k -0.223 -0.217 -0.232 -0.273 -0.298 -0.129
(0.256) (0.253) (0.254) (0.250) (0.255) (0.250)
Education = 2, UG -0.185 -0.229 -0.200 -0.195 -0.203 -0.048
(0.250) (0.253) (0.249) (0.249) (0.251) (0.237)
Education = 3, >UG -0.133 -0.201 -0.156 -0.169 -0.178 -0.021
(0.281) (0.283) (0.280) (0.281) (0.285) (0.270)
Observations 181 181 181 181 181 181
Survey controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is Air pollution Risk Perception (APRP) from 1 (‘No risk at all’) to 11
(‘Extreme risk’). All models use robust standard errors. Significance levels reported at *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix E
Data Appendix for Chapter 5
E.1 Sample characteristics and balance tests
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Table E.1: Balance on covariates I (with sample characteristics)
Variables Categories All Control group Treatment group Test of equality
% Share Mean (s.d.) % Share Mean (s.d.) % Share Mean (s.d.) p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Perceived Air Quality- London (PAQL) 1.337 1.177 1.494 [0.433]
(1.309) (0.110) (0.159)
Air pollution knowledge 2.938 2.923 2.933 [0.891]
(1.243) (1.267) (1.225)
Cyclist type Recreational 24.860 1.75 25.560 1.758 24.180 1.744 [0.830]
Rec./Commuter 75.140 (0.433) 74.440 (0.431) 75.820 (0.439)
Cycle frequency <1 pm 2.210 4.09 2.220 4.132 2.200 4.056 [ 0.480]
1-2 pm 8.840 (1.037) 10.000 (1.046) 7.690 (1.032)
1 pw 9.390 6.670 12.090
2-4 pw 36.460 42.220 30.770
≥ 5 pw 43.090 38.890 47.250
Age 18 - 34 years 37.020 1.77 41.110 1.758 32.970 1.778 [0.608]
35 - 54 years 50.830 (0.700) 42.220 (0.621) 59.340 (0.776)
≥ 55 10.497 14.444 6.593
PNTS 1.657 2.222 1.099
Gender Male 66.300 1.36 65.560 1.330 67.030 1.389 [0.360]
Female 32.600 (0.546) 32.220 (0.473) 32.970 (0.612)
PNTS 1.100 2.220 0.000
Ethnicity White 76.800 1.30 76.670 1.319 76.920 1.289 [0.605]
BAME 16.020 (0.598) 17.780 (0.630) 14.290 (0.566)
PNTS 7.180 5.560 8.790
Income <£32k 22.380 2.66 24.660 2.692 20.000 2.633 [0.761]
£32k to <£64k 16.780 (0.938) 10.960 (0.939) 22.860 (0.942)
≥ £64k 41.960 49.320 34.290
DK/PNTS 18.880 15.070 22.860
Education <UG 20.99 2.14 20 2.099 21.98 2.178 [0.507]
UG 48.07 (0.787) 46.67 (0.775) 49.45 (0.801)
>UG 27.07 28.89 25.27
PNTS 3.87 4.44 3.3
Sample size 181 90 91
Notes: The table presents the % share of the sample falling in each category of the covariate, with the means, and standard deviation in parentheses. The
p-value (in square parentheses) test on the test of equality is based on the null hypothesis of no difference in the observed proportions for a variable between
the control and treatment groups using a Pearson chi-squared test (Gender, Cyclist type, Ethnicity, categorical variables) or Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
test (PAQL, Air pollution knowledge, Age, Eduction, Income, ordinal variables). PAQL: Perceived Air Quality in London, pm: per month, pw: per week,
DK/PNTS: Don’t know/Prefer not to say, BAMEO = Black Asian, minority ethnic + Other, UG = Undergraduate degree.
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Table E.2: Balance on covariates I (other pre-treatment baseline variables)
Covariates p-value
BEG risk preferences 0.199
SOEP-G, general willingness to take risk 0.529
SOEP-H, willingness to take health risks 0.675
Importance of lights in a cycling kit 0.809
Importance of helmets in a cycling kit 0.703
Importance of facemasks in a cycling kit 0.114
Air pollution risk perception 0.661
Surveyor 0.739
Location 0.366
Time of day 0.494
Notes: The p-value (in square parentheses) test on the test
of equality is based on the null hypothesis of no differ-
ence in the observed proportions for a variable between the
control and treatment groups using a Pearson chi-squared
test (Surveyor, Location, Time of day, categorical vari-
ables), Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (BEG risk, Lights, Hel-
mets, Facemasks, 5-point scale, ordinal variables) or a t-test
(SOEP-G, SOEP-H and Air pollution risk perception, 11-
point scale ordinal variable).
E.2 Robustness checks
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Table E.3: Heterogeneous treatment effects: Perceived Air Quality in London (PAQL),
with individual controls
Treatment effect by sample: ATE ATT
Logit model: (1) (2)
Treat = 1, Social norms 1.530** 1.586**
(0.695) (0.756)
High PAQL = 1, Optimistic about air quality = 1, 1- 0.628 0.596
(0.611) (0.641)
Treat (=1) x High PAQL (=1) -1.542* -1.436*
(0.803) (0.861)
AP knowledge -0.097 -0.105
(0.157) (0.168)
Age = 2, 35-54 0.073 0.242
(0.384) (0.423)
Age = 3, >55 -0.761 -0.674
(0.656) (0.650)
Gender = 2, Female 0.541 0.630
(0.425) (0.443)
Ethnicity = 2, BAMEO 0.268 0.347
(0.473) (0.532)
Income = 2, £32k to < £64k 0.147 -0.274
(0.599) (0.635)
Income = 3, ≥ £64k -0.721 -1.093**
(0.530) (0.549)
Income = 4, DK/PNTS -1.174* -1.631**
(0.683) (0.728)
Education = 2, UG -1.052** -1.247**
(0.478) (0.523)
Education = 3, >UG 0.022 -0.018
(0.530) (0.547)
Education = 4, PNTS -0.454 -0.368
(0.993) (1.027)
Constant -0.841 -0.225
(0.991) (1.109)
Observations 177 160
Survey dummies Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Binary
outcome variable of choice of face-mask (or not). Independent variable: exposure to nor-
mative message. Moderator variable: Binary variable of Perceived air quality in London
(High or Low PAQL). The logistic regression coefficients give the change in the log odds
of the outcome for a one unit increase in the predictor variable. Surveyor dummies in-
clude surveyor and location dummies. ATE= Average treatment effect, ATT= Average
treatment effect on treated. 4 observations dropped upon the addition of controls due to
quasi-separation.
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Table E.4: Heterogeneous treatment effects: Perceived Air Quality in London (PAQL),
sub-group analysis
Treatment effect by sample: ATE ATT
Logit models: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat = 1, Social norms 1.810** 1.826* 1.909** 6.532**
(0.721) (1.014) (0.746) (3.006)
AP knowledge -0.581 0.500
(0.457) (0.803)
Age = 2, 35-54 -0.031 0.194
(0.981) (1.246)
Age = 3, >55 0.896 4.989**
(1.978) (2.499)
Gender = 2, Female 0.996 1.218
(0.954) (1.779)
Ethnicity = 2, BAMEO 0.287 6.560*
(1.274) (3.639)
Income = 2, £32k to < £64k 1.181 1.409
(1.434) (1.340)
Income = 3, >≤ 64k -0.887 -1.539
(1.177) (1.344)
Education = 2, UG -1.614 -4.885**
(1.117) (2.196)
Education = 3, >UG -0.351 -2.923
(0.911) (1.931)
Constant -1.740 0.675 -0.955 -2.293
(1.274) (2.111) (1.428) (4.787)
Observations 50 46 45 41
Survey dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Binary outcome variable of choice of face-mask (or not). Independent variable: ex-
posure to normative message. Sample restricted to those optimistic about air quality,
i.e., those who reported above median PAQL. The logistic regression coefficients give
the change in the log odds of the outcome for a one unit increase in the predictor
variable. Surveyor dummies include surveyor and location dummies. Four observa-
tions dropped due to quasi-separation.
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Appendix F
Data Appendix for Chapter 6
Table F.1: Experimental parameters in relation to CPR literature
Features OGW 1994 AMR 2006* KL 2014* CG 2015 Experiment
Endowment 25 100 50 12 25
a 23 6 6 18 25
b 0.25 0.0125 0.25 0.4 0.25
w 5 1 1 2 5
Group size (n) 8 4 4 4 4
Fee-to-Fine Ratio 0.25 to 0.50 - - 0.33 0.33
-tokens 8 80 40 8 16
-payoff 70 180 112.5 37.6 189
-tokens 4.5 50 25 5 10
-payoff 83 225 90 52 225
Nash (N)/Pareto (P) tokens 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
N%P payoff 84 80 80 72 84
Notes: OGW 1994: Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (1994); CG2015: Cason and Gangadharan (2015); AMR2006:
Apesteguia and Maier-Rigaud (2006); KL 2014: Kingsley and Liu (2014); Experiment refers to our study. * No
punishment.
References
Apesteguia, J., and Maier-Rigaud, F. P. (2006). The role of rivalry: public goods versus common-pool
resources. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50(5), 646-663.
Cason, T. N., and Gangadharan, L. (2015). Promoting cooperation in nonlinear social dilemmas
through peer punishment. Experimental Economics, 18(1), 66-88.
Kingsley, D. C., and Liu, B. (2014). Cooperation across payoff equivalent public good and common
pool resource experiments. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 51, 79-84.
Ostrom, E., Gardner, R., and Walker, J. (1994). Rules, games, and common-pool resources. Univer-
sity of Michigan Press.
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Table F.3: Effect of beliefs on appropriation by network
Networks: Complete Undirected circle Directed circle Directed line
Random-effects models: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Beliefs -0.07 0.122** -0.124 0.009
(0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09)
Beliefs(t-1) -0.013 0.038 0.091 0.189**
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09)
Other’s (mean) appropriation (t-1) 0.063 0.005 0.056 0.01
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Appropriation (t-1) 0.363*** 0.280*** 0.494*** 0.516***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Node degree = 2 -0.642
(0.69)
Sex = 1, 1 -0.7 -0.017 -0.608 -1.264*
(0.56) (0.63) (0.71) (0.75)
Experience 0.394 0.072 0.112 -0.498
(0.33) (0.39) (0.31) (0.38)
Economics = 1 0.384 -1.079* -0.037 -0.223
(0.60) (0.56) (0.95) (0.75)
Constant 9.193*** 8.381*** 8.364*** 6.949***
(1.35) (2.14) (1.60) (2.18)
Observations 786 469 525 551
Number of subject 60 36 40 42
Session dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Round dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the subject level, and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The Complete
network is the omitted category.
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Table F.11: Received punishment: Pooled sample
Regression models: Random Effects Probit
Pooled sample (1) (2)
Treatment = 1, Undirected circle 3.557* 0.544***
(1.864) (0.131)
Treatment = 2, Directed circle -4.511*** -0.690***
(1.588) (0.139)
Treatment = 3, Directed line -2.970** -0.243
(1.361) (0.166)
Positive deviation-Pareto 0.899*** 0.082***
(0.105) (0.007)
Negative deviation-Pareto -0.281* -0.056***
(0.146) (0.019)
Stage 1 payoff -0.013 -0.000
(0.010) (0.001)
Sex = 1, 1 1.626** 0.111
(0.683) (0.072)
Experience -0.160 -0.056
(0.384) (0.040)
Economics = 1 -1.163 -0.055
(0.748) (0.101)
Constant 4.168 -0.645***
(2.793) (0.229)
Observations 2,670 2,670
Number of subject 178 178
Session + Round + Individual controls Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the subject level, and *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure F.1: Predicted marginal effect of positive deviations from Pareto over Network
treatment on punishment received
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Figure F.2: Predicted marginal effect of negative deviations from Pareto over Network
treatment on punishment received
302
Figure F.3: Predicted marginal effect of positive deviations from Pareto over Network
treatment on probability of receiving punishment
303
Figure F.4: Predicted marginal effect of negative deviations from Pareto over Network
treatment on probability of receiving punishment
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Table F.12: Deviation in beliefs and other’s (mean) appropriation by networks
Outcome: Deviation between Beliefs-Others (mean) appropriation
Random-effects model: (1)
Treatment = 1, Undirected circle -0.753
(0.92)
Treatment = 2, Directed circle 0.421
(0.88)
Treatment = 3, Directed line 1.41
(1.10)
Period = 1, Rounds 6-10 -0.673
(0.44)
Period = 2, Rounds 11-15 -1.293***
(0.35)
1.treat#1.period, Undirected circle x Rounds 6-10 0.897
(0.68)
1.treat#2.period, Undirected circle x Rounds 11-15 1.286**
(0.64)
2.treat#1.period, Directed circle x Rounds 6-10 1.290**
(0.60)
2.treat#2.period, Directed circle x Rounds 11-15 1.650**
(0.66)
3.treat#1.period, Directed line x Rounds 6-10 -0.193
(0.70)
3.treat#2.period, Directed line x Rounds 11-15 0.328
(0.72)
Sex 0.388
(0.42)
Experience 0.403
(0.28)
Economics -1.462***
(0.44)
Constant 1.726**
(0.79)
Observations 2,880
Number of subject 192
Session dummies Yes
Individual controls Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the subject level, and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The Complete network
and period 1 (rounds 1-5) are the omitted categories.
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Appendix G
Supplementary materials for
Chapters 2 and 3
G.1 Video scripts
G.1.1 Non-charismatic species script: Giant Leaf-nosed Bat
Introduction: This is the Giant Leaf-nosed Bat. The Giant Leaf-nosed Bat lives in the Savanna, in
sub-Saharan Africa. Bats live in groups, called colonies, in cave habitats but also roost in tree canopies,
hollow trees and dense vegetation.
Ecological role: Bats have an important role in maintaining the health of the local ecosystem. Bats
maintain the equilibrium in the Savanna ecosystem by consuming a large number of insects. They also
feed on fruit and nectar, and in the process, they pollinate numerous plants and disperse seeds.
Endangerment: Although the Giant Leaf-nosed Bat was once a widespread species, the population is
now in significant decline. It is classified as a Threatened species, but it has disappeared in the majority
of its range. Habitat loss and conversion has led to a number of Bat populations becoming small, isolated
or extinct.
Information on anthropogenic threat: But the main threats to Bats are indiscriminate mining in
limestone caves and disturbance of their roosting spots by local populations. Illegal hunting for their pelts
and their meat has also lead to a population decline in some areas.
End: The Giant Leaf-nosed Bat is one of Africa’s greatest treasures, but needs protection to survive.
G.1.2 Charismatic species script: African Lions
Introduction: This is the African Lion. The African Lion lives in the Savanna, in sub-Saharan Africa.
Lions live in groups, called prides, in open grasslands or woodlands.
Ecological role: Lions have an important role in maintaining the health of the local ecosystem. Lions
maintain the predator-prey equilibrium in the Savanna. By hunting medium and large herbivores, lions
keep their populations in check to prevent over-grazing and habitat destruction.
Endangerment: Although the African Lion was once a widespread species, the population is now in
significant decline. It is classified as a Vulnerable species, but it has disappeared in the majority of its
range. Habitat loss and conversion has led to a number of Lion populations becoming small, isolated or
extinct.
Information on anthropogenic source of threat: But the main threat to Lions comes from local
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populations that kill them to protect themselves and their livestock. Illegal hunting for trophies and meat
has also led to a population decline in some areas.
End: The African Lion is one of Africa’s greatest treasures, but needs protection to survive.
G.1.3 Complex habitat script: Bats and Lions in the African
Savanna
Introduction: This is the Savanna, in sub-Saharan Africa. The African Savanna is the largest grassland
and woodland ecosystem in the world and supports a wide variety of plant and animal life.
Ecological role: The diverse community of organisms that live here depend on each other to form a
complex food web. The African Lion for instance has an important ecological role in the savanna. By
hunting medium and large herbivores, lions keep their populations in check to prevent over-grazing and
habitat destruction. The Giant Leaf-nosed Bat is another species that has an important role in maintain-
ing local ecosystem health. By consuming large numbers of insects, bats keep their population in check.
They also pollinate numerous plants and disperse seeds.
Endangerment: Although the Savanna - and its wildlife - was once widespread, this ecological habitat
is now in significant decline. The African Lion, for example, is classified as Vulnerable, and has disap-
peared in the majority of its range. The Giant Leaf-nosed Bat is also Threatened, and missing in its
native range.
Information on anthropogenic source of threat: Intensive farming, deforestation and over-grazing
have led to the removal of naturally occurring Savanna vegetation and habitats. Other threats from hu-
mans to both lions and bats are killings by local populations as well as illegal hunting for meat and body
parts.
End: The Savanna grassland and its endangered animals - such as the Lion and the Bat - are some of
Africa’s greatest treasures, but need protection to survive.
G.2 Video links
Bats – Control: https://youtu.be/hg28VbhLbAA
Bats – Cause: https://youtu.be/cQVT7wJ0hoQ
Lions – Control: https://youtu.be/k-KVGQSizgE
Lions – Cause: https://youtu.be/2nF_mrfsdwU
Savanna – Control: https://youtu.be/yKA60PevI9w
Savanna – Cause: https://youtu.be/AErTDRa0XaU
G.3 Sequence of photos with links
The videos are intended only for education/research purposes as in this paper. All photos were taken
from Wikipedia, Wikimedia, Flickr, Google images., Search terms included Africa, Savanna, Lion, Leaf
nosed bat. Images used were available under the creative commons license and/or for reuse for non-
commercial purposes. Hyper-links are provided by the source name and date wherever available. No
copyright infringement is intended.
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G.3.1 Bats and Lions
1 Intro: “Please clear your mind of all thoughts and feelings.” (20 seconds)
2 Single individual in habitat 1
2a Bats: Frank Vassen, 2010:https://www.flickr.com/photos/42244964@N03/4315234399
2b Lions: Kevin Pluck, 2004: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/73/Lion_
waiting_in_Namibia.jpg
3 Savanna landscape 1: Ikiwaner, 2008: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kiang_West_
savanna.jpg;
4 Savanna landscape 2: CT Cooper, 2011:https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Savanna_
towards_the_north_from_Lion_Rock_in_the_LUMO_Community_Wildlife_Sanctuary,_Kenya.
jpg
5 Pair of individuals
5a Bats: Charlesjsharp, 2013: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Commerson%27s_
leaf-nosed_bats_hipposideros_commersoni.jpg
5b Lions: Robek, 2006: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pair_of_lions.jpg
6 Single individual in habitat 2
6a Bats: David Dennis, 2007:https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bat_in_a_Cave.
jpg
6b Lions: Anette Mossbacher:https://anettemossbacher.photoshelter.com/image/I0000sRSnFv.
8ONg
7 Group/family in habitat 1
7a Bats: US Geological survey 2014:https://www.flickr.com/photos/usgeologicalsurvey/
14539308013/in/photolist-o9MKJn-eouGhy-87sHDx-enV1oH-8YbKC7-nw2uSV-dfZFyX-6iTy5p-dnfyQT-ba2uwz-qi3uK3-ndK8gJ-6RjnW5-8YbKWC-nB9ZKt-5P612Q-oefrHy-ob4i9Y-reeExY-m7SDug-4U2VMY-4Ncoxm-9uAP8d-B2LTg5-5Tow9
7b Lions: Benh LIEU SONG 2012:https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Lions_Family_
Portrait_Masai_Mara.jpg
8 Group/family in habitat 2
8a Bats: BBC 2014: http://www.bbc.co.uk/nature/life/Horseshoe_bat
8b Lions: amanderson2: https://www.flickr.com/photos/amanderson/4685708477/in/photolist-894tTc-kV2z8f-7DvLd5-hMcJNj-dqfs2L-iN2rmv-baxggB-96dQCP-23PAmA-23LjMd-23LkmG-4Zwcae-8EEvuZ-8EHGF9-dzskwi-ceCvA1-75Dk3P-9bV48z-8eQG8A-8zvdQG-bTQpVc-PrhNs-biewCe-3Wynt-hUCp4X-xNw3q-afr
9 Single individual
9a Bats: Micheal Pennay 2009: a.%09https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hipposideros_
diadema_(3933426171).jpg
9b Lions: Corinata 2008: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Lions_hunting_Africa.
jpg
10 Ecological role photo
10a Bats with pollen: Merlin D Tuttle 2015: https://www.flickr.com/photos/usdagov/15472782607
10b Lions eating: Samuele Cavadini, 2010: https://www.flickr.com/photos/fusion68k/2385374947
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11 Single individual in habitat 3
11a Bats: Coke and Som Smith photography and travel: http://www.cokesmithphototravel.
com/wildlife-of-sri-lanka.html
11b Lions: Drew Avery 2009: https://www.flickr.com/photos/33590535@N06/3527041123
12 Single individual in habitat 4
12a Bats: Coke and Som Smith photography and travel: http://www.cokesmithphototravel.
com/wildlife-of-sri-lanka.html
12b Lions: freestock.ca, 2008: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Lion_Female_Kruger_
National_Park.jpg
13 Habitat loss: deforestation/tree burning: Frank Vassen 2010: https://commons.wikimedia.org/
wiki/File:Slash_and_Burn_Agriculture,_Morondava,_Madagascar.jpg
14 Deceased individual
14a Bats: Patricia Litton, 2012: https://www.flickr.com/photos/plitton/8001828633/in/
photolist-Cfx41m-o3FWsj-AmSpoN-qSP1DT-bY57F3-xzbkL5-rKQhNp-Bkkwj9-qDeUbH-QGTawe-r2QwPH-BJjZ9F-rHXo52-r6hhk7-s3hKrx-r6hnoo-s3hniz-r6uj5K-r6tV8c-r6hkXC-s39GAA-rKFUXq-rZZmdL-rKHsJb-rKHnWA-rKGc7j-rKH
14b Lions: Africa Geographic blog, 2014: https://africageographic.com/blog/damaraland-lion-dead/
15 Cause treatment: Illegal hunting
15a Bats: Stan Dalone 2007:https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bats_for_eating_
in_Laos.jpg
15b Lion: accessed from Flickr, creative common license, but removed
16 Single individual in habitat 7
16a Bats: Frank Vassen 2010: Phttps://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Commerson%E2%
80%99s_Leaf-nosed_Bat,_Tsimamampetsotsa,_Madagascar.jpg
16b Lions: rcrhee, 2013: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Amboseli_Lion_(Kenya,
_Day_2).jpg
G.3.2 Savanna
1 Intro: “Please clear your mind of all thoughts and feelings.” (20 seconds)
2 Savanna opening: Gossipguy 2008: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Upland_South_
Africa_Savanna.jpg
3 Savanna landscape 1: Ikiwaner, 2008: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kiang_West_
savanna.jpg;
4 Savanna landscape 2: CT Cooper, 2011: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Savanna_
towards_the_north_from_Lion_Rock_in_the_LUMO_Community_Wildlife_Sanctuary,_Kenya.
jpg
5 Single individual lion in habitat
5a Lions: Kevin Pluck, 2004: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/73/Lion_
waiting_in_Namibia.jpg
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5b Lion’s ecological role photo: Samuele Cavadini, 2010: https://www.flickr.com/photos/
fusion68k/2385374947
6 Single individual bat in habitat
6a Lions: Frank Vassen, 2010: https://www.flickr.com/photos/42244964@N03/4315234399
6b Bat’s ecological role photo: Merlin D Tuttle 2015: https://www.flickr.com/photos/usdagov/
15472782607
7 Habitat loss, deforestation/tree burning:
7a Individual Lions: freestock.ca, 2008: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Lion_
Female_Kruger_National_Park.jpg
7b Individual Bats: Coke and Som Smith photography and travel: http://www.cokesmithphototravel.
com/wildlife-of-sri-lanka.html
8 Cause: Intensive farming, overgrazing: Hobgood, 1987 – 1991: https://commons.wikimedia.org/
wiki/File:Typical_Bandundu_savanna_village.jpg
8a Deceased Lions: Africa Geographic blog, 2014: https://africageographic.com/blog/damaraland-lion-dead/
8b IDeceased Bats: Patricia Litton, 2012: https://www.flickr.com/photos/plitton/8001828633/
in/photolist-Cfx41m-o3FWsj-AmSpoN-qSP1DT-bY57F3-xzbkL5-rKQhNp-Bkkwj9-qDeUbH-QGTawe-r2QwPH-BJjZ9F-rHXo52-r6hhk7-s3hKrx-r6hnoo-s3hniz-r6uj5K-r6tV8c-r6hkXC-s39GAA-rKFUXq-rZZmdL-rKHsJb-rKHnWA-rKGc7j-rKH
9 Lion/Bat/Savanna collage:
9a Lions: dutchbaby 2009: http://www.cokesmithphototravel.com/wildlife-of-sri-lanka.
html
9b Bats: Coke and Som Smith photography and travel: https://www.flickr.com/photos/
godutchbaby/4081148859
9c Savanna: CT Cooper, 2011: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Savanna_towards_
the_north_from_Lion_Rock_in_the_LUMO_Community_Wildlife_Sanctuary,_Kenya.jpg
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G.4 Snapshots of Experimental interface
Figure G.1: Instructions for watching film
Figure G.2: Donation page
Notes: Films with Bats and Lions films only have a single picture of the individual embedded in this
donation appeal photo, and the size of each photo image is held constant across groups. Note that all
groups have a default donation on the slider of 0. Interventions without the offer of public recognition
lack the following paragraph starting with, “To publicly acknowledge your donation ‘The Beaver’. . . ”
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Figure G.3: Donations receipt and further payment instructions
Figure G.4: Affect questions
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Figure G.5: Willingness to Pay a green fee (WTP)
Figure G.6: Willingness to Donate time (WTD)
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G.5 Debrief sheet
Study on economic decision making and social issues Thank you for participating in this exper-
iment.
This study aims to uncover how participants respond to different types of media content of biodiversity
conservation films. Specifically, the study examines if different types of species or information about the
conservation issue impacts [economic decision making, through the donation] or how people feel after
watching the film. First all participants watch a short movie. [They can then decide to donate some or
any part of their endowment to an organization working on wildlife conservation, if they so wish (Africa
Wildlife Foundation).] Then, they state the amount of affect (i.e. emotional states) they feel after watch-
ing the movie.
All the data from the experiment is anonymised, private and confidential. Please note that some of the
photographs of the bats included photographs of different bat species, other than the Giant leaf nosed
bat. This was due to the scarcity of photos for the focus species.
If subjects would like more information about the study, please contact the researcher at email.
Notes: Text in italics for was used in debrief form for Study 1 only.
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Appendix H
Supplementary materials for
Chapters 4 and 5
H.1 Instructions
H.1.1 Survey implementation
Notes on data collection: The data was collected at the Prudential Ride London Festival during 28-30
July 2017. The data collection venues were the Olympic Park and ExCel Exhibition Centre on 28 July
2017, and Green Park/The Mall. All venues attracted spectators, cyclists and their families, and had
numerous cycling-themed event and merchandise stalls. The Olympic Park and ExCel Exhibition centre
venues were selected because they were the only active PRL events on 28 July 2017. The Green Park/The
Mall was selected for data collection during 29-30 July, because all cycling events were routed through this
venue. It also had the largest festival zones for spectators. To minimise procedural variance, all surveyors
were trained and undertook pilot surveys, the week prior to the survey. They all dressed identically and
followed the same opening script. If the participant answered yes to three qualifying questions, she was
handed the tablet with the survey open at the consent form. After agreeing to participate, subjects were
shown the brief preamble to clarify the rules of the survey including answering alone and truthfully.
When we consider the number of observations by location, surveyor and time of day (table B1), it is
clear that the majority of responses were collected in Green Park/The Mall (164/181 observations).
315
Table H.1: Survey variables and balance on covariates
Variables Category Control group Treatment group Test of equality All
p-value
Location GP/Mall 61 68 0.494 129
ExCel centre 15 10 25
Olympic park 14 13 27
Surveyor Surveyor 1 7 7 0.739 14
Surveyor 2 25 24 49
Surveyor 3 27 34 61
Surveyor 4 31 26 57
Time of day Morning 26 32 0.366 58
Afternoon 64 59 123
Sample size 90 91 181
Notes : The table presents the number of observations (share of total) collected by survey variable for the
treatment and control groups. The p-value is from a chi-squared test, which tests the null hypothesis of
differences in distributions in between the control and treatment groups.
Figure H.1: Opening script
Figure H.2: Preamble
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H.1.2 Note on risk perception
Apart from risk aversion, an individual’s subjective perception of the risk associated with different choices
or the risk inherent in a specific situational context, has been identified as another key dimension of risk in
economics and psychology. Under the EUT framework, individuals can hold subjective risk probabilities
which guide decision making when objective probabilities are unknown. In psychology, the risk-return
model proposes that the perceived riskiness of a particular choice, determines attractiveness of that
choice, alongside risk preference and the perceived benefit (Weber et al., 2002). It emphasizes that both
risk preferences and risk perceptions are domain-specific, and that the perceived risk attached to differ-
ent choices explains a significant proportion of the variability of a person’s level of apparent risk taking
across risk domains. An important body of work has established that risk perceptions are contingent
on a variety of factors apart from cognitive processes, objective probabilities or access to information
about them. These include the role of group-level socio-cultural and political factors conceptualized in
the socio-cultural paradigm, and people’s emotional reactions to risky situations in the psychometric
paradigm (Weber, 2001; Slovic et al., 2004; Slovic and Peters, 2006). Perceived risk is also an important
variable that is linked to the uptake of preventive health and pro-environmental behaviours, in the Health
Belief Model (Rosenstock et al., 1988) and the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1985, 1991).
The behavioural validity of risk perception has been empirically explored both in relation to health
and environmental risks. Most studies find higher risk perception attached to negative outcomes (e.g.
morbidity or mortality), events (e.g. climate change or accidents) or technologies (e.g. GM foods), is
associated with behavioural intentions or decisions to self-protect or mitigate the risk.1 For instance,
higher risk perception has been linked to the lower acceptance and consumption of GM food (Lusk
and Coble, 2005), reduction of beef consumption due to mad cow disease (Pennings et al., 2002), lower
risk taking behaviour in traffic (Ulleberg and Rundmo, 2003) and speeding (Machin and Sankey, 2008),
greater willingness to mitigate climate change (Leiserowitz, 2006; Spence et al., 2011, 2012), greater
frequency of breast cancer screenings and the uptake of mammographies (Goldzahl, 2017; Carman and
Kooreman, 2014; Katapodi et al., 2004), attempts and intentions to quit smoking (Lin and Sloan, 2015)
and decisions to purchase flood insurance policy (Petrolia et al., 2013). Psychological studies note the
‘white male’ effect in risk perception research, i.e., the tendency for a larger proportion of white men tend
to judge risks as lower compared to women and minority ethnic groups (Finucane et al., 2000; Kahan
et al., 2007; Whitmarsh, 2011; Kahan et al., 2011).
Risk perception has also been measured using experimental and questionnaire methods. Experimental
and incentive-compatible methods are most commonly used in the economics literature to elicit rankings
of mortality (or environmental) risk (e.g. in Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2006) or through scoring rules
(Andersen et al., 2014). Questionnaire methods can be further divided into three (broad) types of risk
perception measures and their corresponding theoretical foundations. The first pertains to hypothetical
survey questions asking subjects to rank the probability of different contracting risks or various diseases
(similar to experimental methods; e.g. ).2 Secondly, the DOSPERT scale elicits the perceived riskiness of
different actions (perceived risk and benefit), as previously discussed. Thirdly, subjects rate the subjective
1In the related environmental and health valuation literature, the perceived risk of contracting diseases
or environmental hazards is also measured. To illustrate, Gerking et al. (2014), measure perceptions of
morbidity and mortality risk from skin cancer and leukaemia, to recover willingness to pay to reduce the
risk and the value of statistical life.
2Weber (2001) call this the axiomatic measurement paradigm, as it subjectively transform objective
risk information (i.e., possible consequences of risky choice options such as mortality rates or financial
losses and their likelihood of occurrence.
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concern, seriousness or severity a particular risk is to themselves (and/or their loved ones) using either
multi-item (e.g. in Lusk and Coble (2005)) or single-item survey questions (e.g. in Kahan et al. (2012)).
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H.1.3 Survey questions and variables
Figure H.3: Binswanger-Eckel-Grossman (BEG) risk measure question
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Figure H.4: Socio-Economic Panel-General (SOEP-G) risk measure question
Figure H.5: Socio-Economic Panel-Health (SOEP-H) risk measure question
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Figure H.6: Importance of items in safety kit question
Figure H.7: Air Pollution Risk Perception (APRP) question
Figure H.8: Risk-taking behaviours while cycling question
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Figure H.9: Air pollution avoidance behaviours question
Figure H.10: Facemask choice question
Figure H.11: Barreriers to facemask question
Notes on survey questions:
Risk questions BEG risk measure is obtained from Crosetto and Filippin (2016). The SOEP-G
and SOEP-H questions are obtained from the German Socio-Economic Panel survey. To measure
attitudes to items in the cycling kit, a separate question (from figure H.6) id modified from previous
studies such as XXX. To measure air pollution risk perception, a single item response following
Kahan et al. (2016) study on Climate Change risk perception is used, as is presented to subjects
on a separate screen (figure H.7).
323
Figure H.12: Prize draw instructions
Air pollution knowledge: Subjects also answered two questions that measured their prior
knowledge about air pollution. Variants of these questions are commonly used in studies on inter-
personal comparisons of knowledge of air pollution and climate change (e.g. Leiserowitz et al.,
2010, DEFRA 2011). An aggregate air pollution knowledge score is constructed by adding up the
points to both questions, where the minimum score is 0 and the maximum score is 5. I randomize
the question order, as well as the order of the answer choices for each question, to mitigate any
ordering effects. The two questions are as follows: Air pollution knowledge- question 1 : Subjects
were asked ‘Which of the following cause air pollution in cities? Please select all that apply.’,
and options include Oxygen (O2), Hydrogen (H), Nitrogen dioxide (NO2), lead and heavy metals,
Carbon monoxide (CO), particulate matter (PM 2.5, PM 10) and Don’t know. The four correct
answers are NO2, lead and heavy metals, CO and particulate matter. Each correct answer earns
one point. Air pollution knowledge- question 1 : Subjects were asked ‘Which of the following do you
think contributes most to air pollution in London? Please choose one.’ Subjects get an additional
point for the correct answer, which is ‘Vehicle emissions’.
Question order: Subjects were first exposed to risk questions, followed by questions on cycling,
and then air pollution. Within each survey module, the order of the questions (and items within
each question if relevant) was randomized.
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Appendix I
Supplementary materials for
Chapter 6
I.1 Instructions
Instructions:
This is a study on economic decision making. If you read the following instructions carefully, you can,
depending on your decisions and on the decisions of the other participants in the experiment, earn money.
All earnings on your computer screen are in experimental tokens. Experimental tokens will be converted
to real Great Britain Pounds (GBP) at the end of the experiment at the rate of 25 experimental tokens
= GBP 1.
Introduction
In this experiment, you will participate in 15 identical decision-making periods. Each period consists of
two decision stages (Stage 1 and 2) which will be described in detail below. Before the first period, you
(and all other participants) will be assigned by the computer to one of the four types labelled A, B,
C or D. This assignment depends solely upon chance. Each network contains one Type-A player, one
Type B player, one Type C player and one Type-D player. There are an equal number of participants
of Type-A, Type-B, Type-C and Type-D in the room. Everyone’s type will remain the same throughout
all 15 periods of the experiment.
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The relationship between types is illustrated below. Type-A can observe Type-B, Type-C and Type-
D, Type-B can observe Type-C, Type-D and Type-A, Type-C can observe Type-D, Type-A and Type-B,
and Type-D can observe Type-A, Type-B and Type-C. When you enter Stage 1 you will be informed of
your type in the dialog box on the top of the screen along with a picture of this network.
Every period begins with the computer assigning you to a four-person network or group (yourself
and three other participants). Remember that each network contains one Type-A player, one Type B
player, one Type C player and one Type-D player. Everyone’s type will remain the same throughout all
15 periods of the experiment. In every period one participant of each type is equally likely to be chosen
to be in a particular group. The network or group formed in each period depends solely upon chance
and does not depend on groups formed in previous periods.
Stage 1
In Stage 1 of every period, you receive an endowment of 25 experimental tokens. You will decide to
place your tokens in either or both of two accounts: a Private Account and a Common Account. The
total number of tokens you place in either or both accounts must add up to your endowment of 25
tokens. Your total earnings from Stage 1 (for each period) are the sum of your returns from the Private
Account and Common Account. Everyone has to make the decision at this stage and has the same returns.
Earnings from your Private Account: For each token you place in the Private Account you
generate a return of 5 tokens. Your earnings from the Private Account depend only on the number of
tokens you place in your private account and generate a return only to you.
Earnings from the Common Account: Each token placed in the Common Account generates
a return that depends on the total number of tokens invested in the common account by all members
in your group (including you) and your share of the total tokens placed in the common account in that
period.
Assume a total of X tokens are placed in the Common Account by all your group members (including
you). The return to your entire group from the Common Account is 25X − 0.25X2 tokens.
For instance, assume a total of X=4 tokens are placed in the Common Account by all your group
members (including you). The earnings to your whole group from the common account are;
25 ∗ (4)− 0.25 ∗ (4)2 = 96 tokens
Your share of this total group return equals the number of tokens you placed in the
Common Account divided by the total tokens placed in the Common Account by your
group (Tokens you place in Common Account/X).
Following on from the example above, assume you placed 1 token in the Common Account. Then
your share of the total Common Account earnings is 1/4 and your earnings from the Common Account
are:
(1/4) ∗ 96 = 24 tokens
Thus, from stage 1 your total earnings are given by;
326
Y ourEarnings = Private Account Earnings + Common Account Earnings
= [5 ∗ Tokens you place in Private Account]
+ [
(Tokens you place in Common Account)
(Total Tokens in Common Account orX)
∗ (25X − 0.25X2)]
The earnings table attached below describes your total potential earnings (sum of Private Account
and Common Account earnings; in tokens) that correspond to different token placements (in steps of five)
in the Common Account by you (first row) and the three others in your group (first column). Remember,
you can assign any number of tokens into your Private and Common Accounts as long as they add up
to your endowment of 25 tokens. All participants use the same earnings table.
On your computer screen during Stage 1, you can calculate your expected earnings from your token
allocation to your Private and Common Accounts, and your estimate of the total number of tokens
allocated by the three other group members to the Common Account. Use the mouse to click on the
Private and Common Account input boxes and use the keyboard to fill in the number (without decimals)
of tokens between 0 and 25 that you wish to allocate to that account. Do the same for your estimate of
the total number of tokens allocated by the three other group members to the Common Account.
To calculate your expected earnings based on your estimate of the other group members’ Common
Account token allocation, and your allocation, please press the calculate button. If you are happy with
your token allocations, click Confirm and Continue to proceed to next round. If you want to revise your
allocations or your estimate, please key in new values and proceed in the same way. Remember, you can
only enter your estimate of the total number of tokens allocated by the three other group members to
the Common Account. This is not their actual decision.
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Once you press Confirm and Continue, your decisions cannot be revised. This completes Stage 1 of
each period. After all members of your network or group have made their decisions, your earnings from
the Stage 1 will be displayed. Please click the Continue button to proceed to the Stage 2.
Stage 2
In Stage 2, you will observe the choices made by the other participants in your network. A line between
any two types represents that they are connected and the arrowhead points to the participant whose
decision is observed. For instance, if you are a Type-A participant, you can observe the decisions of
Type-B, Type-C and Type-D and so on. This information is given to you in the table on your computer
screen. Each participant can observe only allocations of those to whom they are connected in the network.
By assigning Deduction Points, you can now decide if and by how much to reduce the earnings of
the participant whose allocations you can observe. Each of the other participants will also decide if and
by how much to reduce the earnings of the participant whose allocations they can observe.
You must decide by how much you wish to reduce the earnings of each of the other participants with
whom you are connected, by filling in the number of Deduction Points for each of them. If you do not
wish to reduce the earnings of another participant, you must enter 0. Reducing the earnings of other
participants is costly to you. Assigning one deduction point to another participant reduces your earnings
by 1 token. Each deduction point received by a participant reduces their earnings by 3 tokens.
Total Cost of Deduction Points you assigned = Sum of Deduction Points assigned Total Cost of Deduction Points you received =
3 ∗ (Sum of Deduction Points you received)
After, and if you have entered deduction points, click the Calculate button to check the Total Cost
of Deduction Points you assigned. If you are want to revise your decision, key in another number. To
confirm your decision, press Confirm and Continue. If you cannot observe other’s decisions press Confirm
and Continue. This completes the Stage 2 of each period.
When a period ends, the computer will inform all participants of their total earnings and the Total
Cost of Deduction Points assigned and received. Please click the Continue button to proceed to the next
period, which will start with the computer forming new groups of participants in networks. Remember,
15 periods will be conducted and you will receive a new endowment of 25 tokens in each period.
Earnings
Your earnings in each period will be calculated in tokens as follows:
Y our F inal Earnings = (Y our Total Earnings from Stage 1)
− (Total Cost of deduction points you assigned)
− (Total Cost of deduction points received)
This sum is positive or will be zero if it is negative. Thus, if Stage 1 earnings are reduced to be-
low zero through cost of assigned and received deduction points, total earnings for that period will be zero.
At the end of the session, you will be given your earnings from a randomly selected round out of the
15 rounds played. Additionally, players who accurately estimate the expected allocation of each of other
three payers will earn 4 tokens for each correct estimate.
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Rules
1. Please remain silent until the end of the last period and then wait for further instructions.
2. Please do not talk to anyone during the experiment.
3. Please remain alert during the experiment.
4. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and we will come to you to address any doubts
you may have.
5. Your participation and any information about your earnings will be kept strictly confidential.
Test Questions
1. Please write down how much to invest in your private and the common account.
2. How much should the sum of your token placement in your private and common accounts add up
to?
3. How much should the sum of your token placement in your private and common accounts add up
to?
4. What are your total earnings (earnings from private + earnings from common account; consult
earnings table) if the three other participants place 0 in the common account?
5. If you invest 25 tokens in the Common Account and the three other participants invest a total of
75 tokens, what are your total earnings?
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I.2 Snapshots of experimental interface
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